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Appendix............................................................................................1269
INTRODUCTION
During the 2000-2001 Supreme Court term, the Justices came
perilously close to deciding that non-Indians can never be subject to
1
suit in American Indian tribal courts. While the Court did not go
that far, it continued its trends of divesting tribes of jurisdiction over
non-tribal members and permitting increasingly onerous forms of
2
state regulation within tribal territorial boundaries. If these trends
are not reversed, self-determination, which must include diverse
forms of economic development and legal self-sufficiency, will remain
elusive for tribes. What is striking about the Court’s recent decisions
is not their novelty. Since 1991, the Court has decided twenty-nine
cases involving federal Indian law questions, and twenty-three of
3
those were decided against the tribes or tribal litigants. Rather, what
is curious is the absence of voices from the highest bench articulating
the defensible position that the Court ought not to, without clear
Congressional indication, be engaged in such extensive common law
decisionmaking in an area that has been clearly committed to the
4
legislative branch. The silence may not be deafening to most, but it
rings loud in the ears of tribal advocates: of the twenty-three cases
5
decided against tribal interests, twelve were unanimous.
Cass Sunstein has described the current Court as being controlled
by Justices whose jurisprudential tendencies are “minimalist,”

1. See Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001) (holding that tribal courts lack
jurisdiction over state officials in tort action concerning claims arising from state
officials execution of a search on tribal lands for evidence of an off-reservation
crime).
2. See id. at 2311-12 (noting that state sovereignty does not end at reservation
borders, and emphasizing state authority to regulate tribal members, even on tribal
lands, in furtherance of legitimate state regulatory scheme); see also Atkinson Trading
Post v. Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001) (holding that tribe lacks taxing authority over
non-tribal members on non-Indian fee lands within reservation boundaries).
3. See Case Chart at Appendix. Among the twenty-three, I include three cases in
which the outcome was mixed, with one issued decided in favor of the tribal litigant,
and one decided against the tribal litigant. See generally Okla. Tax Comm’n v.
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995); Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen
Band of Potawatami Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
4. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (explaining prior decisions that
recognize Congress’ “plenary” authority in the area of American Indian tribal
policy).
5. See Case Chart at Appendix. Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001) is
included in the twelve unanimous decisions, but one should note that the Hicks
Court was united in its judgment and not in its reasoning. Justice O’Connor filed a
concurrence in which she departed significantly from the majority’s reasoning, and
also suggested a different course for the case on remand. See Part III.D infra for a
detailed discussion of Hicks.
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meaning they do not issue broad rules (their opinions are “narrow”)
and tend not to base their decisions on deep or unitary theories
6
(their opinions are “shallow”). The members of the current Court
who are most likely to rule in favor of tribal interests—Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter—constitute, along with Kennedy and
7
O’Connor, the minimalist core of the Court. Yet these Justices
frequently have joined in or authored unanimous opinions, whether
8
minimalist or not, that defeated tribal interests. Could it be, then,
that judicial minimalism is inconsistent with opinions that favor
tribes? At first glance, it may appear that this is the case. The
strongest recent proponent of tribal sovereignty—Justice Thurgood
Marshall—is associated with opinions that declare broad rules and
9
often are accompanied by deep justifications.
This paper
demonstrates, however, that the current Justices can remain faithful
to the procedural tenets of minimalism and still draft opinions that
do not diminish tribal sovereignty. In addition, this paper asserts that
what Sunstein posits as minimalism’s substance, which is the
promotion of democratic deliberation, is better served by judicial
decisions that do not divest tribes of aspects of their sovereignty. In
order to arrive at this second conclusion, however, one must take a
critical stance towards minimalism as a theory of jurisprudence in the
10
Indian law context. Its purported substance is often under-served by
opinions (like several recent ones) that nonetheless can be readily
11
described as narrow and shallow.
More disturbingly, judicial
opinions that are shallow, whether narrow or not, may in fact conceal
the assumptions underlying their outcomes in a manner that actually

6. CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 10-14 (1999) (noting that the two central characteristics of minimalism are
narrowness and shallowness).
7. See id. at 9 (describing each of the five Justices as minimalists).
8. See Case Chart at Appendix (documenting the minimalist core of the Court’s
rulings against tribal interests in a number of different cases).
9. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)
(holding that States may not tax the income of tribal members who live and work
within reservation boundaries); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)
(ruling that the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 fails to grant a private cause of action
to enforce its guarantees). These opinions, authored by Justice Marshall, are two of
the most important Indian law opinions of the modern era. Justice Marshall also
wrote twelve other decisions involving Indian litigants, taking an intellectual interest
in the field that remains rare among Supreme Court Justices. See also Rebecca
Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of Justice
Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495, 496 (1994)
(describing Marshall’s opinions as sensitive to the separate, sovereign character of
the Indian nations).
10. See infra Part IV (examining theories of minimalism and applying them to
Supreme Court Indian law decisions).
11. See infra Part III.A, B.
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12

Such is the case with judicial
stifles democratic deliberation.
opinions that define tribal jurisdiction without sufficiently airing the
latent, and inherently normative, assumptions about the role of the
13
third sovereign in our republic.
Part I describes minimalism and affirms that the core of the
current Court generally attempts to adhere to some form of it. Part
Two first provides an overview of federal Indian law, remaining
agnostic as to which scholarly account best describes the cases. The
point of such agnosticism is to remain consistent with the
minimalists’ apparent aversion to deep or unitary theories of
decision-making. Regardless of whether one describes Indian law
from one scholarly viewpoint or another, however, one must still
grapple with the inescapable normative nature of the enterprise.
Part II, therefore, also emphasizes (and endorses) the normative
unity in Indian law scholarship despite differences in doctrinal
theory. Finally, Part II begins the exploration of why minimalists
might feel constrained to stray from doctrinal principles supporting
tribal sovereignty. Starting in the late seventies, the Court embarked
on a path of circumscribing tribal authority, finding that tribes lacked
the power to govern non-tribal members in certain circumstances
and allowing increasingly elaborate forms of state regulation within
Indian Country. By the time the minimalist core jelled, it could have
seemed that the narrowest and shallowest way to rule in Indian cases
was to follow these precedents.
Part III takes a close look at some of the minimalist Court’s Indian
law decisions. A surprising number are unanimous, indicating quite
clearly that something more than minimalism is at work. Abetting
the minimalists’ aversion to re-conceptualizing recent cases are the
maximalist, but generally anti-tribal, tendencies of the remaining
14
justices. Thus, a negative interest convergence (or perhaps lack-ofinterest convergence) helps explain the unusual number of
unanimous decisions against tribal litigants. Six unanimous opinions:
15
16
Nevada v. Hicks, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, Strate v. A-1
17
18
Contractors, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, Alaska v. Native

12. See infra Part III.C, D.
13. See infra Parts III, IV (evaluating cases involving tribal sovereignty).
14. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (describing a political interest
convergence that explains why Brown struck down intentional segregation). In this
piece, I borrow the term to describe a much more micro-level convergence on the
Court itself.
15. 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001).
16. 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001).
17. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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19

Village of Venetie Tribal Government, and Cass County v. Leech Lake Band
20
of Chippewa Indians, are discussed in detail. These cases highlight
the risk of a theoretically minimalist approach, which obscures deep
assumptions underlying decisions.
One particularly pernicious
assumption underlying recent Indian cases is that tribal sovereignty is
a dated notion, and that it should be scaled back to comport with
non-Indian expectations.
Part IV contends that minimalism’s substance, which is to preserve
and promote democratic deliberation, is best served by decisions that
leave questions of tribal status to other branches of government. A
true minimalist—one committed to its substance and not just its
form—should accept a default rule of refusing to divest tribes of
aspects of their sovereignty unless Congress has clearly done so. This
rule would curb the Court’s forays into undemocratic free-lancing in
21
the world of Indian common law.
With this substantive
commitment in place, the minimalist core of the Court could resume
its procedurally minimalist approach to Indian law cases. In fact,
given the particularized nature of the field, an approach that resists
laying down broad rules and instead decides cases on their particular
22
facts is peculiarly appropriate. The “scattering forces” in Indian law
that make doctrinal unity evasive lend themselves to contextual
incrementalism. That incrementalism need not be incoherent if it is
based on an underlying normative commitment to fostering the
endurance of the ancient, yet ever-evolving, political relationship with
Indian tribes.
For Indian tribes, the problem with the Court’s current approach is
far more than a jurisprudential or theoretical one. It impinges on
their ability to administer justice and to grow and adapt to changing
social and economic contexts. This Article demonstrates that while
tribes can live with Indian law minimalism redeemed, they will suffer

18. 533 U.S. 329 (1997).
19. 522 U.S. 520 (1997).
20. 524 U.S. 103 (1998).
21. See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1999)
[hereinafter Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism]. In this article,
Professor Frickey conducts a searching review of cases involving tribal jurisdiction
over non-members, and determines that any coherentist account of the decisions
fails both as a descriptive and normative matter. He concludes that the Court often
engages in a peculiarly unguided and unreflective form of common law decisionmaking. Id. at 7-8.
22. See CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW: NATIVE
SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-9 (1987) (describing the
various strands of legislation, policy, and doctrine that push Federal Indian law in
inconsistent directions).
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irreparably under the status quo approach that chips away at their
sovereignty, one case at a time.
I.

MINIMALISM AND THE CORE OF THE COURT

Several scholars have taken the position recently that with respect
23
to judicial review, the less the better. Cass Sunstein can be counted
among this group. But his book, which describes the current Court’s
approach as well as propounds a normative theory of jurisprudence
24
based thereon, attempts to steer somewhat of a middle ground.
Sunstein self-consciously acknowledges the parallels between his
approach and Alexander Bickel’s famous advocacy of the “passive
25
virtues,” but Sunstein also attempts to distinguish his theory from
26
Bickel’s. According to Sunstein, the current Court is not opposed to
27
Nor should the Court
invalidating statutes, nor should they be.
refuse to weigh in on evolving questions of individual rights. When it
engages in either of these, however, it should do so cautiously,
allowing unresolved issues of deep controversy to be debated in other
28
forums. Sunstein calls his approach “judicial minimalism.” In this
section, I first describe Sunstein’s minimalism, and then provide
some (minimal) corroboration of his description of Ginsburg, Breyer,
Kennedy, O’Connor and Souter as minimalists.
Minimalist judges decide cases before them, but leave many things
29
30
undecided. They do not lay down broad rules. They are “alert to
31
the problem of unintended consequences.” They are aware of their
32
They attempt to attract
existence in a heterogeneous society.

23. See generally LINO A. GRAGLIA, In Defense of Judicial Restraint, in SUPREME COURT
ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 135, 160-62 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds.,
1982) (supporting judicial restraint); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION
(1997); ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES:
THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989); ANTONIN SCALIA, COMMON-LAW COURTS IN
A CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, IN A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 23-25 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)
(analyzing judicial review).
24. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 6.
25. Compare SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, with ALEXANDER H. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962).
26. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 40 (summarizing the ways in which minimalism
differs from judicial restraint, including minimalism’s neutrality with respect to
overturning legislation).
27. See id. at x (writing that judicial minimalism cannot be defined by the term
“judicial restraint” because “restraint” is too limited).
28. See id. at xiii (noting that a minimalist court refuses to issue a clear rule in the
hopes that the democratic process will resolve the issue).
29. See id. at ix (stating a procedural characteristic of minimalism).
30. Id.
31. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at ix.
32. Id.
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33

support for their rulings by not basing decisions on unitary theories.
Essentially, minimalist judges are judges who know their place. But
Sunstein makes the case for minimalism as more than just a means of
34
constraining the least democratic branch. According to Sunstein,
minimalism has both procedural and substantive aspects, which go
35
hand in hand. Procedurally, minimalist cases serve minimalism’s
36
substance, which is to promote democratic deliberation.
Regarding the procedural aspects of minimalism, minimalist
37
opinions are both “narrow” and “shallow.” Narrowness means that a
court decides the case at hand, based on its particular facts, and does
38
not lay down broad rules. Narrowness is not the equivalent of what
others have termed judicial restraint, because narrow decisions may
39
or may not invalidate statutes. If they do, however, they do so on
grounds particular to the case at hand. Sunstein provides examples
40
of recent narrow cases, including United States v. Virginia, and Romer
41
v. Evans. In Virginia, the Court struck down the state’s policy of
single-sex admission at its elite military college, but left open the
possibility that a state could present a government interest substantial
42
enough to warrant single sex education.
In Romer, the Court
invalidated a state law prohibiting measures banning discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation, but did not indicate whether or
how other state regulation of sexual orientation would be analyzed
43
under the Constitution.
By comparison, a “wide” decision is one that lays down broad and
clear rules that will govern in many circumstances, not just those
44
45
presented by the facts of the case. Roe v. Wade is a wide decision.
Roe did not just strike down the Texas law, but declared state

33. Id. at ix-x.
34. See id. at xiv (arguing that judicial minimalism promotes democracy).
35. See id. at ix.
36. See id. at x.
37. See id. at 10-11.
38. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 11 (defining “narrowness” as decisions that are
“no broader than necessary to support the outcome”).
39. See id. at 10-11 (noting that the decisions of minimalists are unique and
specific to the facts of the relevant case).
40. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
41. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
42. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (holding that a sex-based classification is not
proscribed per se, but is subject to a heightened standard of review and concluding
that, in this case, the justification for the classification failed to be persuasive, and
thereby violated the Equal Protection Clause).
43. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
44. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 11 (noting that the Marshall and Warren Courts
favored “wide” decisions that set forth general rules, an approach that is popular with
current Justices Scalia and Thomas).
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1974).
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prohibition of abortion unconstitutional in a wide range of
46
circumstances.
By shallow, Sunstein means that the Court does not come to
47
consensus on issues of basic principle. Thus the absence of a deep
theory for decision-making characterizes shallow opinions, which are
based instead on what Sunstein terms “incompletely theorized
agreements.”
By this, he means that no unitary theory of
interpretation, whether statutory, constitutional, or over-arching,
under-girds or is articulated in an opinion as the basis for its
48
resolution.
Shallowness allows “the possibility of concrete
judgments on particular cases, unaccompanied by abstract accounts
49
about what accounts for those judgments.” Romer, in addition to
50
being narrow, is shallow. The Court did not state the underlying
reasons for deciding that the Colorado statute violated equal
51
protection principles. Was the Court analogizing sexual orientation
to other protected classes? Or was the Court relying on a theory of
the Constitution as guaranteeing access to political processes? The
52
decision is opaque on these questions.
Minimalism’s substance is to promote the core value of the
democratic process, which Sunstein describes as political
53
deliberation.
He asserts that judicial minimalism, appropriately
described and exercised, improves democracy by encouraging the
other political branches and the public to debate difficult and
54
unresolved questions in a more directed and principled manner. A
Court that takes discussion of divisive issues of morality off of the
table by deciding too widely or too deeply stifles political
deliberation, whereas narrow and shallow decisions promote such
55
deliberation.
Sunstein discusses several cases in which he thinks the minimalist

46. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 37 (noting that the Supreme Court went
beyond the facts in Roe and issued a broad ruling protecting a woman’s right to have
an abortion).
47. See id. at 13.
48. See id. at 11-14, 247-58 (declaring that minimalist Justices favor incompletely
theorized agreements examining the case as presented rather than invoking
complicated legal theories that would prevent a consensus).
49. See id. at 13.
50. See id. (illustrating that Romer exemplifies shallowness).
51. See id. at 141 (arguing that the minimalist majority struck down the state
policy without offering any judicial opinion about the sexual orientation protections
offered by the Constitution).
52. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 16, 137-62 (discussing Romer in detail).
53. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 14.
54. See id. at 259.
55. See id. at 27.
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In the
form of the opinion did reinforce political deliberation.
“right to die” cases, for example, the Court ruled both narrowly and
57
shallowly. It declined to find that substantive due process included
58
a fundamental right to die on the facts presented by the cases. But
it left open the possibility that, in certain extreme circumstances,
59
such a right might be found.
The Court declined to speculate,
60
however, on the underlying basis for such a right. The majority of
the Court thus bounced the difficult questions surrounding when
and how to allow very ill people to make choices about whether to
continue living back to state legislatures. The Court’s reticence
allowed debate to continue on an issue about which there is
61
considerable underlying moral disagreement. Moreover, the Court
left the issue open in a way that informs the debate. Legislatures and
the public are on notice that, even if the “right to die” is never found
to be a constitutional right, there are certainly circumstances in
which the state ought to have very good reasons for forcing someone
62
to continue living in unbearable pain with no hope of recovery.
Sunstein is cautious, one might even say minimalist, in his advocacy
of minimalism. He acknowledges that sometimes wide and clear
rules extending well beyond the facts of a particular case may be
necessary to provide “participants in democratic processes . . . a clear
63
background against which to work.” Wide rules also may, in some
circumstances, prevent errors in future cases that stem from
64
uncertainty. The preconditions to appropriate minimalism exist:
(1) when judges are proceeding in the midst of (constitutionally
relevant) factual or moral uncertainty and rapidly changing
circumstances, (2) when any solution seems likely to be
confounded by future cases, (3) when the need for advance
planning does not seem insistent, and (4) when the preconditions
for democratic self-government are not at stake and democratic

56. See id. at 77 (arguing that opinions involving privacy and equal protection
issues are written narrowly to force democracy to tackle these sensitive issues).
57. See id. at 76.
58. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 76 (noting that as typical minimalists, the
majority declined to tackle the basic issue).
59. See id. at 77 (explaining the Court left open the possibility that it may find a
fundamental right to die, depending on fact-specific circumstances).
60. See id. at 76 (claiming that the majority was leery of being aggressive on such
an emotional issue).
61. See id. at 77 (asserting that the opinion was written to avoid a judicial
mandate and to spur debate about physician-assisted suicide).
62. See id. at 78 (noting that the complexities of the issue prevent a Courtmandated one-size-fits-all solution).
63. Id. at 55 (stating further that a narrow decision in one case may further
complicate other related matters).
64. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 56.
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goals are not likely to be promoted by a rule bound judgment.

65

As will be discussed in Part IV, these conditions are often present in
cases about the extent of Indian tribal jurisdiction, but Sunstein does
66
not address the application of minimalism to Indian cases.
His
analysis of minimalism is confined to the context of individual
67
rights.
He notes that minimalism has its role in issues of
governmental structure, though by this he refers only to the
relationship among the federal branches of government and between
68
the federal government and states.
According to Sunstein, Justices Ginsburg, Souter, O’Connor,
69
Breyer and Kennedy, “the analytical heart of the . . . Court,” are
70
minimalists. None has adopted a unitary theory of constitutional
71
In addition, each shies away from broad rules,
interpretation.
instead issuing narrow decisions that hew closely to the facts of the
72
case. Of course, for each of these Justices, there are exceptions. For
example, Ginsburg embraces a “deep” notion of sex equality in
73
Virginia, even though her ruling was narrow. And Souter’s dissents
in the Court’s Eleventh Amendment cases draw on a deep notion of
74
the contours of federalism. But for the most part the minimalist
label aptly fits these five justices.
Indeed, some of these Justices have described their own approach
to decision-making in strikingly similar terms. Justice Ginsburg
advocates decisions that are narrow and incremental, rather than
75
broad and definitive. For example, she criticizes Roe for being too
encompassing, and speculates that a narrower decision “that merely
struck down the extreme Texas law and went no further on that
76
day . . . might have served to reduce rather than to fuel controversy.”

65. Id. at 57.
66. See infra Part IV (addressing the unique issues raised by the application of
minimalism’s principles to Indian law).
67. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 63.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 9.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
74. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(engaging in a lengthy historical argument concerning limitations of the Eleventh
Amendment); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 297 (1997)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (urging application of clear rule for determination of whether
the Ex parte Young doctrine applies).
75. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185,
1186 (1992) (claiming that the principles of the founding fathers dictate that judges
should refrain from broad decisions and instead look to the other branches of
government to effectuate social change).
76. Id. at 1199.
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In fact, Sunstein cites to a Ginsburg article in his discussions of how a
77
minimalist might have ruled in Roe.
Ginsburg also describes her lack of commitment to any unitary
theory of constitutional interpretation. She rejects originalism and
opts instead for some indeterminate version of “an evolving
78
document.” Beyond this, however, she is critical of attempts by the
79
Rather, she
Court to base its decisions on “grand philosophy.”
praises the Supreme Court’s gender discrimination cases, which were
both narrow, in that they did not adopt broad rules and instead
struck down gender stereotypes incrementally so that “the ball, one
might say, was tossed . . . into the legislators’ court, where the
80
political forces of the day could operate,” and shallow, in that the
81
Court wrote “modestly” rather than resort to deep justifications.
Ginsburg’s preference for shallowness is also evident in her
82
comments about the importance of promoting judicial collegiality.
She criticizes the “too frequent” resort to separate opinions, which
83
undermine the court’s ability to settle a matter definitively. She
advocates instead that judges ought to moderate their own positions
84
and be “less bold” in order to attract a majority.
85
Ginsburg also appears to be Sunstein’s Hercules in that she shares
86
the same optimism about minimalism’s substance. Her advocacy of
moderation, incrementalism and restraint has the same underlying
87
aspiration of improving the democratic process. She believes that
courts must be ever cognizant of their role as just one of the
coordinate branches: “[Courts] do not alone shape legal doctrine

77. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 37 (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts
on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 385 (1985))
(“a minimalist would have said more simply that the state may not forbid a woman
from having an abortion in a rape case, or that a state may not ban all abortions in all
circumstances”).
78. Ginsburg, supra note 75, at 1186-87.
79. Id. at 1204 (approving of Supreme Court decisions that call for legislatures to
reexamine laws instead of relying on the Court to apply its collective judicial
philosophy).
80. Id.
81. See id. (asserting that the Court wrote its opinion modestly and exemplified
shallowness).
82. Id. at 1194-98 (noting that collegiality among associates is important in
promoting respect for the courts and the law).
83. Id. at 1191.
84. See Ginsburg, supra note 75, at 1191.
85. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239-40 (1986). Hercules is Dworkin’s
idealized judge, engaged in the interpretive project and at the same time able to
come up with right answers. Ginsburg could be the idealized type for a proponent of
minimalism.
86. See Ginsburg, supra note 75, at 1191 (favoring a minimalist approach).
87. See id.
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but . . . they participate in a dialogue with other organs of
88
government, and with the people as well.” Ginsburg supports the
continuation of “the dialogue,” and criticizes decisions that she
89
perceives to have usurped the ongoing democratic discussion.
Justice Breyer also written about the judicial role in ways that
resonate with minimalism. In an article on judicial review, Breyer
discusses the constraints imposed upon the judiciary by an opinion’s
90
potential impacts on the outside world. He suggests that a judge
might consider, among other factors, the impacts an opinion has on
the court’s working relations with other major governmental
91
institutions. He also mentions that a judge should consider whether
to rule narrowly, “to avoid commitment to a ‘theme,’ where
92
consequences are not known.” Like a good minimalist, Breyer is
thus “intensely aware of [his] own limitations,” and “[a]lert to the
93
problem of unanticipated consequences.”
Breyer also seems to be concerned with the Court’s role in
94
promoting the core values of a democracy.
While he does not
mention explicitly the value of “democratic deliberation,” his writings
evidence a belief in the democracy-promoting, and democracy95
stabilizing, functions of a constitutional court that knows its place.
Justice Souter has not written articles that describe his own view of
the judicial role. But, like Ginsburg and Breyer, his record as a
96
minimalist speaks for itself. Only rarely does Souter appeal to deep

88. Ginsburg, supra note 75, at 1198 (stressing the importance to democracy of
“measured motions” as opposed to “doctrinal limbs”).
89. See id. at 1205-06 (criticizing Roe for being too legislative and ignoring the
legislature’s role in shaping legal doctrine).
90. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review: A Practicing Judge’s Perspective, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 761, 768 (2000).
91. See id. at 768.
92. Id.
93. SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at ix-x.
94. See Breyer, supra note 90, at 764-65 (questioning whether “a democracy—a
political system based on representation and accountability—should entrust the
final . . . making of such highly significant decisions to judges who are unelected,
independent, and insulated from the direct impact of public opinions”).
95. See id. (recognizing that an independent judiciary acting with restraint can
protect a “democratically structured government and . . . basic liberties”); see also
Stephen G. Breyer, Liberty, Prosperity, and a Strong Judicial Institution, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1998).
I must be able to explain to the public why we all should support judicial
independence in the face of decisions that both you and I believe are wrong.
What is the explanation? The answer has to be put in terms of liberty and
prosperity, and it has to be consistent with a democratic society.
Stephen G. Breyer, Liberty, Prosperity, and a Strong Judicial Institution, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5 (1998).
96. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter, J.
concurring) (writing separately to emphasize particularized nature of decision
rejecting substantive due process argument); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
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justifications for a particular outcome. When he does, it tends to be
97
in dissenting rather than majority opinions. Furthermore, Court
watchers other than Sunstein have corroborated the characterization
of Souter as one who tends to rule narrowly and lacks a “grand
98
philosophy.” Others have described Souter’s view of the substantive
role of the Court in terms that are similar to Sunstein’s: “[Souter]
has a vision of the Court as a moderating influence . . . to serve as a
unifying part of the country . . . there is a central core of David Souter
that sees the Court as a conciliator and legitimizer, bringing society
99
together.”
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor comprise the conservative wing of
100
the minimalist core.
As many have noted, these two are often the
101
Neither has
“swing votes” that determine the outcome of a case.
102
Both tend to
articulated a theory of constitutional interpretation.
103
decide cases pragmatically.
Justice O’Connor in particular, like
Justice Ginsburg, seems to embody minimalism’s purported virtues.

Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 518 U.S. 787 (1996) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (supporting the anti-categorical approach to free speech issues
endorsed by the majority opinion); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) (avoiding categorical interpretation of a
statute in a bankruptcy case).
97. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100-85 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (offering a lengthy historical critique of the majority’s view of the
Eleventh Amendment); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 297-319
(1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (urging the application of a clear and broad rule to
determine whether the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity
should apply).
98. See Ruth Marcus, Justices Souter, Thomas Follow Separate Paths, WASH. POST, July
5, 1992, at A1 (quoting academics and advocates who describe Souter as nonideological, cautious, and lacking a judicial philosophy).
99. See Jeffrey Rosen, Poetic Justice: The Education of David Souter, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 8, 1993, at 25; see also Liang Kan, A Theory of Justice Souter, 45 EMORY
L.J. 1373, 1404-05 (1996) (describing Souter as prudent, respectful of precedent, and
wary of decisions that undermine the institutional legitimacy of the Court).
100. See M. David Gelfand & Keith Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on a
“Conservative” Court: Currents and Cross-Currents from Justices O’Connor and Scalia, 64
TUL. L. REV. 1443, 1443 (1990) [hereinafter Gelfand & Werhan, Federalism and
Separation of Powers on a “Conservative” Court] (categorizing Justice O’Connor in the
“conservative bloc” of the Court).
101. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH.
LAW. 25, 51 (2000); Thomas G. Shack, United States v. Dickerson: Miranda Revisited,
26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 299, 302 (2000); Akhil Reed Amar,
Justice Kennedy and the Ideal of Equality, 28 PAC. L.J. 515, 516, 520, 526 (1997)
(discussing three cases in which Kennedy represented a swing vote).
102. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 9.
103. See Gelfand & Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on a “Conservative”
Court, supra note 100, at 1448-55 (illustrating Justice O’Connor’s pragmatic approach
in several cases); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Justice O’Connor’s Opinion in Feist
An Uncommon Though
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co.:
Characteristic Approach, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 83, 85 (1990) (describing much
of Justice O’Connor’s work as pragmatic).
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O’Connor never articulates broad rules, opting instead for context104
105
based balancing tests. She is particularly deferential to precedent.
She is, to some commentators, frustrating precisely because of her
106
reluctance to endorse deep justifications.
Of course, one cannot assume that the minimalist Justices actually
buy into Sunstein’s full-blown account and defense of minimalism.
But it seems abundantly safe to observe that as a descriptive matter,
Sunstein is correct about the narrowness and shallowness of the
minimalist core’s opinions. And from what one can glean about their
normative views of minimalism, it seems that they share some sense of
how their relative reticence can and should contribute to democratic
decision-making.
The question this article seeks to address,
therefore, is whether judicial minimalism is compatible with decisions
that preserve tribal sovereignty.
II. INDIAN LAW’S NORMATIVE AND DOCTRINAL BACKDROP
The current trends in Indian law, if any can be discerned from the
107
fractured and particularized opinions,
seem to be to allow
concurrent state taxation and regulation in Indian country when
tribes are seen as competing with states for non-Indian business, and
to disallow tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservation
108
boundaries in order to comport with non-Indian expectations.
Thus, as tribes exert their sovereignty in ways that are typical for nontribal governments, they face increasing impediments from the

104. See Hamilton, supra note 103, at 83 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s middleground approach); see also Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 100, at 1450-51 (discussing
Justice O’Connor’s contextual balancing approach).
105. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 522-31 (1989) (basing
her opinion on precedent); Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(upholding Roe on principles of institutional integrity and stare decisis).
106. See, e.g., Nadine Taub, Sandra Day O’Connor and Women’s Rights, 13 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP 113, 113 (1991) (acknowledging that Justice O’Connor occasionally
resorts to deep justifications but then often takes “two-step[s]” back); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Sandra Day O’Connor, Conservative Discourse and Reproductive Freedom, 13
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 95 (1991) (criticizing O’Connor for masking her conservative
political views).
107. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Court’s decisions addressing Indian law); see
also Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1754 (1997) [hereinafter Frickey,
Adjudication and its Discontents].
More than any other field of public law, federal Indian law is characterized
by doctrinal incoherence and doleful incidents. Its principles aggregate into
competing clusters of inconsistent norms, and its practical effect has been to
legitimate the colonization of this continent—the displacement of its native
peoples—by the descendants of Europeans.
Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents, supra, at 1754.
108. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 28-57
(summarizing case history which has eroded Indian sovereignty).
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Supreme Court. These trends are deeply troubling, if we are to
promote tribal sovereignty in anything other than an archaic, highly
romanticized form. For tribes to survive today, they need to be able
to engage in economic development, which includes the ability to tax
and regulate. If the Supreme Court undermines every step in this
direction, tribes will die a slow and painful death by case law that they
have resisted all these years by other means.
It may be too late to halt the Court’s trends. Two recently decided
109
110
cases, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, and Nevada v. Hicks, cement
the notion that Indian tribes only have jurisdiction over non-tribal
members in extremely narrow circumstances. The minimalists have,
wittingly or not, contributed to a fundamental re-shaping of Indian
law. Case by case, they have joined with the maximalists in undoing
111
core principles of the field. Of even more concern, the Court has
accomplished this diminishment of tribal sovereignty without
acknowledging the highly normative role it has played. This would
appear to be contrary to minimalism’s substantive goal of airing
contested issues and deferring them to more democratic branches of
112
government.
The unstated normative vision underlying many of the Court’s
recent opinions is that tribal sovereignty should either whither away,
or at best remain a static notion, incapable of allowing tribes to adapt
113
in the ways described above.
This normative vision is out of sync
114
with that of the other branches of government. Moreover, despite
the vicissitudes in federal policy, the most enduring and normatively
defensible underlying theme in Indian law is to preserve tribes as
115
separate, self-governing entities. Indian law scholars, who otherwise
have a diverse range of views, share a remarkable consensus on this
116
point.

109. 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001).
110. 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001).
111. See Part III infra.
112. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
113. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 82.
114. See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
115. See WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 4-5, 14-19 (stating that the strongest theme is
to preserve for tribes their “measured separatism[,]” a separatism that recognizes
their sovereign status, but simultaneously does not erase their complicated
relationship with the federal government).
116. Almost all scholarship written about federal Indian law is by scholars who
support tribal sovereignty and are, in some way or other, critical of Supreme Court
decisions that erode tribal sovereignty. This normative consensus encompasses too
many articles to list individually, but the skeptical reader may want to peruse the
work of the following scholars: Robert Clinton, David Getches, Robert Laurence,
Nell Jessup Newton, Frank Pommersheim, Charles Wilkinson, Jo Carillo, Richard
Collins, Robert A. Williams, Jr., Gloria Valencia-Weber, Rebecca Tsosie, Allison
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These scholars can be divided into roughly three camps:
117
foundationalists, pragmatists and critics. The foundationalists posit
a core of doctrinal principles supporting tribal sovereignty from
118
which the Court has only recently strayed.
The pragmatists are
skeptical of any coherent account of the doctrine, and describe
instead an interpretive approach that would uphold tribal sovereignty
119
in most cases.
The critics unearth the racist and colonialist
assumptions that under-gird the foundations of Indian law, and argue
that a decolonization of the federal-tribal relationship can occur only
120
if the discriminatory aspects of those foundations are repudiated.

Dussias, Robert Porter, Dean Suagee, Philip P. Frickey, Rennard Strickland, Ralph
Johnson, Judith Royster, Monroe Price, Christine Zuni, and John P. LaVelle. (This
list is not exhaustive.) While these scholars may be grouped in several different
camps in terms of the tenor of their writings (foundationalist, critical, pragmatist),
they can all be fairly said to support the development of tribal sovereignty. I am
unaware of any other field where the normative consensus is so strong. Agreement
among scholars could be viewed as a strength in the field—perhaps, upon scholarly
reflection, there is no normatively attractive defense of federal courts unilaterally
divesting tribes of their powers of self-governance. Philip Frickey has speculated,
however, that the strong consensus in Indian law scholarship may partly explain why
it has been so unpersuasive:
[T]o the extent that even [objective Indian law scholarship] is rather
uniformly highly critical of the field, it becomes easier for more practically
minded opponents of reform to dismiss it as mere practitioner advocacy
masquerading as something more highfalutin.
Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents, supra note 107, at 1178.
117. These camps are not rigid, non-permeable entities. Individual scholars may,
at various points in their careers, fit into more than one camp. Also, the camps are a
broad-brush way of characterizing scholarship that does not, and is not meant to,
capture nuances within scholarship that draw on various camps.
118. See, e.g., David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1573 (1996)
(outlining the traditional foundationalist approach to Indian sovereignty and
highlighting the Court’s recent move to a more subjective approach). See generally
WILKINSON, supra note 22; Richard Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31
ARIZ. L. REV. 365 (1989) (making a foundationalist argument concerning the federaltribal relationship).
119. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990) [hereinafter Frickey,
Practical Reasoning] (describing an interpretive approach for upholding tribal
sovereignty); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993)
[hereinafter Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present] (arguing that Marshall’s approach,
and not simply his doctrinal formulations, should be followed); see also Nell Jessup
Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
195 (1984) (criticizing the origins of the plenary power doctrine in Indian law).
120. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993) (suggesting federal
government treat Indian tribes as they would any other government); Robert B.
Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control Law, 31 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 899 (1998) (outlining proposals for decolonization); Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonization and
Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219 (1986)
(analyzing justifications of Indian colonization and suggesting steps on how to
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All three groups of scholars emphasize the over-riding norm of
recognizing tribes as distinct political entities with rights to selfgovernance.
To remain consistent with minimalism’s reluctance to settle on a
particular theoretical account of decisionmaking (other than
minimalism, of course), this article does not take a position on
whether the Court should have adopted foundationalism over
pragmatism, or vice versa. (And, to add a note of realism, this article
does not even speculate that the Court would adopt the critics’ view,
though I do rely on critical insights throughout the paper.) What is
essential for the minimalists to note, however, is that regardless of the
meta-account, foundationalists and pragmatists agree that the
preservation of tribal self-governance is a norm of over-riding
significance. Both caution that the Court treads into unrestrained
territory when it diminishes tribal sovereignty without clear guidance
from Congress.
A. Indian Law Origins
Chief Justice John Marshall authored the three opinions, Johnson v.
121
122
123
M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia, that
consolidated the federal government’s power over relations with
Indian tribes and defined the legal status of tribes within our federal
124
system as “domestic dependent nations.” The Marshall trilogy, as it
is known, accomplished by judicial fiat what otherwise would have
remained a contested political matter: who has power to negotiate
and legislate with respect to Indian tribes? Justice Marshall’s general
answer to this question is that only the federal government has that
125
power.
In order to arrive at that conclusion, Marshall had to
account for how tribes came to be divested of that power
126
In dividing up tribal governance between tribes and
themselves.
the federal government, Marshall not only had to deprive states of

decolonize); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A
Reply to Professor Laurence’s Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress Over the
Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439 (1988) (responding to Professor Laurence and
asserting that the colonizing function of Indian law cannot be eliminated); Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in
Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983) (examining the development of
Western legal and ideological thought on the nature and extent of Indian tribal
sovereignty and rights).
121. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
122. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
123. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
124. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
125. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 594.
126. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20.
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any powers, but also to account for how tribes came to have less than
127
Thus, what many view as essentially a
complete sovereignty.
continuation of Marshall’s federalism decisions, which consolidate
power not only in the federal government generally but in the federal
128
129
courts specifically, is also a remarkable jurispathic moment.
By
describing tribes as domestic dependent nations, deprived by
conquest and discovery of their fully sovereign status, he is at once
130
making them so. He cuts off other possibilities that existed at the
131
time and instigates an entirely new creature at law, one that has
since taken on and created unique legal and social categories of
132
meaning.
In these three crucial decisions, the Marshall Court decided several
major principles. First, in Johnson, the Court established that the
federal government, not Indian tribes, has the right to sell Indian
133
lands.
To arrive at this conclusion, Marshall had to employ the
harsh Anglo version of the discovery doctrine, thereby implicitly

127. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 536; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20.
128. See generally ROBERT KENNEDY FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN
MARSHALL (1968); WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION (1993); G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE (1991); Christopher L.
Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 66-70 (1995)
(describing Marshall’s belief in the unity of the American people); see also Frickey,
Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 1224 (noting that Marshall’s federalist
perspective was likely responsible for his holdings in Indian law cases).
129. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 41-44 (1983)
(describing the “jurispathic” function of courts, which consists of their statist role in
declaring a single interpretation to be the official one, killing off other local
interpretations (and therefore other locally-generated laws)).
130. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (finding that
Indian tribes are not sovereign foreign nations within the meaning of the
Constitution).
131. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775-1979 (1999)
(providing numerous examples of treaties between Indian tribes, the federal
government, and foreign nations in which the Indian tribes are treated as the
equivalent of foreign nations). Of course, a dimmer possibility for tribes was that
they had been deprived completely of any sovereign status, by “discovery,” conquest,
and mere proclamation of the states. That was the view urged by Andrew Jackson,
and one he ultimately sought to put into effect during the period known as
“Removal,” when many tribes were forcibly relocated from their homelands to
territories west of the Mississippi. See generally GLORIA JAHODA, THE TRAIL OF TEARS 26
(1975); ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE, THE LONG BITTER TRAIL 50-72 (1993) (discussing
views held by those who supported Indian Removal).
132. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The
Impact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1123, 1145-46 (1994)
(arguing that the rise of “tribalism” as a legal and political matter has given rise to
pan-Indianism as a social and cultural matter, which in turn reinforces the politics of
tribalism).
133. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 585 (1823) (“It has never
been doubted that either the United States or the several States [have] clear title to
all the lands within the [country’s] boundary lines.”).
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sanctioning the thesis that Indian tribes were “conquered” merely by
134
Second, in Cherokee
the arrival of Christians on their continent.
Nation, the Court decided that Indian tribes are the equivalent
neither of states nor of foreign countries, but rather are semisovereign entities that exist within the domestic framework of federal
135
law. And third, in Worcester, the Court found that tribal sovereignty,
though compromised by the superior power of the United States and
its purported conquest, is not subordinate to the sovereign powers of
136
the states.
In other words, Indian tribes are self-governing, and
137
individual states may not impose their laws in Indian country.
Despite its acceptance of racist ideology concerning the
138
colonization of the continent, the Marshall trilogy is credited by
foundationalists and pragmatists as the basis for recognizing Indian
tribes as pre-constitutional sovereigns, not merely associations of
139
people linked by culture or race. Philip Frickey, the leading Indian
law pragmatist, has described Marshall’s approach in Worcester as the
140
He
appropriate model for current Indian law decisionmaking.
counsels that Marshall’s legacy is important not simply because of the
doctrinal commands issuing from Cherokee Nation and Worcester, but
because of the interpretive stance and structural approach that he
took in those cases:
What is most important . . . is not whether Chief Justice Marshall’s

134. See id. at 589, 595 (discussing a different version of the discovery doctrine
espoused by Francisco de Vitoria, a prominent Spanish theologian, holding that the
native inhabitants were the true owners of the land, and European nations could
only claim title by engaging in a precisely-defined “just war,” or by voluntary consent
of the Indians); see also FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 50-51
(Rennard Strickland ed., 1982); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN
INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 2-3 (1983) (discussing de Vitoria’s views); ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST 312-17 (1990) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST]
(discussing the genesis of Marshall’s “Doctrine of Discovery”).
135. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17; see also Philip P. Frickey,
Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 51 (1996) [hereinafter Frickey,
Domesticating Federal Indian Law] (arguing that Marshall’s decisions determining
domestic status of American Indian tribes necessarily import international law
doctrines, and therefore American law governing status of tribes is, and should
continue to be, “domesticated” by international law).
136. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 538-40 (1832) (finding that the
sovereign power of the states did not override autonomy of Indian tribes).
137. See id.
138. See WILLIAMS, THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST, supra note 134, at 312-17
(discussing Marshall’s “Doctrine of Discovery”).
139. See Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, supra note 119, at 406 (discussing the
manner in which Marshall’s interpretative methodology supports pre-constitutional
sovereignty of Indian tribes); Getches, supra note 118, at 1577-89 (crediting the
Marshall trilogy with recognizing pre-constitutional sovereignty of Indian tribes).
140. See Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, supra note 119, at 406-09 (describing
Marshalls’ interpretive approach in Worcester).
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precise statement of the [Indian law] canon begins to appear fresh
in our law. . . . The most important result of a revival of Chief
Justice Marshall’s legacy would be that judges would be compelled
to view Indian law afresh in today’s context. The issues would be
structural, involving conflicts among sovereigns, and not contests
between sovereigns and disadvantaged groups who seek judicial
141
solicitude with hat in hand.

David Getches, the most recent proponent of the foundational
approach, lauds the trilogy precisely because of its doctrinal
142
formulations of the foundational principles of Indian law.
These
foundational principles, according to Getches, were refined in
subsequent case law and then aptly summarized by Felix Cohen,
author of the seminal treatise on federal Indian law, as follows:
(1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of
any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the
legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates
the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to
enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect
the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local selfgovernment. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by
treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus
expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in
the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of
143
government.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
144
145
decided two cases, Ex parte Crow Dog, and Talton v. Mayes, that
affirmed Worcester’s holding that Indian tribes have authority to
govern their members and their territory, and that the origins of that
146
authority are pre-constitutional.
In Crow Dog, a case involving the
murder of one Indian by another Indian, the Court found that tribes
had exclusive jurisdiction over criminal acts committed by Indians
147
against Indians within a tribe’s reservation boundaries.
Talton

141. Id. at 428.
142. See Getches, supra note 118, at 1577-89 (discussing the doctrinal
developments of the Marshall trilogy).
143. Id. at 1574 (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123
(1941)).
144. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
145. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
146. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572 (holding that offenses committed by Indians
against each other were “left to be dealt with by each tribe by itself, according to its
local customs”); Talton, 163 U.S. at 383 (stating that the powers of the Cherokee
nation do not derive from the Constitution).
147. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 567 (determining the constitutionality of treaties
that extend federal jurisdiction over crimes by Indians against Indians on
reservations).
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found that tribes were not required to provide Fifth Amendment
grand jury proceedings because tribal governmental authority
predated the Constitution and therefore was unaffected by its
148
passage.
Immediately after the Crow Dog decision, however, the federal
government embarked on one of its most destructive policies
149
regarding tribes—that of “Allotment and Assimilation.”
From
roughly 1884-1928, the federal government implemented policies
aimed at causing the demise of tribes as distinct political and cultural
150
entities.
The centerpiece of the Allotment Era was the Indian
151
General Allotment Act, or Dawes Act, which provided the legal
152
framework for eliminating Indian reservations.
Under the Dawes
153
tribal landholdings were divided into
Act and its progeny,
individual parcels and all Indian families and/or individuals were
154
given a specified allotment.
Any additional land held by the tribe
could be declared “surplus,” and therefore opened to white
155
The effects of these policies on Indian lands were
settlement.
devastating: by the end of the Allotment Era, tribal land holdings
156
were reduced from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million in 1934.
Reservations that were allotted ended up with checkerboard patterns
157
of property ownership.
The lands were carved into individual
parcels, some of which were Indian-owned allotments, some non
148. See Talton, 163 U.S. at 382 (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not apply
to tribal governments).
149. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 134, at 8-12 (discussing the period of
Allotment and Assimilation). Some attempts at allotment can be dated earlier than
1884, however. For example, several treaties in 1854 contained provisions for tribal
consent to allotment. See, e.g., Treaty with the Omaha, 10 Stat. 1043 (1854); Treaty
with the Shawnees, 10 Stat. 1053 (1854); Treaty with the Sacs and Foxes of Missouri,
10 Stat. 1074 (1854); Treaty with the Kickapoos, 10 Stat. 1078 (1854); see also FRANCIS
PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES, THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 241
(1993) (describing the 1854 treaties).
150. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 134, at 8-12.
151. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887), repealed 2000.
152. See WALLACE, supra note 131, at 119-20 (discussing the impact of the Dawes
Act on the continued existence of Indian reservations).
153. The Dawes Act spawned individual allotment acts for particular tribes. See,
e.g., Citizen Band of Potawatomie Indians, ch. 543, § 8, 26 Stat. 1016; Absentee Shawnee
Indians, ch. 543, § 9, 26 Stat. 1018; Cheyenne and Arapahoe Tribes, ch. 543, § 13, 26
Stat. 1022; Coeur d’Alene Indians (I), ch. 543, § 19, 26 Stat. 1026; Coeur d’ Alene
Indians (II), ch. 543, § 20, 26 Stat. 1029; Gros Ventres, Mandans and Arickarees, ch.
543, § 23, 26 Stat. 1032; Crow Indians, ch. 543, § 31, 26 Stat. 1039; see also Lone Wolf
v. Hitchchock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (discussing allotment statutes for individual
Indian tribes).
154. See 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887).
155. See id. (discussing surplus land held by Indian tribes).
156. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 134, at 10.
157. See id. (describing the effects of the Allotment Era on Indian reservations).
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On some
Indian owned lands, and some tribal trust land.
reservations, virtually all of the land fell into the hands of non159
Indians.
During this period, the Supreme Court ratified Congress’ actions,
160
providing no protection to tribes. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the
Court held that Congress could unilaterally abrogate treaties with
161
Indian tribes.
The Supreme Court found that Congress had
“plenary power” over Indian tribes, meaning essentially that its
decisions concerning termination of treaty rights were non162
reviewable.
The plenary power doctrine is the source of much controversy
among Indian law scholars. Foundationalist scholars maintain that
the doctrine is an inseparable part of the foundational package, and
that Indian tribes are better off fighting for their sovereignty in
163
Congress than fending off acts of implicit divestiture by the courts.
Pragmatists contend that their approach is a normative improvement
over foundationalism precisely because pragmatism allows for a
robust critique of the plenary power doctrine while proscribing
164
judicial acts diminishing tribal powers.
This is perhaps the single
area in which the two theoretical approaches actually make a
165
prescriptive difference.

158. See id.
159. See WALLACE, supra note 131, at 199.
160. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
161. See id. at 566.
162. See id. at 565 (discussing the “plenary power” doctrine and its effects on
Indian tribes).
163. See Getches, supra note 118, at 1581-82 (discussing foundationalists viewpoints
with respect to the plenary power doctrine over Indian tribes); David Getches, Beyond
Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice, and
Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter Getches, Beyond
Indian Law]. Still, some foundational scholars—and some courts—have attempted to
scale back the plenary power doctrine to what they believe it meant in the Marshall
trilogy, i.e. the federal government has exclusive power to deal with tribes—and
therefore states have no power—even though the federal power is not unlimited. See,
e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 734 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that
the government’s power over Indians is limited by the Constitution); Del. Tribal Bus.
Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977) (finding federal legislation not immune
from judicial review); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54
(1946) (noting that congressional power over Indian affairs is plenary but not
absolute); COHEN, supra note 134, at 219.
164. See Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 1204-07; see also FRANK
POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL
LIFE 47 (1995) (observing that the Lone Wolf Court “simply converted its perception
of congressional practice into a valid constitutional doctrine without any legal
support or analysis.”); Newton, supra note 119, at 228 (examining the unique
features of Indian tribes and suggesting there should be constitutional limits on
governmental actions affecting tribal rights).
165. The differences between the two theories are more descriptive than
prescriptive. Frickey maintains that the Marshall approach, and consequent canons,
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Under the pragmatist approach, the Court would be prohibited
from diminishing tribal rights in the absence of clear congressional
statements, but could still—theoretically—decide whether Congress
had violated tribal rights even when Congress clearly had intended to
166
breach treaty obligations or otherwise diminish tribal sovereignty.
The foundational approach is limited by its formalism, and therefore
167
does not attempt to critique the plenary power doctrine.
The Court decided other cases during the Allotment Era that
reflected tribes’ diminishing control over reservations. First, in 1881,
towards the end of the Removal Period and at the beginning of
168
Allotment, the Supreme Court held in United States v. McBratney that
states had criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes
169
on Indian reservations.
McBratney has since been narrowed to
mean that states only have jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians
that are also against non-Indians. Thus, states only have criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country when the tribe has no purported
170
jurisdictional interest in the crimes charged.
Similarly, the Court

make up a flexible interpretive stance that allows courts to see Indian law “afresh in
today’s context.” See Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, supra note 119, at 428.
Further, he argues convincingly that the Court’s Indian law cases since 1970, even
the ones that favor tribal litigants, cannot be explained coherently according to
foundationalist principles. See generally Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 119.
Therefore he suggests that the only way to make sense of Indian law, and to apply
Indian law principles correctly in future cases, is to acknowledge the doctrinal
instability, but nonetheless to venture extremely cautiously into any exercises of
judicial power that would strip tribes of their attributes of sovereignty. See id. at 1239;
see also Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, supra note 119, at 428-29; Frickey, A
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 11-13. Getches maintains
that, until very recently, most of the cases can be explained according to
foundationalist doctrine, and that when the Court strays from these principles, it
cannot be reined in by underlying norms. See Getches, supra note 118, at 1581-82.
To the contrary, according to Getches, the justices’ underlying norms typically
counsel them to rule against tribal interests. Therefore they cannot be trusted with a
theory that permits them to acknowledge instability in the doctrine. See generally
Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 163. Both Frickey and Getches agree,
however, that the Court is getting it “wrong” in some sense when it defines tribal
status without due respect for our historical relationship with tribal governments and
the underlying restraint counseled therefrom.
166. See Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 1204-07; Newton, supra note
119, at 228 (suggesting the protection afforded certain classes, such as racial and
ethnic minorities oppressed in the political process, should extend to Indian tribes).
167. See Getches, supra note 118, at 1577-86 (discussing the foundationalist
approach to tribal sovereignty).
168. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
169. See id. at 624 (noting that, absent a treaty provision to the contrary, the state
retains jurisdiction over crimes committed by whites against whites on an Indian
reservation).
170. See New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 500 (1946) (finding that
states have jurisdiction over white-on-white crimes within Indian country). Of
course, this conceptualization of a tribe’s interest is deeply troubling, and has led to
many of the recent problematic decisions. So long as tribes are perceived as
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upheld the states’ authority to tax non-Indian lands and property
171
within Indian country in several cases near the turn of the century.
Foundationalists look upon the Allotment cases as rare exceptions to
172
They cabin the implications of
the general thrust of Indian law.
173
these cases by emphasizing their historical context, and the Court’s
174
subsequent rejection of the cases’ doctrinal approach.
The
pragmatists are less concerned with coherence, and therefore do not
175
Similar to
spend time explaining why these cases are exceptions.
the foundationalists, however, they stress that allotment policies have
been abandoned and therefore should not haunt current
176
jurisdictional decisions.
The Allotment and Assimilation Period was a complete failure by
all measures except one: the transfer of lands from Indians to non177
Indians. Indians resisted the eradication of their traditions, and in
any event were not provided with the proper tools to become
178
productive farmers even if they wanted to do so.
The devastating

governments that have interests in their members only, they will never be permitted
to transcend the “state of pupilage” imposed upon them by Justice Marshall in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
171. See, e.g., Maricopa & P.R.R. v. Arizona, 156 U.S. 347 (1895) (holding that
territory of Arizona could tax railroad going through Indian country); Utah & N. Ry.
v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) (involving taxation of railroad rights-of-way through
reservations); see also Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U.S. 588 (1898) (upholding county
taxation of non-tribal members’ cattle that grazed within tribal reservation
boundaries); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) (involving state taxation of nonIndian-owned cattle in Indian country).
172. See Getches, supra note 118, at 1586-89 (discussing foundationalist
perspectives on Allotment cases).
173. See id. at 1587 (“The McBratney Court was moved by the reality that nonIndians live and own land on reservations as a result of federal policies.”); see also
WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 35 (“McBratney is an important example of judicial
acceptance of a gradual breakdown of reservation boundaries at a time when
assimilationist sentiments were building in Congress and increasing numbers of nonIndians were beginning to enter Indian country.”).
174. See WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 35-37.
175. See Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 1150, 1180-81 (discussing
pragmatists’ relatively terse explanations of Allotment cases).
176. See id. at 1150, 1180-81; Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra
note 21, at 14-16.
177. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 134, at 12 (arguing that “assimilation had
been a miscalculation of major proportions”).
178. See id. at 10 (describing the miniscule appropriation for providing Indian
farmers with seed and equipment). During a discussion of the Allotment Era in a
seminar for the Indian Law Clinic at the University of Colorado, one of my students,
a Lakota from Pine Ridge, recalled that one of her uncles still has the lone hoe and
sack of seeds that were distributed to his father during allotment. They sit behind a
shed, unused and useless. This image brings home the weird, magical thinking in
which the architects of this sorry period engaged. The situation is comparable to
someone knocking at the door of a lawyer, handing him a trowel and a few envelopes
from Burpees, and announcing that from here on out he is to make his living as an
urban gardener.
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effects of this failure were published in a government-sponsored
179
The Meriam Report heralded the
report by Lewis Meriam.
beginning of the next phase in American Indian policy, that of
180
Reorganization and Self-Government (1928-1945).
The legislative
centerpiece of this era was the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),
181
passed in June, 1934.
The IRA formally repudiated the government’s allotment policy,
declaring that no more land within Indian reservations was to be
182
allotted to individuals.
The IRA also imposed restrictions on the
voluntary alienation of Indian lands to any entity other than the
183
Tribe itself. In addition, the IRA attempted to revitalize tribal selfgovernance by decentralizing the power of the Department of
Interior’s Office of Indian Affairs and distributing that power to the
184
tribes themselves.
Many tribes interpreted the requirement that
they form Anglo-American style governments with centralized power
185
as yet another means of destroying their traditional ways.
Nevertheless, during this period tribal members were at least
discussing how to govern themselves, a dim prospect during the
186
Allotment Period.
After World War II, however, a convergence of forces and
ideologies similar to that which led to Allotment forced a new,
terrifying, but mercifully brief and ineffectual, policy upon tribes:
187
that of Termination (roughly 1945-61).
In an era of fiscal
stringency, some government officials promoted the release of tribes
188
from federal supervision as a cost-saving measure.
Some Christian

179. See LEWIS MERIAM, INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION (1928).
180. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 134, at 12-15 (discussing origins of the
Reorganization and Self-Government period).
181. 25 U.S.C. § 461.
182. See id. (“On and after June 18, 1834, no land of any Indian Reservation
created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress,
Executive Order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severality to any
Indian”).
183. See id. (stating that the Secretary of the Interior can, however, approve a
tribal transfer or exchange of land if it is in the tribe’s best interests).
184. See id.
185. See EDWARD H. SPICER, CYCLES OF CONQUEST 351-52 (1962); DELORIA & LYTLE,
supra note 134, at 14-15 (illustrating there is evidence that tribal councils were often
selected and approved by the Office of Indian Affairs for their likely compliance with
plans for natural resource extraction. Pro-development factions of tribes were
therefore given power and control over tribal affairs, despite the strong opposition of
traditionalists.).
186. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 134, at 8-12 (discussing federal control over
Indian tribes during the Allotment Period).
187. See id. at 10-20 (discussing the Termination policies of 1945-1961).
188. See id.
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groups strongly supported this measure as a means of bringing
189
In addition, World
civilization and full citizenship to the Indians.
War II’s lesson of the evils of racial separatism caused some liberals to
equate the separate status of Indian tribes with invidious racial
190
discrimination. Thus, the political moment was ripe for an attempt
to reverse the IRA policies and to assault the existence of tribes as
191
separate peoples.
Congress passed legislation to terminate
particular tribes from federal supervision, most notably two major
tribes that were rich in natural resources, the Klamath of Oregon and
192
the Menominee of Wisconsin.
In total, Congress terminated the
193
federal relationship with 109 tribes.
Termination meant the end of federal assistance, which treaties
guaranteed to many tribes. The impact of termination was similar to
that of allotment for the affected tribes. Tribal lands became subject
to state laws and therefore were taxable and transferable; health care
grew scarce if not non-existent; infant death rates rose as did the
194
number of people on welfare. However, the termination era came
to an end in practice just as abruptly as it had begun. In 1958, the
Secretary of Interior announced that “no tribe would be terminated
195
without its consent.” Like the preceding policies that attempted to
eliminate tribes, termination was a failure, even by its own terms.
Perhaps as a harbinger of better times to come, the Supreme Court
196
decided Williams v. Lee just as termination was ebbing. In Williams,
the Court addressed whether Arizona state courts had jurisdiction

189. See id. at 16:
[T]he National Council of Churches . . . issued a report recommending that
Indians be given full citizenship by eliminating much of the discriminating
legislation that bound them to the federal government. This report was
deeply tinged with the same philosophical views that had been used to justify
the allotment act: economic and religious Darwinism—the survival of the
fittest, although phrased in traditional Protestant ethical clothing.
Id.
190. See id. at 17 (discussing the effects World War II had on Indian tribes).
191. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 134, at 15-16 (discussing the political context
of the Termination programs).
192. See 68 Stat. 718 (1954) (terminating an Oregon tribe from federal
supervision); 68 Stat. 250 (1954) (terminating a Wisconsin tribe from federal
supervision).
193. See Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy,
5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 151 (1977) (discussing the termination of Indian tribes
from federal supervision).
194. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 60-77 (Univ. of
Okla. Press 1988) (1969) (detailing fourteen years of congressional and
administrative action during which the federal government reduced centralized
supervision of tribal affairs, often resulting in the elimination of government
assistance).
195. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 134, at 20.
196. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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over a debt collection case that arose within the boundaries of the
197
The case involved a debt incurred by members of
Navajo Nation.
the Navajo Nation at a trading post. The creditor was non-Indian.
198
Arizona had not adopted Public Law 83-280, an Allotment Era
statute which authorized the imposition of state laws in Indian
country under specified conditions, nor was there any other
congressional authorization to extend state jurisdiction into Navajo
country. The Court therefore held that the tribe had exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter, finding that “absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
199
and be ruled by them.”
Williams was, at that historical moment in
the context of termination, a very positive decision for tribes. The
decision ousted state court jurisdiction from internal tribal matters,
and helped to revitalize tribal dispute resolution by forcing even non200
Indian litigants to sue for on-reservation matters in tribal courts.
On Williams, foundationalists and pragmatists agree: the decision
revived John Marshall’s legacy despite the Allotment Era cases and
201
recent congressional efforts to eliminate tribes.

197. See id. at 223 (holding Arizona could not interfere with authority of tribal
courts over matters occurring on reservations).
198. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (§ 7 repealed and reenacted as
amended in 1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 13211326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360). During the termination era, Congress passed laws allowing
some states to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribes within their
boundaries. Other states could assume jurisdiction over Indian country if they
followed the procedural steps outlined in the statute. These laws are commonly
referred to as “Public Law 280.”
199. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
200. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 28-34
(suggesting that Williams and subsequent cases offer inconsistent holdings); Robert
Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith
and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 589, 618-19 (1990)
[hereinafter Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments] (characterizing Williams as a
decision defining the Court as “extremely protective of the [Navajo’s] right to self
determination”); Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal
Sovereignty While Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1996)
(arguing that Williams acted to grant tribes exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over
matters originating on reservations).
201. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 28-34
(referencing Justice Black’s decision in Williams, which characterized Chief Justice
Marshall’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), as
“courageous” (quoting Williams, 358 U.S. at 219)); Getches, supra note 118, at 158990 (asserting that the significance of Williams was to grant tribal jurisdiction over
commercial claims occurring on reservations filed by non-Indians). But see Milner S.
Ball, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1183, 1186-87 (2000) (arguing that Williams justified a
limited state encroachment on Indian affairs, so long as the state does not interfere
with tribal lawmaking); L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the
Millenium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 823-24 (1996) (indicating that Williams had limited
application, despite the advances it made for tribal sovereignty, because the
reservation in question had few non-Indians and Arizona had not exercised
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President Richad M. Nixon formally repudiated termination
policies in 1970. Nixon initiated a program that included the
transfer of administrative responsibility for federally funded
programs from the BIA to the tribes themselves, and the creation of
202
The Indian Self-Determination and Education
tribal-run schools.
203
Assistance Act, passed in 1975, embodied the policies of the new
era. The Act allowed tribes to assume control over federally funded
204
programs, if they chose to participate at all. Many tribes have taken
advantage of the Act, and run their own police, social service, health
care and natural resource management programs.
Congress continued to pass legislation promoting tribal sovereignty
and self-determination throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. To
reverse some of the effects of the policies aimed at cultural
205
destruction, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act, which
requires unique procedures in cases involving the adoption and
206
207
208
placement of Indian children. The Clean Air, Clean Water, and

jurisdiction pursuant to “Public Law 280”).
202. See H.R. DOC. NO. 91-363, at 4-5, 6-7 (1970) (enhancing tribal self-sufficiency
through a more limited role for the Bureau of Indian Affairs and other federal
agencies with jurisdiction over Indian territory). These policy ideas were not solely
the President’s. Tribal leaders and activists had been advocating for such changes
throughout the 1960s. And, during this time, President Johnson’s “Great Society”
programs provided funding to poor Indian communities. Both in 1964 and 1968,
Indians were given special consideration under the Economic Opportunity Act, Pub.
L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2991-2994 (1994))
(authorizing administrative and financial support for economic development on
Indian reservations). Such funding enabled tribal communities to participate in the
larger debate on ending poverty and fostering self-determination. Indian legal
services programs, such as DNA-People’s Legal Services, were founded with Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO) money, making it possible for poor, rural Indians to
access the legal system for the first time. See also Robert C. Swan, Indian Legal Services
Programs: The Key to Red Power?, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 594, 625 (1970) (viewing Indian legal
services as part of an evolving sensitivity to Indian civil rights). In addition, more
radical factions, such as the American Indian Movement, raised both Indian and
non-Indian consciousness about the destitute conditions on many reservations and
the internal corruption caused by the heavy hand of the BIA in internal tribal affairs.
See WARD CHURCHILL, THE BLOODY WAKE OF ALCATRAZ, IN SINCE PREDATOR CAME:
NOTES FROM THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN INDIAN LIBERATION 203, 203-43 (1995)
(discussing the American Indian independence movement of the 1970s, and the
response of the federal government, particularly the Federal Bureau of
Investigation). While a thorough analysis of how the events of the 1960s led to a
revamping of Indian policy is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that the
activism of these turbulent times brought the misguided approach of the
Termination era into sharp focus.
203. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458 (1994) (providing funding for construction of tribal
schools and guidance for tribally-managed education, health services and land
management).
204. Id.
205. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994) (establishing procedures to protect unity of
Indian families in custody proceedings and develop tribal child welfare codes).
206. See id. §§ 1901-1917 (providing specific procedures for cases involving the
adoption and placement of Indian children).
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209

were amended to authorize the
Safe Drinking Water Acts
Environmental Protection Agency to treat tribes as states for the
purposes of enforcing their own air and water quality standards.
210
Congress also passed the Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993, which
authorized funding to establish or expand Indian tribal judicial
systems.
B. Supreme Court Cases in the Era of Self-Determination
Early on in the era of self-determination, the Supreme Court’s
Indian law jurisprudence appeared to complement the Indian
policies of Congress and the Executive Branch. Following Williams v.
Lee, the Court decided two cases in the 1970’s that affirmed the
sovereign status of tribes. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
211
Commission, the Court, with Justice Thurgood Marshall speaking for
a unanimous Court, held that Arizona could not tax the income of a
member of the Navajo Nation who lived and worked within the
boundaries of the Navajo reservation. First, the Court noted that
tribal sovereignty was the “backdrop” against which the laws must be
212
read.
The Court then employed a “preemption” analysis, which
looked at the treaty between the United States and the Navajo
Nation, and other relevant statutes, to determine whether those
federal laws preempted any application of state law in the particular
213
circumstance at issue.

207. Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 107(d), 104 Stat. 2464 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(A) (1994) (authorizing the Administrator of Act to treat
Indian tribes as states in limited respects).
208. Act of Nov. 1, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-581, § 207, 102 Stat. 2940 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994)) (granting tribes with organized selfgoverning bodies control over funding to establish water quality priorities). See also
Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 921 (1996)
(affirming that 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1994) authorizes the EPA to treat Indian tribes as
states for purposes of promulgating water quality standards); Albuquerque v.
Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 419 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 965 (1997) (noting
the EPA recognizes Indian reservations as states for purposes of the Clean Water
Act); Wisconsin v. EPA, 2001 WL 1117281 (7th Cir. Sept. 21, 2001) (rejecting state
challenge to tribal treatment-as-state (TAS) designation).
209. Act of June 19, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, §302(c), 100 Stat. 666 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(e)) (1994) (granting tribes primary enforcement responsibility
for aspects of safe drinking water enforcement).
210. Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3621 (1994))
(authorizing funds to support tribal justice efforts).
211. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
212. See id. at 172.
213. See id. at 181 (holding Arizona lacked jurisdiction to impose a tax on
reservation Indians). As with Williams, scholars disagree as to whether McClanahan
diverges from a notion of intact territorial sovereignty or merely perpetuates the
analysis of the Marshall trilogy. Compare Getches, supra note 118, at 1647-48 (arguing
McClanahan faithfully follows foundational principals), with Gould, supra note 200,
at 824-25 (describing McClanahan’s preemption test as relegating tribal sovereignty to
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214

Subsequently, in Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held
that the Indian Civil Rights Act did not waive a tribe’s sovereign
immunity from suit in federal court. In coming to this conclusion,
the Court strongly reiterated the pre-constitutional sovereign status of
Indian tribes stating that “Indian tribes are ‘distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights’ in
215
matters of local self-government.”
The Court found that, while
Congress has “plenary authority to limit, modify, or eliminate the
216
powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess,”
Congress had not expressly waived tribal sovereign immunity from
217
suit in the ICRA.
Foundational scholars call the period in which these decisions were
218
The modern era is
made the “modern era,” in Indian law.
characterized by a revival of the core doctrinal principles enunciated
by Chief Justice John Marshall that tribes have authority over their
members and their territory unless Congress divests them of that
219
authority.
Pragmatists contend that the best cases in the “modern
era” are better explained by a revival of Marshall’s approach, rather
than his doctrine. That approach mediates the historical and
political forces tending to diminish tribal self-governance with a
context-sensitive recognition of the strong normative claims (based
also on history and politics) that tribes have to continue as separate
220
sovereigns.
Early on in the modern era, however, some cases involving tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians did not appear to follow the Marshall
approach. In 1978, the same year Martinez was decided, the Court
221
decided Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.
In Oliphant, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found that criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians was inconsistent with a tribe’s dependent status.

a “mere” backdrop).
214. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
215. Id. at 55 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)).
216. Id. at 56 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (holding Fifth
Amendment did not limit powers of the Tribes as it had the powers of the states or
the federal government)).
217. Id.
218. See WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 23-31 (coining the term “the modern era”
and describing it as the revival of judicial acknowledgment of the special rules that
protect tribal self-governance).
219. See generally id.
220. See Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 1177-78 (suggesting that the
Court’s decisions on Indian matters demonstrates a “tradition” of preserving Indian
rights from state and congressional interference); Frickey, Marshalling Past and
Present, supra note 119 (describing Marshall’s approach as an attempt to mediate the
reality of colonization with the norm of respect for tribes as sovereigns).
221. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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The presumption governing McClanahan and Martinez—that a tribe’s
preconstitutional sovereignty is intact and encompasses the ability to
govern internal affairs unless Congress has clearly stated otherwise—
222
The Oliphant court determined that it need not
did not apply.
review federal legislation to determine if Congress had explicitly
divested the tribe of its criminal authority over non-members because
that authority simply was not compatible with the tribe’s inherent
223
The approach in Oliphant was the first application of
sovereignty.
224
the Court’s “implicit divestiture” doctrine.
Oliphant has been
heavily criticized by commentators for engaging in unguided
common-law decision-making, thereby usurping Congress’ special
225
role in defining relations with tribes.
The Supreme Court continued to act schizophrenically in Indian
cases throughout the 1980s and 1990s. For example, in tax matters,
the Court has resorted to obfuscating distinctions in order to permit
increasing forms of state taxation within Indian Country. In 1976, a
unanimous Court applied McClanahan to a Public Law 280 state in
Bryan v. Itasca County, holding that Minnesota could not impose
226
property taxes on reservation mobile homes. The same term,

222. See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978) (discussing
instances when Congress divested tribes of authority over Indian affairs);
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 171-172 (1973) (requiring an
explicit act of Congress before states can exercise regulatory authority over onreservation Indian affairs).
223. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211 (noting exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
respondent tribe would run contrary to certain protections afforded by the federal
government).
224. See N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate
Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 380-88 (1994)
(providing a useful overview of the implicit divestiture cases).
225. See, e.g., Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 3439 (finding Oliphant to be inconsistent with prior cases, such as Williams, with regard
to judicial respect for tribal sovereignty); Getches, supra note 118, at 1595-99 (citing
Oliphant as an example of the Court’s changed attitude towards tribal sovereignty);
Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of
the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 439-43 (1993) (arguing that Oliphant has led to the
evisceration of tribal sovereignty); Russel L. Barsh & James Y. Henderson, The
Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L.
REV. 609, 636 (1979) (arguing that Oliphant will hamper law enforcement efforts on
Indian reservations and runs contrary to previous Supreme Court decisions
extending tribal jurisdiction over on-reservation affairs).
226. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976) (holding that Congress
expressed no intent that state jurisdiction over reservations would extend to the
power to tax). Minnesota based its argument on Public Law 280’s imposition of state
civil jurisdiction in Indian Country. The Court held the law only applied to civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction, not to regulation. Id. at 381, 392-93. See also Frickey,
Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 1166-68 (concluding that factors other than
congressional intent best explain the decision). See generally Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch.
505, § 4, 67 Stat. 589 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360a (1994) (granting six states
jurisdiction over civil causes of action where an Indian is a party)).
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however, the Court decided Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
227
Tribes. Moe affirmed lower court decisions finding that reservation
cigarette sales to Indians were not subject to state tax, though Justice
Rehnquist added that Montana could tax on-reservation purchases by
non-Indians. Moe thus opened the door to Washington v. Confederated
228
Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation.
In Colville, the Court upheld
Washington’s attempts to impose taxes on reservation sales of
229
Justice White, writing for
cigarettes to non-members of the tribe.
the majority, conducted a cursory preemption analysis, and
concluded that the tribe should not be able to use its sovereignty in
230
order to lure customers away from the state. The ruling seemed to
depend more upon a determination concerning the appropriateness
of the tribe’s economic behavior than on whether Congress had
preempted states from regulating in the field. Thus, although the
cases are doctrinally distinct, Colville resonates with Oliphant. Without
articulating so directly, both decisions are moored in the Court’s own
sense of the appropriate place for tribes rather than any clear
statements from Congress or elsewhere regarding the extent of tribal
powers.
During the same term the Court also decided that state taxation of
non-Indians in Indian country was prohibited in two cases: White
231
Mountain Apache v. Bracker and Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State
232
Tax Commission.
In both of these cases, with Justice Marshall
speaking for the majority, the Court applied the McClanahan
233
preemption analysis and found that Congress did not intend to
234
allow for state taxation. However, the Moe and Colville legacy lived

227. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
228. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
229. Id. at 159 (“We therefore hold that the State may validly require the tribal
smokeshops to affix tax stamps purchased from the State to individual packages of
cigarettes prior to the time of sale to nonmembers of the Tribe.”).
230. See id. at 155 (“We do not believe that principles of federal Indian law,
whether stated in terms of preemption, tribal government, or otherwise, authorize
Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to persons who would
normally do their business elsewhere”); see also Getches, supra note 118, at 1600-06
(providing in-depth discussion of Colville, and how the decision damaged tribal
sovereignty).
231. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
232. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
233. See id. at 165 (asserting that “Indian trader statutes” preempt taxation of
transactions between Indians and non-Indians occurring on reservations); see also
White Mountain Apache, 448 U.S. at 142 (noting that the exercise of state regulatory
authority “may be pre-empted by federal law”) (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)).
234. See Central Mach., 448 U.S. at 165-66 (finding that Arizona could not impose a
gross receipts tax on a non-Indian farm machinery dealer because the matter could
have been regulated under a federal statute, even though in fact it was not); see also
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on. In 1989, the Court held in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
that states could impose oil and gas severance taxes on non-Indian
companies extracting oil and gas in Indian country, leaving the
236
companies subject to taxation by the tribe and the state.
While
Cotton Petroleum ostensibly allows concurrent taxing authority by the
state and tribe, as a practical matter it allows state taxes to preempt
tribal ones. Tribes rarely will succeed at convincing businesses to stay
on their reservations if they are subjected to triple taxation. Thus,
the Court’s decisions concerning the imposition of state taxes in
Indian Country have left tribes with uncertainties concerning their
attempts at revenue collection.
In terms of a tribe’s authority to impose taxes and regulations on
non-Indians, a similarly inconsistent pattern of case law developed.
On the one hand, the Court appeared to follow the path of
237
238
Worcester and Williams, affirming tribal rights to govern within
239
their boundaries. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the Court
affirmed the tribe’s power to tax non-Indian companies for
reservation mineral production. Similarly, in Kerr-McGee Corp. v.
240
Navajo Tribe of Indians, the Court determined that the tribe’s power
to tax did not depend upon approval by the Secretary of the Interior.
Two other promising cases involved non-Indian efforts to avoid
defending lawsuits in tribal courts. In National Farmers Union
241
Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe, and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v.
242
LaPlante, the Court developed a prudential rule requiring litigants
in tribal court to exhaust their tribal court remedies before coming to

White Mountain Apache, 448 U.S. at 151 (prohibiting Arizona’s attempts to tax a nonIndian logging company operating on the White Mountain Apache Reservation and
concluding that the federal government’s comprehensive scheme for regulating the
timber industry preempted any state taxation.).
235. 490 U.S. 163, 177 (1989) (disagreeing with Petitioner’s contention that state
tax on petroleum extraction from Indian reservation is preempted by federal
mandate).
236. See id. at 186-87 (concluding that federal law does not preempt state oil and
gas severance taxes).
237. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (stating that Indian
nations are “distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within
which their authority is exclusive”).
238. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (holding state court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over matters occurring on reservation).
239. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
240. 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (holding Secretary of the Interior need not review all tax
matters arising from a reservation’s mineral production).
241. See 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985) (asserting that a non-Indian challenging
tribal court jurisdiction must exhaust tribal court remedies before being heard by a
federal district court under federal question jurisdiction).
242. See 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) (applying the National Farmers requirement of
exhaustion of tribal court remedies before being heard by federal district court in
cases involving out of state defendants).

KRAKOFFJCI.DOC

1210

10/11/2001 1:59 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1177

243

The Court in
federal court to question the tribe’s jurisdiction.
National Farmers also decided that the question of whether the tribal
courts had exceeded the limits of their jurisdiction was indeed a
federal question, but that the federal courts should stay their hands
244
The exhaustion rule
until the tribal court had a chance to rule.
furthers the development of tribal sovereignty by allowing tribes to
develop their own procedural and substantive case law. Arguably, the
exhaustion rule also protects tribes from undue backlash by
245
providing a mechanism for federal review.
Moreover, language in
National Farmers and Laplante indicates that the Court took Williams to
246
mean that tribal court jurisdiction extends to non-Indians.
However, in a series of cases beginning with Montana v. United
247
States, the Court began limiting tribal civil jurisdiction over nonIndians. In Montana, the Crow Tribe was attempting to ban nonIndian hunting and fishing within the Crow Reservation’s
248
boundaries.
First, the Supreme Court determined that the bed of
the Big Horn River passed to the state upon its entry into the Union,
249
and that therefore the river bed was not Crow tribal trust land. This
determination was crucial, because previous cases, like Merrion and
Kerr-McGee, determined that tribes retained inherent power to
250
regulate non-Indian use of tribal property. With none of the land

243. See id. at 16 (granting tribal court primary jurisdiction over challenges to its
jurisdiction, thereby sustaining its authority over reservation affairs); Nat’l Farmers,
471 U.S. at 856 (allowing tribal court “first opportunity” to address challenge to its
jurisdiction).
244. See Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857.
245. Cf. Robert Laurence, Martinez, Oliphant and Federal Court Review of Tribal
Activity Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411, 428 (1988) (arguing
that tribal courts might have retained more jurisdiction had Martinez been decided
differently and allowed for federal court review of tribal court decisions under the
Indian Civil Rights Act). But see Philip Allen White, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine:
“Just Stay on the Good Roads and You Have Nothing to Worry About,” 22 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 65, 162 (1997) (indicating that the tribal court exhaustion doctrine has not
protected tribal courts from federal court intermeddling).
246. See LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 14 (noting the Court’s repeated recognition of the
federal government’s encouragement of tribal self-government); Nat’l Farmers, 471
U.S. at 853 (observing that tribal courts may hear disputes between Indians and nonIndians).
247. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Two of the other cases in this series, South Dakota v.
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), and Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), are
discussed in Part III.
248. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 549 (explaining Resolution No.74.05, which
prohibited hunting and fishing by non-members of the Crow tribe).
249. See id. at 557 (holding that the river beds passed to Montana).
250. Other cases also affirmed the principle that tribes retained authority over all
lands within their reservation boundaries. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (“Indian tribes
possess a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on
Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have a significant interest.”); Solem v.
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984) (explaining that all land within reservation
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at issue in Montana being tribal trust land, the question was whether
the Crow Tribe had the power to regulate non-Indians on non-Indian
251
The Court ruled that tribes do not have regulatory
fee land.
jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian fee lands unless the
activity to be regulated fits into one of two exceptions: (1) if nonIndians engage in “consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases or other
252
arrangements;” or (2) if the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
“threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
253
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”
Montana was followed by Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
254
the Yakima Indian Nation, which further complicated the question of
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. In Brendale, the Court ruled that
the Yakima Tribe could only impose its zoning regulations on nonIndian lands in the two-thirds portion of its reservation that retained
255
a reservation character. The Court’s differential treatment of
portions of the reservation stemmed from the patterns of landownership that developed after allotment. The “open” third of the
reservation was occupied largely by non-Indians who owned their
land in fee. The “closed” two thirds, in the Court’s eyes, retained the
character of an Indian reservation because most of the land was tribal
256
or individual Indian trust land.
Finally, in the modern era, the Court confronted several cases
concerning the extent of reservation territorial boundaries. In these
cases, the Court had to consider whether allotment-era statutes that
opened up Indian lands to non-Indian settlement also diminished
tribal reservation boundaries.
The Court’s diminishment

boundaries is “Indian country,” regardless of ownership).
251. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 557.
252. Id. at 565.
253. Id. at 551-52.
254. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
255. See id. Brendale has three separate opinions, none of which commanded a
majority. Justice White authored an opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy and
Rehnquist, which would have denied tribal authority to zone any non-Indian land
within the reservation. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan,
would have allowed the tribe to zone all land within the reservation. Justices Stevens
and O’Connor joined to make the jurisdictional compromise of allowing the tribe to
zone non-Indian lands within the “closed” area of the reservation (an area which was
still largely tribal trust land or trust allotments), but prohibiting them from doing so
in the “open” portion of the reservation. Although no other Justices seemed to favor
this outcome, each portion of the opinion drew enough support to become the
holding. Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall joined in the part granting the tribe
jurisdiction, while Scalia, Kennedy and Rehnquist joined in the part allowing only
the county to zone non-Indian land. See id.
256. See id. at 441 (explaining the closed area is an undeveloped refuge of cultural
and religious significance).
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jurisprudence, even more so than its regulation of non-member
jurisprudence, is a relatively recent creature. Since the Marshall
trilogy, the Court has been addressing the issue (often very
indirectly) of tribal control over people within tribal territorial
boundaries. But only since the era of self-determination have
questions arisen concerning whether allotment-era statutes (the
policies of which have been entirely abandoned) diminished
reservation boundaries.
257
In the first two such cases, Mattz v. Arnett and Seymour v.
258
Superintendent, the Court found that the reservations had not been
diminished. In the next two, however, the Court found that
allotment statutes had constricted reservation boundaries.
In
259
Decoteau v. District County Court, the Court appeared to rely on the
language of the allotment statute to conclude that, the Indian law
260
canons notwithstanding, the reservation had been diminished.
Thus the Court incorporated into its diminishment approach the
261
search for “magic language” in the statute. In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
262
Kneip,
however, the Court found that the Rosebud Sioux
Reservation had been diminished despite serious questions
263
In Kneip, the
concerning the presence of such magic language.
Court stated that it was relying additionally on circumstances
264
surrounding the enactment of the allotment statute.
The Court, with Justice Thurgood Marshall writing for the
265
majority, attempted to harmonize these cases in Solem v. Bartlett.
The outcome of Solem was favorable to the Cheyenne River Sioux
266
Tribe in that the Court found no diminishment of their reservation.

257. 412 U.S. 481, 485 (1973).
258. 368 U.S. 351, 352 (1962).
259. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
260. See id. at 427-28.
261. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 18
(discussing the “magic language” aspect of the Court’s diminishment approach); see
also Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by Judicial, As
Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting
Both, 71 N.D. L. REV. 393, 398 (1995) [hereinafter Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of
Reservation Diminishment] (criticizing the judiciary’s approach to diminishment). The
“magic language” in Decoteau was that the tribe agreed to “cede, sell, relinquish, and
convey to the United States all . . . claim, right, title and interest.” Decoteau, 420 U.S.
at 439-40 n.22 (describing the Sisseton-Wahpeton Agreement and the language of
other comparable agreements).
262. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
263. See id. at 585-86 (holding that Congress intended to diminish the
reservation).
264. See id.
265. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
266. See id. at 466 (affirming the lower court’s ruling that the reservation had not
been diminished).
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But the Court’s route to that conclusion was far less auspicious. First,
Marshall acknowledged the impossibility of there being specific
congressional intent on this particular issue, not just in Solem, but in
267
Congress did not anticipate that tribal
any Allotment Era case.
sovereignty would outlast the allotment of tribal lands; indeed, in the
268
Allotment Era Congress anticipated just the opposite.
Thus,
Congress had no intent regarding the question whether reservation
269
In
boundaries, as markers for tribal authority, survived allotment.
the absence of clear congressional intent, one would expect the
Indian law canon requiring that statutory ambiguities be construed
narrowly to protect tribal interests to compel a conclusion for the
270
tribes.
But Decoteau and Kneip foreclosed such a straightforward
resolution. Instead, the Solem Court purported to look at several
factors. The first was whether the allotment statute had clear
271
language of cession —the “magic language” test first articulated in
272
Decoteau. The Solem Court found no such language in the Cheyenne
273
River allotment statute.
Next, the Court looked to whether the circumstances surrounding
the passage of the allotment statute could support a finding of
274
275
diminishment. Finally, the Court considered “to a lesser extent”
whether events occurring since the enactment of the allotment
276
statute should be taken into account to decide congressional intent.
These factors include the demographics of the disputed area and the
277
degree of tribal versus state control.
Several commentators have
observed that this last factor is actually what drives outcomes in

267. See id. at 468-69.
268. See supra notes 149-81 and accompanying text.
269. See Solem, 465 U.S. at 472-73 (finding that “both [the] Act and its legislative
history fail[ed] to provide substantial and compelling evidence of a Congressional
intention to diminish Indian lands”); see also Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of
Colonialism, supra note 21, at 17 (“Note precisely what Marshall posited: The statutes
did not address reservation boundaries, and Congress did not deliberate about
them.”).
270. See COHEN, supra note 134, at 122 (discussing the canons of Indian law
construction).
271. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984) (explaining that the language
of cession and commitment from Congress to pay Indians for their opened land is a
strong indication that Congress meant to diminish the reservation).
272. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 19
(describing this search for clear statutory language as disingenuous, given that the
Court had already conceded that Congress could have had no intent on the specific
question of whether conveyance of tribal lands affected reservation boundaries).
273. See Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-71.
274. See id. at 471.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
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278

diminishment cases.
In Solem, the demographics and governmental authority favored
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. The Court found that nearly two
thirds of the Tribe’s members lived in the opened area, that the seat
of tribal government was located there as well, and therefore that “it
is impossible to say that the opened areas of the . . . [r]eservation
279
have lost their Indian character.”
The Solem Court thus arrived at
the same conclusion that it would have had it taken its own
observations concerning the impossibility of specific congressional
intent seriously, and then applied the Indian law canons of
interpretation. The roadmap left by Solem, however, was much less
280
straightforward.
Thus, although we remain in the period of self-determination for
tribes in terms of the policies of the executive and legislative
branches, the proposition appears questionable when one looks at
the trajectory of the judicial decisions. In the courts, Indian tribes
still suffer from the wild inconsistency of the past. When faced with
an individual issue concerning tribal sovereignty, the courts look to
more than just the Marshall trilogy and recent pronouncements by
the President and Congress about the inherent sovereignty of tribes.
Rather, they draw on the whole messy, conflicted and conflicting
281
doctrinal and legislative history.
Foundationalists and pragmatists
alike conclude that the Court risks becoming the final agent of

278. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 20-27
(discussing the importance of demographics in diminishment cases); see also Robert
Laurence, The Dominant Society’s Judicial Reluctance to Allow Tribal Civil Law to Apply to
Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography and the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 789-93 (1996) [hereinafter Laurence, The Dominant
Society’s Judicial Reluctance] (finding the presence of non-Indians to be the
determinative factor in diminishment cases); see also Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of
Reservation Diminishment, supra note 261, at 403; James M. Grijalva, Diminishment of
Indian Reservations: Legislative or Judicial Fiat?, 71 N.D. L. REV. 415, 417, 421-22 (1995)
(noting that using present day demographics of the reservation does not legitimately
indicate congressional intent).
279. Solem, 465 U.S. at 480.
280. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 20-21:
Solem is a puzzle when viewed on its own terms, as a statutory interpretation
case involving a canon focusing on congressional intent. When it and the
prior diminishment cases are assessed through a wider lens, however, it
seems that the Supreme Court resolved each of them not by statutory
interpretation, but by practical, contextual judgments concerning whether,
because of post-enactment developments, the disputed area had lost its
“Indian character.”
Id.
281. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 70-76 (1995)
(explaining how the Court’s jurisdictional decisions resurrect repudiated Allotment
Era statutes and policies); see also Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 118081 (questioning the guidance offered by the Court’s decision in Solem); Getches,
supra note 118, at 1622-26.
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colonization if it continues to engage in ad hoc decision-making
282
Foundationalists urge the Court to
concerning tribal authority.
return to the core doctrinal principles and accompanying canons of
interpretation of Indian law. These principles would require the
Court to defer to exercises of tribal authority and to reject incursions
of state law into Indian country unless Congress has clearly dictated
otherwise. Pragmatists urge the Court to look at Indian law afresh in
today’s context, and recognize that tribes are sovereign governments
that have a strong normative claim to continue as such. Legislation
and treaties concerning tribal self-governance thus should be
construed in light of this normative claim. In the absence of either
the structuralist/formalist approach of the foundationalists or the
interpretive/contextualist approach of the pragmatists, the Court is
rudderless in Indian law, allowing unspoken norms of tribal
termination and/or strong commitments to other areas of law to
283
carry out the final conquest.
III. MINIMALISM, LACK-OF-INTEREST CONVERGENCE AND THE CURRENT
COURT’S INDIAN LAW CASES
The patchwork approach to questions of jurisdiction in Indian
country was well on its way when Justice Souter, the first of the
plausibly pro-tribal minimalists, arrived on the Supreme Court in
1990. By the time Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were appointed (in
1993 and 1994 respectively), the last Indian law maximalist, Justice
Blackmun, resigned. Given their minimalist tendencies, these
Justices might well have felt constrained by recent precedent

282. See Getches, supra note 118, at 1654 (noting that a “return to foundation
principles . . . would spare tribes the subjective judgments of courts by requiring
congressional action, with the scrutiny of the political process and the tribes’ full
participation, before modifying their rights as sovereigns.”); Frickey, A Common Law
for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 80:
[The court’s approach] turns federal Indian law on its head. The field is
best understood as reflecting a stark compromise between colonialism
(overriding power) and limited government (the rule of law): Congress has
virtually untethered authority over Indian affairs, but the courts stand ready
. . . to force Congress to do its ongoing colonial work expressly. The vagaries
of existing law are interpreted to preserve tribal sovereignty, and those
seeking to diminish tribal power must bear the burden of overcoming
legislative inertia . . . [the court’s current approach] threatens to jettison this
well-established mediating method rooted in congressional responsibility
and judicial checks in favor of a one-sided imposition of colonial values
where courts, not Congress, assume front-line colonial responsibility.
Id.
283. See Getches, supra note 118 (describing how the Court’s Indian law agenda is
often captive to other concerns); Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism,
supra note 21, at 64-85 (criticizing the Court for lacking any Indian law justifications
for their decisions in Indian cases).
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restricting tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Moreover, minimalist
preference for “shallow” decisions may have obscured the norms
underlying recent precedents. Unable or unwilling to see that the
Court’s common law of tribal jurisdiction imposed a vision of tribes
endorsed neither by Congress nor by the Executive Branch, the
minimalists often converged with the maximalists to divest tribes of
284
aspects of their sovereignty. Six cases, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, South
285
Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
286
287
Government, Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians,
288
289
Atkinson Trading Post v. Shirley, and Nevada v. Hicks reveal this
convergence.
A. Strate v. A-1 Contractors: Minimalist Divestiture of Tribal Court
Jurisdiction
290

In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
Justice Ginsburg authored a
291
unanimous opinion, limiting the reach of tribal court jurisdiction.
Strate involved a personal injury case that occurred on a state highway
located within the boundaries of the Fort Berthold Indian
292
Reservation in North Dakota. As Justice Ginsburg framed the issue,
the question before the Court was:
When an accident occurs on a portion of a public highway
maintained by the state under a federally granted right-of-way over
Indian reservation land, may tribal courts entertain a civil action
against an allegedly negligent driver and the driver’s employer,
293
neither of whom is a member of the tribe?

First, note the procedurally minimalist way the issue is described;
294
the Court is not considering, as it did in Oliphant, whether all Indian
tribes are divested of entire categories of jurisdiction over non
284. 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (ruling that the tribe does not have jurisdiction over a
claim between non-Indians that resulted from a traffic accident on a public highway
situated on reservation land).
285. 522 U.S. 329 (1997).
286. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
287. 524 U.S. 103 (1998) (finding that Congress intended to subject Indian
reservation land to state and local taxation when it made the land freely alienable).
288. 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001).
289. 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001).
290. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
291. See id. at 442 (“[T]ribal courts may not entertain claims against nonmembers
arising out of accidents on state highways, absent a statute or treaty authorizing the
tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the highway in question.”).
292. See id. at 442-43 (describing the location and details of the traffic accident
that was the subject matter of this case).
293. Id. at 442.
294. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978)
(determining that Indian tribal courts do not have criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians).
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295

As Ginsburg describes it, all the Court is considering is
members.
whether this tribe has jurisdiction over this case involving these
296
litigants. And, as is taught frequently in continuing legal education
seminars on legal writing, the issue—framing foretells the outcome.
Once Ginsburg starts by highlighting that the state maintains the
“public highway,” under a “federally granted right-of-way,” and then
297
notes that neither of the defendants is a tribal member, logic
inexorably dictates that tribes should not entertain jurisdiction over
these foreign claims.
But, with a different starting point, the inexorable logic could
easily have dictated a different outcome. The issue confronting the
Court could have been framed in the following manner: “When a
plaintiff, who is a resident of an Indian Tribe’s reservation, chooses to
bring a personal injury lawsuit against a non-tribal member in tribal
court for an accident that occurred on a right of way granted by the
Tribe, does the tribal court have jurisdiction to hear the case?”
Because Justice Ginsburg adopted the former framing of the issue, we
know from the outset of the opinion that the Tribe loses.
The Strate opinion turns on the Court’s characterization of the
state highway on which the accident occurred. The characterization
of the right-of-way is crucial because otherwise Justice Ginsburg would
have to do more than just follow precedent with respect to limitations
on tribal jurisdiction. She would have to make new pronouncements
about the limits of inherent tribal sovereignty, as Justice Rehnquist
did in Oliphant. Justice Ginsburg’s minimalist tendencies would make
such pronouncements difficult; instead, the deep assumption is
buried under a shallow approach. As long as the case can be
298
squeezed into a Montana framework, an incremental ruling is
possible.
As discussed above, in Montana, the Court found that Indian tribes
do not have regulatory jurisdiction over non-members on non-Indian
299
fee land, with two exceptions. First, the tribe has jurisdiction when
the non-members have entered into a consensual relationship with
300
the tribe.
Second, the tribe has jurisdiction over the conduct of
non-members that “threatens or has some direct effect on the

295. See id. at 195.
296. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 442; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at ix, 9 (describing
minimalist decisions as being based on the facts of the particular case, rather than
broad rules).
297. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.
298. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
299. See id. at 565.
300. See id.
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political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
301
the tribe.”
However, Montana did not address the extent of tribal jurisdiction
over non-members on tribal trust land, or land that is considered the
equivalent of such land, stating that tribes retain considerable control
302
over nonmember conduct on tribal land. To rule that tribes do not
have jurisdiction in those circumstances when Congress has not
explicitly divested tribes of such jurisdiction, the Court would have to
303
confront head-on the divergence from Worcester, as well as the drift
304
which mandates exclusive tribal
away from Williams v. Lee,
305
jurisdiction in certain cases involving non-Indians.
The question of the nature of the right-of-way, however, did not
seem to be so easily resolved. Prior to Strate, courts looked to the
definition of Indian country found in the criminal statutes for
306
application in civil matters involving tribal members. The criminal
provisions include in their definition of Indian country, “all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
307
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation . . .”
But Ginsburg, rather than apply § 1151 as written, finds a latent
308
ambiguity. In a footnote that does not mention the many cases that
apply the criminal definition of Indian country in civil cases, she

301. Id. at 566.
302. Id. at 557.
303. See supra Part II.A (discussing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832)). Worcester held that the State of Georgia could not enforce its laws within the
boundaries of the Cherokee reservation, even when those laws involved a nonIndian. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 595-96. While Worcester’s apparent bright line
rule has been modified in certain circumstances to allow concurrent taxation of nonIndians in Indian country and criminal jurisdiction over crimes involving nonIndians, it has never been completely repudiated. See supra Part II.A. Therefore, to
find that tribes do not have jurisdiction over non-members on tribal lands would
potentially leave a jurisdictional gap, with neither the state nor the tribe able to
impose its laws. See id.
304. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
305. Id. at 223.
306. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125-26, 128 (1993)
(invalidating state income and motor vehicle tax on tribal members living in Indian
country); see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 505, 513 (1991) (invalidating state cigarette tax on tribal members who lived in
Indian country); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22
(1987) (finding no jurisdiction for the state’s regulation of tribal bingo and card
games).
307. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
308. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454 n.9 (1997) (comparing 18
U.S.C. § 1151(a), which defines “Indian country” to include rights-of-way for the
purposes of criminal statutes, with 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154(c) and 1156 (dealing with
“dispensation and possession of intoxicants), which defines “Indian country” as not
including rights-of-way through Indian reservations).
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points out that rights-of-way are treated differently in § 1151 than in a
provision governing the dispensation and possession of alcohol on
309
reservations.
Ginsburg then characterizes the right-of-way as the equivalent of
310
She states that the right-of-way is of infinite
non-Indian fee.
duration and that the only right reserved by the tribe or the
individual Indian landowners was the right to construct crossings of
311
the right-of-way. She finds that “[a]part from this specification, the
Three Affiliated Tribes expressly reserved no right to exercise
312
dominion or control over the right-of-way.”
Ginsburg then notes
that the Tribe has no gatekeeping right, and, therefore, cannot
313
exclude non-members from entering the reservation.
Drawing on
314
dicta from South Dakota v. Bourland, she concludes that a tribe’s loss
of the “‘absolute and exclusive use and occupation . . . implies the
315
loss of regulatory jurisdiction over the use of land by others.’” With
the land “align[ed] . . . for the purpose at hand, with land alienated
316
to non-Indians,” the Montana test applies; the tribe only has
317
jurisdiction over non-Indians under Montana’s exceptions.
As with the characterization of the right-of-way, Justice Ginsburg
makes the analysis under the Montana exceptions artificially tidy.
Under the “consensual relationship” exception, she describes the
auto accident that gave rise to the dispute in tribal court as a “‘run-of318
the-mill [highway] accident.’”
Brushing aside facts that indicate
that the only reason the non-Indian defendant was traveling on the
highway was to carry out business under a contract it had with the
319
Tribe, Justice Ginsburg determines that the only relevant facts are
that “‘Gisela Fredericks was not a party to the subcontract, and the
320
tribes were strangers to the accident.’”
Ginsburg then cites a number of cases that she says would fit within

309. Id.
310. Id. at 456.
311. Id. at 455.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 456.
314. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
315. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997) (quoting Bourland, 508
U.S. at 689) (interpreting Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 409, 422-25 (1988)).
316. Id.
317. See id. (concluding that Montana, is the controlling decision); see also supra
notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
318. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457 (quoting A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 940
(8th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)) (alteration in original).
319. See id. at 443, 457.
320. Id. at 457 (quoting A-1 Contractors, 76 F.3d at 940) (alteration in original).
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321

the first Montana exception. None of the cases she cites, however,
involved activity on non-Indian fee land. Rather, they are cases
involving the inherent sovereignty of a tribe to regulate and/or tax
the activity of non-members on tribal lands. In one of the cases she
322
cites, Williams v. Lee, the Court found that the tribe had exclusive
jurisdiction over a dispute involving a non-Indian that occurred
323
within the boundaries of the tribe’s reservation.
Two of the other
cases similarly involved regulation and/or taxation that only the tribe
324
could or would exercise.
Only one of the cases cited, Colville,
determined a tribe’s authority in the context of concurrent authority
325
But even Colville did not address the question of
by the state.
inherent authority to regulate on non-Indian land. To use these
cases as an exhaustive list of the consensual relationships that might
qualify under the first Montana exception is to constrict it
unnecessarily.
Justice Ginsburg’s constriction of the second Montana exception is
even less warranted. The second exception permits tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians on Indian land when their “conduct threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
326
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”
While briefly
acknowledging that a careless driver on a public highway running
through a reservation certainly jeopardizes the safety of tribal
327
members,
Ginsburg then dismisses such jeopardy as of minimal
328
concern to tribal self-governance. The reasoning in this part of the
opinion is particularly conclusory and unsatisfying.
First, Ginsburg warns that if the exception included the
circumstances of this case, “the exception would severely shrink the
329
rule.”
Then, as with the first exception, Ginsburg points to the

321. Id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Morris v.
Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905)).
322. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See supra text accompanying notes 196-201.
323. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223 (noting that to allow state jurisdiction would
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over reservation affairs).
324. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 443, 457 (citing Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384
(1904) and Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), which were Allotment Era
cases that nonetheless upheld the tribes’ rights to impose taxes on non-Indian
activities (grazing and business) conducted within reservation boundaries).
325. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1980) (finding that the tribes have the authority to impose
their taxes on non-tribe members engaged in economic transactions on reservation
land).
326. Id.
327. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457-58 (1997).
328. Id. at 459.
329. Id. at 458.
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cases cited in Montana to elucidate the exception, and treats them as
330
though they constitute an exhaustive list. A closer look at the cases
demonstrates that they cannot be treated as Ginsburg suggests,
without rendering the exception meaningless. The first two cases are
331
332
Williams v. Lee and Fisher v. District Court. In Williams, as discussed
above, the Court held that the tribe had exclusive jurisdiction over a
debt collection action that arose out of a transaction that occurred on
333
the reservation between a tribal member and a non-Indian.
Similarly, Fisher upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court to
adjudicate a matter involving the adoption of tribal member
334
It is troubling to use these cases as a basis to deny
children.
concurrent jurisdiction to a tribe, because doing so implies that there is
no intermediate level of interest that could satisfy the Montana test.
These cases suggest that a matter is either so intrinsic to tribal
sovereignty that the tribe has sole jurisdiction or the tribe is divested
of jurisdiction.
The other authorities cited are similarly unsatisfying if the goal is to
outline the contours of this relatively new rule and its exceptions.
They are Allotment Era cases that upheld state taxation of non-Indian
335
property within the boundaries of a reservation. But these cases do
not address whether the tribe may simultaneously regulate or tax the
non-Indian property. These cases might be more helpful if the
question in Strate was whether the state had concurrent jurisdiction to
adjudicate Ms. Fredericks’s lawsuit. Rather, the question was whether
the deprivation of the ability to impose standards of care for highway
safety within the boundaries of a reservation posed a direct threat to a
336
tribe’s ability to safeguard the health of its members.
Rather than

330. See id. at 458-59 (citing Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Mont. Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118
(1906); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898)) (illustrating when the imposition of
state authority would unfairly limit or burden the tribe’s right to self-government).
331. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
332. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
333. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223 (expressing that it was immaterial that
Respondent was a non-Indian when he was on the reservation and the transaction
involved an Indian). See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text (discussing
states’ jurisdiction over tribes within their boundaries).
334. See Fisher, 424 U.S. at 390-91 (stating that jurisdiction “does not derive from
the race of the plaintiff, but rather quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe under federal law”).
335. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 458 (1997) (citing Montana
Catholic Missions, 200 U.S. at 128-29 (refusing to grant a tax exemption for cattle
when the non-Indian owner kept the cattle on reservation land); Thomas, 169 U.S. at
273 (rejecting the notion that Indians have a direct or vital interest in cattle, owned
by a non-Indian, that graze on reservation land pursuant to a lease)).
336. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (applying the second Montana exception narrowly
to the facts of the case). Such a deprivation would be considered a major problem
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treat the cases as examples from which to reason by analogy,
Ginsburg treats them as if they are the sole examples of situations
337
Then, without any application of
that might meet the exception.
the rules that Justice Ginsburg presumably has extracted from these
cases concerning the meaning of a “direct threat” to tribal welfare,
she concludes with language hinting strongly that a tribe’s inherent
powers only extend to tribal members:
Read in isolation, the Montana rule’s second exception can be
misperceived. Key to its proper application, however, is the Court’s
preface: “Indian tribes retain their inherent power [to punish tribal
offenders,] to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic
relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for
members . . . But [a tribe’s inherent power does not reach] beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
338
internal relations.”

Consistent with her concern that a broad reading of the second
339
Montana exception might swallow the rule,
Justice Ginsburg
practically swallows the exception itself.
Thus in Strate, Justice Ginsburg achieved a shallow, narrow opinion
by appearing to hew closely to Montana and refusing to consider the
broader implications of unilaterally divesting tribes of categories of
self-governance, even one case at a time. In an apparent effort to
avoid questioning past precedent or ruling based explicitly on deep
theoretical or normative grounds, Justice Ginsburg found it inevitable
that she rule against the tribes. But Ginsburg could have drafted an
opinion permitting Gisella Fredericks to proceed with her lawsuit in
tribal court without ruling broadly or deeply. And she could have
done so following either a foundationalist or a pragmatist approach,
as will be discussed in Part IV.


for states, many of which have passed transient motorist statutes allowing them to
assert personal jurisdiction over drivers who are simply passing through on state or
federal highways. These statutes have been upheld as proper exercises of a state’s
jurisdictional reach, with courts citing the importance of highway safety. See Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (upholding, in the first such case before the
Supreme Court, the nonresident motorist statute in Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 431, § 2 (1923))); see also Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 836-37 (N.D. Iowa
1947) (listing nonresident motorist statutes from 48 states and the District of
Columbia); James J. Daubach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern
Trends, 5 UCLA L. REV. 198, 199-200 (1958) (discussing the rationale for
implementing nonresident motorist statutes).
337. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 458 (describing only the cases cited in Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).
338. Id. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564) (emphasis added).
339. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
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Minimalist Minimizing

As discussed in Part II.B and noted by other commentators, the
Court has devised two ways to deprive tribes of governmental
341
authority. The first, as in Strate, is to determine that tribal authority
itself is diminished by finding that tribes lack jurisdiction over certain
342
persons and/or types of cases, even within reservation boundaries.
The second is to determine that tribal territory has been diminished,
and that tribes, therefore, lack authority over activities that occur on
343
land no longer within tribal control.
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe is a unanimous, minimalist case
that falls in the latter category. In the Yankton decision, authored by
Justice O’Connor, the Court found that an 1894 allotment statute
344
diminished the boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation. The
issue arose in the context of a dispute concerning regulation of a
345
The Tribe argued that
proposed landfill on non-Indian fee land.
the landfill fell within the existing boundaries of the reservation, and
346
therefore, federal environmental regulations applied.
The State
contended that the Yankton Reservation had been diminished, and
347
therefore, that the landfill was subject only to state regulation.
As
in Strate, the fight in Yankton concerned the extent of tribal authority
over non-Indian activity. In diminishment cases, however, tribal
authority is addressed indirectly through the rubric of Congressional
348
enactments concerning tribal territory.
In order to understand Yankton, one must not only have Solem in
mind. One must also consider a post-Solem, minimalist-era case,

340. 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
341. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 17-20,
28 (discussing the methods the Court uses to eliminate tribal authority by
(1) reducing the area of land that constitutes the reservation, and (2) limiting the
tribe’s authority over nonmember activity on reservation land); see also Laurence, The
Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment, supra note 261 (comparing diminishment
of tribal authority by congressional enactment, which limits authority by reducing
reservation boundaries, to judicial decision-making that limits authority over land
within the reservation).
342. See supra notes 303-39 and accompanying text (discussing Strate, 520 U.S. at
438 and Montana, 450 U.S. at 544); see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (determining that Indian tribes do not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians).
343. See Yankton, 522 U.S. at 358 (holding that the state has primary jurisdiction
because an 1894 Congressional Act ended the reservations’ status as Indian country).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 333 (summarizing the facts of the case).
346. Id. at 340-41.
347. Id. at 340.
348. See Yankton, 522 U.S. at 343.
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349

Hagen, also authored by O’Connor, held that
Hagen v. Utah.
350
Congress diminished the Uintah Indian Reservation in Utah. The
opinion is troubling in that it departs even from the suspect
requirement, articulated in Decoteau and Solem, that Congress use the
“magic language” of “cession and sum certain,” when diminishing
351
tribal lands. Although the Hagen Court states otherwise, it relies on
352
the expectations of non-Indians, not merely as a “lesser” factor, but
353
as a determinative factor.
In Hagen, the Court found that the language of the allotment and
354
surplus lands act indicated congressional intent to diminish, even
though the Tribe had never consented to the opening up of its
355
reservation, as was required by the statute.
The discussion in the
case distinguishing the kinds of words that evidence an intent to
diminish versus the kinds of words that do not would give succor to
those who condemn the whole enterprise of statutory interpretation
356
According to the Court, the
as a sophisticated form of neurosis.
words “sell and dispose of,” “merely open the reservation,” whereas
357
the words “restore to the public domain,” diminish it.
But the
appearance of the words “public domain,” does not itself evidence
358
intent to diminish, unless the word “restore,” is somewhere nearby.
The Court then openly relied on the large number of non-Indians
currently populating the reservation, and concluded, that to find that
the reservation was not diminished “would seriously disrupt the

349. 510 U.S. 399 (1994). When Hagen was decided, four of the five minimalists
were on the Court. The only minimalist yet to be appointed was Justice Breyer, who
would take the non-minimalist’s, Justice Blackmun’s, seat.
350. See id. at 421.
351. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1984) (finding the isolated terms
“public domain” and “reservation thus diminished” do not clearly articulate
congressional intent to diminish tribal land when considering the act as a whole); see
also DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 445-46 (1975) (stating that the
agreement’s language is “virtually indistinguishable” from the language used in other
agreements the Court found had diminished reservation land).
352. See Solem, 465 U.S. at 471 (acknowledging that the Court takes the events after
the passage of the legislation into account when determining the intent to diminish
reservation land, but only to a lesser degree than other factors).
353. See Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment, supra note 261,
at 403 (suggesting that Hagen can only be harmonized with Solem by taking into
account the Court’s solicitude for the non-Indian presence on the reservation); see
also Laurence, The Dominant Society’s Judicial Reluctance, supra note 278, at 791-92
(recognizing that the Court considered the expectations of non-Indians residing on
the reservation).
354. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 420-21.
355. See id. at 416.
356. See generally Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1681 (1996)
(asserting that a vast array of meanings can be attributed to legal principles and
rules); Paul Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotext, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2178 (1996).
357. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 413.
358. Id.
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justifiable expectations of the people living in the area.”
360
Blackmun, joined by Souter, dissents.
Blackmun adopted the
foundationalist approach that appears to be the logical outcome of
Solem’s acknowledgment that the questions raised by many of the
modern diminishment cases were never anticipated by the
361
congressional architects of allotment. As Blackmun politely put it:
“As a result of the patina history has placed on the allotment Acts, the
Court is presented with questions that their architects could not have
362
foreseen.” The Indian law canon requires that the Court “must find
clear and unequivocal evidence of congressional intent to reduce
reservation boundaries, and ambiguities must be construed broadly
363
in favor of the Indians.” Given Congress’ subsequent, and current,
initiatives to restore tribal sovereignty, it is all the more justifiable to
hew faithfully to the canon. Blackmun did so, finding that the “clear
evidence of specific congressional intent to diminish a reservation” is
364
lacking in Hagen.
In Yankton, the Surplus Lands Act that divested the Yankton Sioux
Tribe of any un-allotted lands contained, according to O’Connor,
clear language of cession and the denomination of a sum certain in
365
exchange for the lands.
But a “savings” clause in the 1894 Act
appeared to flatly contradict the implication that the Tribe knowingly
366
relinquished any of its treaty guarantees.
Because the treaty
secured the reservation’s boundaries, the Tribe argued the allotment
statute was, at best, ambiguous as to whether it diminished those
367
boundaries. Indian law canons would then counsel against reading

359. Id. at 421.
360. See id. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Souter).
361. See id. at 424 (suggesting that in passing the General Allotment Act, Congress
“assumed that tribal jurisdiction would terminate with the sale of Indian lands and
that the reservations eventually would be abolished); see also South Dakota v.
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 697 (1993); supra notes 257-61 and accompanying text.
362. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 426 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
363. Id. at 422.
364. Id. at 426.
365. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 344 (1998).
366. The savings clause reads as follows:
Article XVIII. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to abrogate the
treaty of April 19th, 1858, between the Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians and
the United States. And after the signing of this agreement, and its
ratification by Congress, all provisions of the said treaty of April 19th, 1858,
shall be in full force and effect, the same as though this agreement had not
been made, and the said Yankton Indians shall continue to receive their
annuities under the said treaty of April 19th, 1858.
Agreement with Yankton Sioux Tribe, in South Dakota, ch. 290, 28 Stat. 314-18
(1894).
367. See Yankton, 522 U.S. at 349 (stating the Tribe’s position that the savings
clause renders the statute equivocal).
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an ambiguous statute in a manner that would be unfavorable to the
368
tribal interests. The contradictory nature of the savings clause did
not sway O’Connor, however, who found that it did not create any
369
ambiguity in the statute. In proper minimalist fashion, she followed
the path of recent cases. At the outset of the analysis, she notes that
both Solem and Hagen acknowledge the anomalous task that the Court
confronts: that of determining congressional intent on an issue that
370
She then recites the factors
could not have been contemplated.
that Solem outlined as relevant:
statutory language, events
surrounding enactment and, “to a lesser extent,” subsequent
371
treatment of the area.
Finally, she notes that “[t]hroughout this
inquiry, ‘we resolve any ambiguities in favor of the Indians, and we
372
will not lightly find diminishment.’”
But in Yankton, as in Hagen, the recitation of the canon has a
hollow ring. Few things could be more ambiguous than two
373
conflicting statutory provisions.
If seen through the eyes of the
Yankton Sioux Tribe, as the canon instructs, the savings clause surely,
at a minimum, preserved their future right to argue that their
territory, already reduced to a sliver of what it was, remained in tact.
374
But, the Court did not find it so.
By applying the tests, but not following the spirit of Thurgood
Marshall’s opinion in Solem, the Yankton Court appears to hew to
precedent. The ad hoc nature of the diminishment cases permits
minimalist, case-by-case decisions, based on the facts as the Court sees
them. Indeed, true to the minimalist objective of not reaching issues

368. See id.
369. See id. at 347 (discussing surrounding factors such as the Tribe’s concern with
reaffirmation of government obligations and a tendency to wield payments as an
inducement to sign the agreement).
370. See id. at 343 (inferring Congress did not recognize a difference between
acquiring Indian property and gaining jurisdiction over Indian territory).
Our inquiry is informed by the understanding that, at the turn of this
century, Congress did not view the distinction between acquiring Indian
property and assuming jurisdiction over Indian territory as a critical one, in
part because ‘[t]he notion that reservation status of Indian lands might not
be coextensive with tribal ownership was unfamiliar[.]’
Id. (citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984)).
371. See Yankton, 522 U.S. at 344 (noting that statutory language is the most
probative evidence of diminishment).
372. Id. (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 411 (1994)).
373. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 22
(suggesting that the “square textual conflict” presented in South Dakota v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) should have been decided in favor of the tribe even
under a “watered-down canonical approach”).
374. See Yankton, 522 U.S. at 358 (holding that “Congress diminished the Yankton
Sioux Reservation in the 1894 Act, [and] that the unallotted tracts no longer
constitute Indian Country”).
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that need not be reached, at the end of the opinion O’Connor noted
that the Court need not address the larger issue of whether the
Yankton Reservation was entirely disestablished by the allotment
375
But the Court’s diminishment jurisprudence is an imperious
acts.
incrementalism, and one in which the Court is acting without
guidance from the current Congress. Instead the Court imagines the
intent of a Congress whose goals have been repudiated, and bolsters
that bit of creativity with its own sense of demographic propriety.
In Hagen, Blackmun and Souter dissented from the majority’s
376
finding of diminishment.
By the time Yankton is decided,
Blackmun is no longer on the Court and Souter silently joins the
377
unanimous opinion. Ginsburg likewise joins, which is unsurprising
378
given her silent assent to diminishment in Hagen. Breyer, facing his
379
first diminishment case, also joins the crowd. With the maximalists
gone, it appears that there is no way out of diminishment by
minimalism. As with Strate, however, this is incorrect. Minimalist
decisions refusing to divest tribes of self-governance are more
380
consistent with minimalism’s substance.
C. Broad and Shallow Indian Law: Cass County v. Leech Lake Band
381
of Chippewa Indians and Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
382
Government
Justice Thomas, a maximalist in terms of his embrace of
383
constitutional originalism and his predilection for broad rules,
384
authored two of the unanimous opinions that disfavored tribes.
True to form, Thomas did not rule narrowly, though I will argue that

375. See id. at 358 (noting that the Court’s holding in Hagen and the state supreme
court’s decision in State v. Greger, 599 N.W.2d 854, 867 (S.D. 1997), were similarly
limited).
376. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 422 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(stating that there was not a clear expression of congressional intent to warrant
diminishment).
377. See Yankton, 522 U.S. at 332.
378. See Hagen, 510 U.S. at 401.
379. See Yankton, 522 U.S. at 332.
380. See infra Part IV (contending that minimalism’s substance is best served by
decisions that leave questions of tribal status to other branches of government).
381. 524 U.S. 103 (1998).
382. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
383. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 8 (noting, however, that Thomas appears to
abandon originalism in the First Amendment context).
384. See Leech Lake, 524 U.S. at 106 (holding that state and local governments may
impose ad valorem taxes on reservation land repurchased by a tribe after Congress
made the land alienable and the federal government sold it to non-Indians); see also
Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523 (concluding that “1.8 million acres of land in northern
Alaska, owned in fee simple by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government
pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,” is not “Indian country”).
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385

How do these cases, which are only
the decisions are shallow.
partially procedurally minimalist, fit into the analysis here? These
cases demonstrate the minimalists’ impotence when faced with
Indian law opinions that would appear to go against the grain of their
general jurisprudential tendencies. This impotence is not a natural
consequence of minimalism, but a risk of minimalism, which
potentially conflates “shallowness” with the absence of any underlying
386
normative commitment.
The unstated approach in these cases is
that the Court need not engage in Indian law analysis, which requires
deferring to other branches of government in matters related to
tribal sovereignty. These cases abandon Indian law, which means
usurping the congressional and executive roles with respect to the
structural relationship with tribes. The underlying norm is that tribal
sovereignty is no longer deserving of the special canons designed to
387
mediate colonization.
In Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, the Court
finds that tribes are not exempt from state and local property taxes
imposed on lands purchased by the Tribe, but not restored to trust
388
status.
Justice Thomas relies principally on an Allotment Era case
389
from 1906, Goudy v. Meath, for the proposition that land made
freely alienable by the issuance of fee patents is subject to state and
390
local taxation.
Goudy invoked a reversal of the usual Indian law
canon requiring clear congressional statements for abrogation of
Indian rights, requiring instead a clear congressional statement for
the Court to infer non-taxability if one would normally expect taxes
391
to be imposed.
Thomas concludes that Congress need not
expressly state that lands are taxable in order for Congress’ intent to
392
be clear.
The Leech Lake Band had argued that its tax immunity

385. See infra notes 388-420 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court’s
decisions in Leech Lake and Venetie).
386. See infra Part IV (explaining that minimalism can be redeemed by accepting
the underlying normative commitment to tribal self-governance).
387. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 11-13
(recognizing the significant side constraints courts place on the imposition of new
colonial intrusions while leaving to Congress the ongoing issues of the relationship
between tribes and the larger society).
388. See Leech Lake, 524 U.S. at 115 (stating that “[w]hen Congress makes Indian
Reservation land freely alienable, it manifests and unmistakably clear intent to
render such land subject to state and local taxation”).
389. 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
390. See Leech Lake, 524 U.S. at 111 (explaining the Court’s reasoning in Goudy,
203 U.S. at 146).
391. See id. at 112 (quoting Goudy, 203 U.S. at 149).
392. See id. at 113 (quoting Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 268-69 (1992), which addressed whether the General
Allotment Act (GAA) manifested an intent to allow state and local taxation of lands
allotted under the GAA and owned by individual Indians or the Yakima Indian
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“lay dormant during the period when the eight parcels [of
393
repurchased lands] were held by non-Indians,” and that the Band’s
394
reacquisition of the land reawakened their tax-exempt status.
Leech Lake is troubling not simply because of its conclusion that the
Band’s land was not tax exempt. Implicit in the Band’s assertion that
395
the non-taxable status of the land “lay dormant,” is that the Band’s
inherent sovereignty, which it retains, determines non-taxability of its
land. The Court unanimously accepts a clear-statement rule that flips
the presumption concerning retained inherent tribal sovereignty: the
land is only non-taxable if Congress has expressly stated that it shall
396
Thomas does not even use the term “inherent sovereignty”
be.
anywhere in the opinion. It is as if a tribe’s immunity from state
taxation had always stemmed only from congressional action. What
397
remains of the approach in McClanahan, which emphasized that the
preemption analysis, which asks whether Congress has left any room
for state taxation, takes place against the backdrop of tribal
398
sovereignty? If one were to read only Leech Lake, the answer might
well be nothing.
The rule of Leech Lake is both clear and expansive. If a tribe
reacquires land that was lost due to allotment, that land is subject to
399
state taxation unless Congress has clearly said otherwise. One could
also argue that the opinion is non-minimalist in that it does not defer
400
But is the Leech Lake
to precedent (McClanahan, White Mountain).
opinion deep? It does not articulate a theory of Indian law decisionmaking. Indeed, the opinion is striking for its failure to cite, let
alone discuss, many of the salient cases in the area of state taxation of
tribal property. Nor does it state overtly that these precedents do not
apply or are being abandoned. Instead, Leech Lake presents itself as a

Nation).
393. Leech Lake, 524 U.S. at 113.
394. See id. at 113-14 (discussing how the Court rejects this contention because
“once Congress has demonstrated . . . a clear intent to subject the land to taxation by
making it alienable, Congress must make an unmistakably clear statement in order to
render it nontaxable”).
395. Id. at 113-14.
396. See id. at 114.
397. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973)
(holding that Arizona could not tax a member of a tribe living and working within
the reservation).
398. See supra notes 211-13 (discussing McClanahan).
399. See Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 112
(1998).
400. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (stating that the Court in White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1979), applied preemption analysis
finding that Congress left no room for state taxation (citing McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)).
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simple, matter-of-fact case, which relies on recent case law for its
401
The opinion is therefore shallow, in Sunstein’s
roadmap.
vocabulary. The minimalists could join it, and not think they were
supplanting the old or adopting the new, in terms of doctrinal
approach. But what underlies Leech Lake is a latent vision of the status
of tribal sovereignty. By rejecting the Tribe’s argument that its
sovereign status lay dormant, the Court is advancing the view that
sovereignty exists solely in the context of ancient promises made in
time-worn documents. For sovereignty to extend beyond such
circumstances, Congress must step in and authorize it. The John
Marshall vision—that sovereignty is both pre- and extraconstitutional—is gone. But because this is nowhere stated explicitly,
Leech Lake appears to be a run-of-the-mill case about statutory
interpretation and doctrinal faithfulness.
Like Leech Lake, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,
is a broad and shallow case. In Venetie, the Court found that the
402
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) terminated the
“Indian country” status of lands owned by Native corporations in
403
Alaska.
The Alaska Native Village of Venetie argued that it could
impose taxes on a contractor who had been hired by the State of
Alaska to construct a public school on land that the Venetie Tribal
404
Government owned in fee simple. Whether the tribal village could
tax the contractor’s activity depended on whether the land was still
considered “Indian country,” as opposed to merely private land that
405
happened to be owned by a Native Village.
The Court, therefore,
had to consider the impact of the ANCSA on lands owned by Alaskan
Native tribes.
To determine whether Venetie retained its Indian country status as

401. See Leech Lake, 524 U.S. at 110-14. The Court, in addition to heavy reliance on
Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146 (1906), relied principally on Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992). In Yakima, the Court held
that lands owned in fee by the tribe or tribal members were subject to taxation, but
the relevant allotment statute had stated expressly that allotted lands would be subject
to taxation. See Leech Lake, 524 U.S. at 112 (stating its finding that alienability of
allotted lands “manifested an unmistakably clear intent” for taxation). So not only
did the Court rely almost exclusively on two cases—one very old and one very
recent—but it retreated even further from Indian law principles.
402. 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994).
403. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 532-34 (1998)
(stating that ANCSA’s purpose was primarily to effect Native self-determination and
end paternalism in federal Indian relations).
404. See id. at 525 (explaining that the tribe was attempting to collect $161,000 in
taxes for conducting business activities on the tribe’s land).
405. See id. (explaining that if ANCSA lands were not Indian country then the
Tribe lacked the power to impose taxes on non-members of the tribe).
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406

the Court considered two
a “dependent Indian community,”
questions: (1) whether the federal government has set aside the
lands in question for use by an Indian community; and (2) whether
the federal government retains superintendence over the lands in
407
The Court found that neither requirement was
question.
408
satisfied.
Venetie argued, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that its
immediate reacquisition of its reservation lands in exchange for
forgoing any other land claims, pursuant to a provision of ANCSA,
409
satisfied the federal set-aside requirement.
The Tribe’s argument,
in essence, was that for this reason, among others, its land remained
410
the de facto equivalent of a reservation. But the Court found that
because ANCSA transferred the lands from trust status to private,
state-chartered Native corporations, without restrictions on
411
alienation, the federal set-aside requirement could not be met.
The Court found it “equally clear” that “ANCSA ended federal
412
ANCSA revoked every
superintendence over the Tribe’s lands.”
413
Indian reservation in Alaska except one, and stated explicitly that
its settlement provisions were intended to avoid a “lengthy wardship
414
or trusteeship.”
The Tribe argued that the protections remaining
under ANCSA, including exemptions from real property taxes,
adverse possession claims, and other judgments, along with the
uninterrupted provision of federal health, welfare, and economic
services, were sufficient to meet the “federal superintendence”
415
requirement. The Court found the provision of federal services to
416
be insufficient to change the over-all character of the land.

406. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1994) (defining Indian country as “all dependent
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof; and whether within or without
the limits of a state”).
407. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 530-31.
408. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 532 (1998).
409. See id. at 525-26 (citing Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 101 F.3d
1286, 1300-02 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the “federal set aside” and the “federal
superintendence” requirements were satisfied and the tribe’s land was Indian
country)).
410. See id. at 532.
411. See id. at 533 (explaining that ANCSA’s design allows Native corporations to
immediately convey former reservation lands to non-Natives).
412. Id.
413. See 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994) (stating that this section does not apply to
Annette Island Reserve established by § 495 of Title 25).
414. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1994).
415. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 534 (1998)
(arguing that for all salient purposes, Venetie was still treated like an Indian
reservation by the federal government).
416. See id. (explaining that forms of federal aid are not indicative of federal
control over land so as to support a finding of federal superintendence).
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The Venetie decision was sweeping in its effects. The Court’s
reasoning reached all lands in Alaska owned by tribal corporations,
which are all tribal lands in Alaska other than the one reservation
417
retained explicitly under ANCSA. Thus, with the exception of this
one reservation, there is no Indian country in Alaska. This means
that tribal governments cannot exercise jurisdiction over activities
that occur on their lands, whether these activities are by non-Indians
or tribal members. The effort to free Alaska Natives from federal
paternalism has therefore resulted in diminishing their capacity for
self-governance.
As with the diminishment cases, the Court encountered a situation
that Congress had, in fact, not directly contemplated. The main goal
418
of ANCSA was to settle all tribal land claims. Beyond that, it is not
clear that Congress intended to clip the inherent sovereignty of tribes
to carry on the usual governmental functions, like regulation and
taxation. Tying the question of whether Alaska tribes retain the
inherent power to tax to the “Indian country” status of their lands
forces the issue into a framework that Congress likely failed to
consider. The Indian country statute was not amended along with
ANCSA, and presumably no thought was given to the future
circumstance of whether the inherent sovereignty of Alaska tribes
should be tied to a definition of Indian country that evolved in the
context of the lower forty-eight. Seen in this light, the Venetie

417. See Erin Goff Chrisbens, Comment, Indian Country After ANCSA: Divesting
Tribal Sovereignty by Interpretation in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 307, 326-29 (1998) (making the more dramatic
contention that Venetie could be used to divest all tribes of sovereignty over lands that
have “dependent Indian community” status).
418. ANCSA’s legislative history emphasized the land settlement, and did not
address anywhere the specific question of whether tribes would continue to have selfgovernance. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 92-23, at 23 (1971), reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192:
The proposed bill, through a combination of providing land and money as
settlement for the native claims, will provide an equitable solution to the
claims made by the natives of Alaska. It will, on the one hand provide land
that is necessary for the living and subsistence needs of those natives who
continue to rely upon the land for their living, while at the same time
provide an economic settlement both in terms of cash contributions and
patents to land and mineral rights which we consider to be generous and
equitable which will be used by the natives for promoting their economic
development to the fullest extent possible. It is our firm belief that the
economic development of the Alaska natives will be of benefit, not only to
themselves, but to all of Alaska as well as all Americans.
Id. at 2213 (quoting letter from Rogers C.B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior). See
also Judith V. Royster, Decontextualizing Federal Indian Law: The Supreme Court’s 19971998 Term, 34 TULSA L.J. 329, 343 (1999) (stating that the purpose of ANCSA was to
promote self-determination and to avoid lengthy wardship or trusteeship by the
federal government).

KRAKOFFJCI.DOC

2001]

10/11/2001 1:59 PM

UNDOING INDIAN LAW

1233

decision is sweeping in more than one sense. It forecloses any future
arguments about certain kinds of tribal self-government in Alaska.
And it declares a certainty of congressional purpose that, on closer
inspection, is elusive. The minimalists’ silent assent to this type of
judicial activism seems at odds with their purported jurisprudential
tendencies, as discussed further in Part IV. But, as in Leech Lake,
perhaps the opinion’s shallowness masked its sweep. The Venetie
Court did not announce that it was relying on a deeply theorized
approach to Indian cases. Rather, the abandonment of any Indian
law approach at all is what makes the opinion notable. The Court
never cited to nor mentioned the canons of construction requiring
that statutory ambiguities be read in the light most favorable to
Indian tribes. The fact that ANCSA itself is silent on the specific
question of whether it terminates tribal self-governance on tribal
lands would presumably warrant at least the diminishment cases’
approach, which is to perfunctorily mention the canons without
419
applying them.
The shallow approach thus reveals, and conceals,
the underlying normative shift. The Court is no longer the force
mediating colonialism by recognizing the structural relationship with
420
tribes.
Rather, tribes are like all other domestic litigants—left to
the vicissitudes of ad hoc interpretation. To put a finer point on it,
the shift accomplishes this: in some Indian cases, the Court, without
saying so explicitly, is no longer doing Indian law.
421

422

D. Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley, and Nevada v. Hicks:
Closing the Conversation About Tribal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians?

The modern era in Indian law may be officially over in the judicial
423
branch, at least concerning matters of jurisdiction over nonIndians. In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, and Nevada v. Hicks, the
Court made clear that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians exists only
in very limited contexts. The sum of the two cases appears to be that
tribes can be certain of such jurisdiction only when non-Indians enter
into consensual relationships with tribes. There is some room left to
speculate that other circumstances might also warrant the exertion of

419. See supra notes 349-91 and accompanying text (explaining that the recitation
of the canons had a hollow ring).
420. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 11-12
(“Under the canons of interpretation, positive law on the books (treaties, statutes,
and so on) is construed narrowly to preserve tribal sovereignty against all but crystalclear losses.”).
421. 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001).
422. 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001).
423. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (describing the “modern era”).
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tribal authority over non-members, but the presumption certainly
runs against the tribes.
Atkinson Trading Co. held that the Montana analysis applied to cases
424
concerning a tribe’s taxing authority. The Navajo Nation had been
imposing a hotel occupancy tax on the guests of an on-reservation
hotel that was located on non-Indian fee land. The hotel, the
Cameron Trading Post, was required by the Navajo Tax commission
to collect the tax from the hotel’s guests.
The hotel owner
challenged the Navajo tax before the Navajo Tax Commission, the
Navajo Supreme Court, and finally in federal court. Until the issue
reached the United States Supreme Court, the Navajo Nation
425
prevailed at every level.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for a unanimous court
reversing the Tenth Circuit, which had applied a balancing test to
determine whether the nature of the land outweighed the tribal
426
interest in taxation. The Court began its analysis with the following
427
pronouncement: “Tribal jurisdiction is limited . . . .” Note how far
the Court has come from the language of Martinez v. Santa Clara
428
Pueblo, which announced tribes’ pre-constitutional sovereignty as
the appropriate backdrop against which to examine incursions into
429
tribal power.
In the context of non-Indians, the presumption has
officially flipped from one of assuming tribal authority unless
Congress has clearly spoken, to one of assuming the absence of such
authority.
The Atkinson Court moved from its announced
presumption—no tribal authority over non-members—to a seemingly
straightforward application of Montana, and found that the Navajo
Nation lacked a consensual relationship with the hotel guests, and
that no “direct threat” to tribal welfare was implicated by the inability
430
to tax.
Atkinson left open the possibility, however, that Montana’s main
431
rule applied only to non-Indians on non-Indian fee land. Perhaps
tribes could still prevail concerning their civil authority over non
424. Atkinson Trading, 121 S. Ct. at 1829.
425. Id. at 1829.
426. Id. (citing to Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 210 F.3d 1247, 1255, 1257, 1261
(10th Cir. 2000)).
427. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 215 S. Ct. 1825, 1830 (2001).
428. 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (emphasizing the sovereign status of tribes and
recognizing that tribal sovereignty is the backdrop against which questions
concerning limitations on tribal governments should be measured).
429. Id.
430. Atkinson Trading, 121 S. Ct. at 1833-34 (rejecting Navajo Nation’s arguments
that Montana exceptions should apply).
431. Id. at 1831-32 (distinguishing Merrion on the basis that it approved a tax on
non-Indians on tribal lands).
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Indians on tribal lands? But Justice Souter filed an ominous
432
Acting in very non-minimalist
concurrence addressing this issue.
fashion, Souter wrote separately to urge “coherence” in the field,
which he articulated could be achieved by announcing that land
status is irrelevant to the determination of whether Montana
433
applies. The hotel in Atkinson was located on non-Indian fee land,
so the Court was not presented with this issue. Souter’s newfound,
and not entirely explicable, urge for coherence apparently overrode
his reluctance to decide an issue not before the Court.
Perhaps Justice Souter, along with Justices Kennedy and Thomas
434
who joined him in the Atkinson concurrence, was just trying to
dampen tribal expectations. They knew Hicks was coming, and in
Hicks the Court announced that Montana applies regardless of land
435
status.
The facts of Hicks were particularly troublesome, given the
strong federalism concerns of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas.
Floyd Hicks, a tribal member, sued state officials for violations of
436
federal and tribal laws in tribal court.
The alleged violations
occurred when state law enforcement officers conducted a search of
Hicks’s property, which was located on tribal land within the
437
boundaries of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone reservation.
Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion demonstrated overwhelming concern for
the status of the state defendants, and the decision appeared to be
driven as much by reluctance to cede state authority as a desire to
438
diminish that of tribes. But a casualty along the way was any hope
that tribal land status could create a presumption of tribal authority
over non-Indians.
From Hicks on, questions of tribal civil authority over non-members
must be analyzed pursuant to Montana:
The ownership status of land, in other words, is only one factor to
consider in determining whether regulation of the activities of
nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or to

432. Id. at 1835 (Souter, J., concurring).
433. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 215 S. Ct. 1825, 1835 (2001) (finding that
Montana’s general proposition that tribal inherent powers do not extend to
nonmembers of the tribe applies “regardless of whether the land at issue is fee land,
or land owned by or held in trust for an Indian tribe”).
434. See id.
435. See Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2001) (finding that Montana
applies regardless of land status, and that land status is but one factor to consider in
determining whether the Montana exceptions apply).
436. Id. at 2308.
437. Id. at 2310.
438. See id. at 2311 (emphasizing that “[s]tate sovereignty does not end at a
reservation’s borders”).
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control internal relations.’439

A devoted Indian law optimist might attempt to cabin the
implications of Hicks by noting that, essentially, the Court adopted a
balancing test to determine whether the tribal court had jurisdiction
over these non-Indian defendants, and the state’s strong interest in
440
investigating off-reservation crimes outweighed the tribal interest.
There is room, the optimist might protest, for other non-Indian
defendants to present stronger cases for tribal jurisdiction, even in
the absence of a consensual relationship. The optimist might then
point out that Justice Ginsburg was at pains to limit the Hicks decision
441
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices
to its facts.
Stevens and Breyer, concurred in the judgment and wrote separately
to disagree with the majority’s reasoning, and indicating that either
442
of the two Montana exceptions might apply.
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is truly narrow. She agreed that
Montana governs tribal civil jurisdiction, but she refused to go
443
She disagreed with Justice Scalia’s pro-states version of
further.
Indian law presumptions, and she demonstrated a detailed
understanding of the complicated jurisdictional web in Indian
444
country without relegating tribes to a place of near-impotence. The
optimist would still come up short, however. First, Justice Ginsburg’s
concurrence is only facially minimalist. She joined Scalia’s opinion,
which contained several references to state authority in Indian
country that go well beyond what recent cases have decided, and that
445
also seem gratuitous. Thus, Ginsburg’s concurrence has an “I don’t
really mean what I said” aspect. Moreover, Ginsburg, O’Connor,
Stevens and Breyer add up to four justices, not five. Only four
justices appear to have any qualms whatsoever about the steady
march away from the underlying Indian law norm of respect for the
ancient yet evolving sovereign-to-sovereign relationship with tribes.
Finally, just to demoralize the Indian law optimist further, Justice

439. Id. at 2310 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).
440. See id. at 2313 (noting the “considerable” interests of the State).
441. Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2324 (2001) (Ginsburg, J. concurring)
(emphasizing that “the Court’s decision explicitly leaves open the question of tribalcourt jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general) (quotations omitted).
442. Id. at 2327-30 (stating that the majority misapplied the Montana exceptions by
misunderstanding the nature of tribal-state relations and also by under-stating the
tribal interest in regulating the conduct of state officials on tribal lands).
443. See id. at 2332.
444. See id. at 2328-29 (describing various kinds of jurisdictional agreements
between states and tribes, and explaining overlapping jurisdiction in Indian
country).
445. See id. at 2311, 2313 (making references to a state’s presumptive and inherent
authority on reservations).
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Souter concurs again, and again is joined by Kennedy and Thomas.
As in Atkinson Trading, Souter stresses the importance of Indian law
coherence at the expense of tribal presumptions of inherent
446
Even more troubling, Souter relies on unwarranted
sovereignty.
447
assumptions about the unfairness of tribal courts, as well as
blatantly inaccurate statements concerning land status within
448
reservations.
Souter clearly has decided to issue broad rulings in
Indian jurisdiction cases. Quite disappointingly, his breadth far
exceeds his depth. To the extent that he reveals his underlying
norms, they are unreflective and partial. Yet despite the lack of
depth, what he and the other minimalists have succeeded in
achieving, along with their maximalist colleagues, is a case-by-case
revision in the doctrine of tribal jurisdiction over non-members.
E. The Rest of the Minimalist Era Indian Cases: Some Convergence, but
Some Cause for Optimism?
Other Indian law cases decided since 1991 send a mixed message.
449
Four were unanimously decided against the tribal interests. But in
many (though not all) of the remaining cases, one or more of the
minimalists steps forward, either in the majority or in the dissent,
450
with an opinion favoring tribal interests.
Some of these opinions

446. Id. at 2318 (Souter, J. concurring) (emphasizing the need for clarity
regarding the presumption that tribes do not have jurisdiction over non-members).
447. Id. at 2323.
448. Id. at 2322 (“[T]ying tribes authority to land status in the first instance would
produce an unstable jurisdictional crazy quilt. Because land on Indian reservations
constantly changes hands (from tribes to nonmembers, from nonmembers to tribal
members, and son), a jurisdictional rule under which land status was dispositive
would prove extraordinarily difficult to administer”). It simply is not true that land
on Indian reservations “constantly changes hands.” Souter cites no authority for this
“fact,” nor could he. It is true that on some reservations, there are checker-board
patterns of land ownership, a legacy of allotment. But the jurisdictional “crazy quilt”
is not caused by fluidity of land ownership. Moreover, to the extent that tying
jurisdiction to land status creates instability, the solution might just as reasonably be
to reverse Montana and restore tribal territorial jurisdiction.
449. See Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32, 37 (1999)
(holding that a state may impose a non-discriminatory tax on federal contractors,
regardless of whether the contracted-for activity takes place on an Indian
reservation); see also El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 476 (1999)
(ruling that the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion that allows a trial court to
determine its own jurisdiction should not extend so far when actions brought in state
courts would be subject to removal to federal courts); Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. of
New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros. Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 75 (1994) (establishing that
Indian traders are not fully immune from state regulation when regulation furthers a
legitimate state interest); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 184 (1993) (holding that the
Indian Health Service’s discretionary decision to discontinue the Indian Children’s
Program was not subject to judicial review or the notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements).
450. See Case Chart at Appendix.
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can be explained because they converge with other, non-Indian law
451
interests. Others, however, can be explained solely on grounds that
affirm an ongoing commitment to the norm of supporting tribes as
452
sovereigns. Thus while there is some risk that the unstated norms
embodied in the six previous cases will rule the Court’s approach to
Indian cases, there is some slender basis upon which to resurrect an
Indian law incrementalism.
Of the four unanimous opinions that disfavor tribes, two involve
453
state taxation issues.
In Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze
454
455
Construction, the issue was whether a non-Indian company that
contracted with the Bureau of Indian Affairs was exempt from
456
Arizona’s transaction privilege tax. Justice Thomas’s approach here
was similar to that in Leech Lake and Venetie, in that he decided the
457
case practically without reference to the vast body of Indian law.
Rather than apply an Indian law analysis, Justice Thomas concluded
458
The
that the matter was controlled by United States v. New Mexico.
Court deemed it irrelevant that the activity being taxed took place on
459
an Indian reservation, rather than on state land.
Therefore, the
Court found it unnecessary to conduct any sort of “balancing test” or

451. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100, 185 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) (arguing that neither precedent
nor history supports the majority’s relinquishment of the Court’s responsibility to
exercise jurisdiction granted by Article III of the Constitution); see also Idaho v.
Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 297 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer) (emphasizing the suit fell under the Ex parte
Young doctrine, obligating the district court to hear the suit).
452. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172
(1999).
453. See Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr., 526 U.S. 32 (1999) (involving
transaction privilege tax); Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. of New York v. Milhelm Attea &
Bros. Inc., 512 U.S. 61 (1994) (discussing a state regulatory tax scheme for
cigarettes).
454. 526 U.S. 32 (1999).
455. See id. at 32. The company was actually “Indian” by any ordinary definition of
the term. Id. Blaze Construction is owned by a member of the Blackfeet Tribe of
Montana and is incorporated under Blackfeet tribal law. Id. However, Blaze
Construction magically became non-Indian as a matter of law. See id. (concluding
that the company is the equivalent of a non-Indian company because its work did not
occur on the reservation). For the purposes of the legal analysis of the claim for tax
exemption, Blaze is considered the equivalent of a non-Indian in all relevant
circumstances because Blaze Construction was not owned by a member of any of the
tribes on which its road construction work occurred, nor was it a tribal enterprise of
any of those tribes.
456. See Blaze, 526 U.S. at 34-35.
457. See generally Blaze, 526 U.S. at 34-39.
458. 455 U.S. 720, 737-38 (1982) (holding that states may impose gross receipts
and use taxes on private contractors doing work for the federal government).
459. See Blaze, 526 U.S. at 37 (adopting a “bright-line standard for taxation of
federal contracts, regardless of whether the contracted-for activity takes place on
Indian reservations”).
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“particularized examination” of whether the tax was either
preempted by federal laws, or interfered unduly with tribal
460
interests.
Indian law analysis often clouds what might otherwise be a clear
rule. While it is tempting to avoid the complicated balancing and
preemption tests established by the Court, if such avoidance were
elevated to the level of foregone conclusion, there would not be
much left of Indian law. Blaze has two distinguishing characteristics:
(1) the work took place on Indian reservations; and (2) the Bureau of
Indian Affairs was contracting with the tribal business. The Court’s
opinion in Blaze disregards these distinctions because the Court has
an interest in demarcating clear lines of authority between state and
federal government. Blaze, although not devastating to tribal
interests, is yet another step away from the work that must be done to
resurrect Indian law from its state of captivity by other concerns. For
the pro-tribal minimalists, other concerns (federalism, in this case)
must not have been in sharp enough focus to muster either a
concurrence or a dissent.
In Department of Taxation & Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea &
461
Bros. Inc., the Court upheld New York State’s regulatory scheme
that imposed cigarette taxes on non-Indian purchasers of reservation
462
cigarettes. The regulations required wholesalers, who were licensed
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to limit the amount of cigarette sales
to tribal retailers and to prepay taxes on all sales in excess of the
463
limited amount.
The regulations also imposed extensive
464
compliance and reporting requirements on tribal retailers.
The
wholesalers argued that the New York scheme was preempted
465
because it imposed requirements directly on Indian traders.
The
Court was unconvinced, emphasizing that the ultimate incidence of
466
and liability for the tax fell on the non-Indian consumer.
Justice Stevens reasoned that the regulatory scheme imposed
different requirements, but otherwise was indistinguishable from the
467
468
state activities approved of in Moe and Colville.
The Court,

460. See id. at 37 (“Interest balancing . . . would only cloud the clear rule
established . . . in New Mexico.”).
461. 512 U.S. 61 (1994).
462. See id. at 78 (reasoning that the regulations do not facially violate Indian
Trade statutes).
463. Id. at 65, 69.
464. Id. at 66-67.
465. Id. at 69.
466. See id. at 73-75 (contending that the main purpose of the regulation is to
disallow non-Indian consumers to avoid the tax).
467. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation,
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therefore, held that New York’s regulations were not preempted,
nor did they impose an unreasonable or improper burden on Indian
470
trading.
Attea does not necessarily break new ground in terms of the Court’s
willingness to permit state regulation of Indian activity within Indian
471
Country.
But, it further entrenches the position that more
elaborate and restrictive forms of such regulation will be tolerated.
New York claimed to impose its preemptive regulations on
wholesalers because tribal retailers were selling untaxed cigarettes far
in excess of what could reasonably have accounted for Indian sales
472
within their territory. Given the legal backdrop of Moe and Colville,
which suggests states have a right to expect Indian retailers to collect
taxes from non-Indians for the state, New York’s case was probably
factually sympathetic enough to ward off any strenuous efforts by the
minimalist justices to draft even a tepid dissent.
The two other unanimous opinions decided against tribal litigants,
473
both authored by Justice Souter, are less significant.
In Lincoln v.
474
Vigil, the Court decided, based on agency deference grounds, that
the Indian Health Service could terminate a health program serving a
particular geographic population in order to fund a nation-wide
475
program. The Court refused to find that, in this circumstance, the
Indian trust doctrine imposed a higher burden on the Indian Health
476
Service than that imposed by statute or regulation. The Court did
not rule out, however, that the trust doctrine might apply to trump

425 U.S. 463, 466 (1976) (upholding taxing of goods purchased by non-Indians on
Indian reservations).
468. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
160-61 (1980) (upholding tax regulation reasoning that burdens may be imposed on
Indian traders).
469. See Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros. Inc., 512
U.S. at 75 (“We now hold that Indian Traders are not wholly immune from state
regulation that is reasonably necessary to the assessment or collection of lawful state
taxes.”).
470. See id. at 76 (“By requiring wholesalers to precollect taxes on, and affix
stamps to cigarettes destined for nonexempt consumers, New York has simply
imposed on the wholesaler the same precollection obligation that under Moe and
Colville, may be imposed on reservation retailers.”).
471. But see Getches, supra, note 118, at 1628-30 (describing Attea as instituting a
balancing test).
472. See Attea, 512 U.S. at 65 (analyzing the volume of tax-exempt cigarettes sold
on New York Indian reservations).
473. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (discussing Indian Health Service
programs); see also El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999)
(involving trial court jurisdiction).
474. 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
475. See id. at 195.
476. See id. at 195 (stating the Indian Health Service had discretion to reorder its
priorities, regardless of the fiduciary relationship).
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477

agency deference in some other context.
478
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, the Court determined that
the doctrine requiring exhaustion of tribal court remedies does not
479
apply to cases arising under the Price-Anderson Act, which gives
federal courts original and automatic removal jurisdiction over all
480
claims arising from nuclear accidents.
The Court reasoned that
Congress made its intent unmistakably clear to consolidate all Price481
Anderson claims in federal court at the behest of the defendant.
Given Congress’ clear preference, the Court could find no reason to
distinguish cases arising in tribal courts from those arising in state
482
courts. One troubling aspect of Neztsosie is that the Court reads the
divestiture of the tribal exhaustion requirement into Congress’
483
silence on the issue.
Justice Souter was careful to point out,
however, that only in cases involving complete preemption, such as
those brought under the Price-Anderson Act, can defendants
correctly assert that they need not exhaust their tribal court
484
remedies.
Of the remaining cases, those involving the imposition of state
485
The first case, Oklahoma
taxes are the most diverse in outcomes.
486
Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatami Tribe of Oklahoma, which
was unanimously decided with a concurring opinion by Justice

477. See id. at 193 (noting an agency is not free to simply disregard statutory
responsibilities and may suffer grave political consequences should it choose to
ignore congressional expectations).
478. 526 U.S. 473 (1999).
479. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (setting forth requirements for
insurance, indemnification, and limiting liability for claims resulting from nuclear
incidents).
480. See Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 484 (discussing the Price-Anderson Act); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (declaring original jurisdiction go to the federal courts).
481. See id. at 484-85 (discussing Congress’ “unmistakable preference for a federal
forum”).
482. See id. at 485-86.
483. See id. at 485. The Court admits that the congressional record is silent on the
issue of whether Price-Anderson applies to tribes and concludes that Congress did
not mention tribal courts because, in all likelihood, it never occurred to them that
such actions would be filed in tribal courts. See id. at 487 (“Congress probably would
never have expected an occasion for asserting tribal jurisdiction over claims like this.
Now and then silence is not pregnant.”). While the Court is probably correct in its
surmise, it is nonetheless troubling that congressional thoughtlessness can be
converted into the erosion of tribal sovereignty. Again, in this case it is not terribly
problematic, but if applied to other situations, this dictum could prove dangerous.
484. See id. at 485 n.7 (indicating that under normal circumstances, tribal courts
can decide questions of federal law).
485. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 (1995); see also
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
270 (1992); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 505, 514 (1991).
486. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
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Stevens, held that a tribe does not waive its immunity from suit when
487
Further, the state
it sues to prevent the collection of state taxes.
cannot impose taxes on Indian purchasers of cigarettes from
reservation smoke shops, but can require the tribe to collect taxes
488
from non-Indian purchasers.
The second case, Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, found that counties may impose ad valorem property
taxes on reservation land patented in fee, but may not impose excise
489
taxes on such land. Only Justice Blackmun dissented to the part of
490
the decision permitting the ad valorem taxes.
491
The third case, Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,
authored by Justice Ginsburg, determined that the state could not
impose a motor fuel tax on fuels sold by the Tribe, but that the state
could tax the income of tribal members employed by the tribe while
492
residing outside of Indian Country.
Justice Ginsburg appealed to
general taxation principles, which dictate that “a jurisdiction, such as
Oklahoma, may tax all the income of its residents, even income
493
earned outside the taxing jurisdiction.”
With general taxation
principles, as opposed to Indian law principles, she frames the
Chickasaw Nation’s attempt to block the state’s income tax on tribal
employees in the following terms: “The Tribe seeks to block the State
from exercising its ordinary prerogative to tax the income of every
494
resident.”
From this general tax-law backdrop, she moved to the question
presented by the Chickasaw Nation, which is whether the Treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek prohibits imposition of the Oklahoma state
income tax on tribal employees regardless of their place of
495
residence. Justice Ginsburg disposed of the treaty-based argument

487. See id. at 512 (declaring that sovereign immunity does not excuse tribes from
all obligations).
488. See id. at 513 (reiterating that tribal sellers are obligated to collect state taxes
on sales to non-Indians).
489. Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 270 (1992).
490. See id. at 270 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(asserting that the county cannot impose ad valorem taxes on fee-patented Indianowned lands).
491. 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
492. Id. at 453.
493. Id. at 462-63.
494. Id. at 464.
495. The Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek provides in relevant part:
The government and people of the United States are hereby obligated to
secure to the said Nation of Red People the jurisdiction and government of
all persons and property that may be within their limits west, so that no
Territory or State shall never have a right to pass laws for the government of
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496

After perfunctorily noting that “‘treaties
in one slim paragraph.
497
she
should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians,’”
concluded that “liberal construction cannot save the Tribe’s claim,
498
which founders on a clear geographic limit of the treaty.” Finding
that the treaty does not apply beyond the Chickasaw Nation’s
territorial limits, Ginsburg determined that general tax laws allowing
499
sovereigns to tax all those residing in their jurisdiction apply.
As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, the “clear geographic
limit” referred to in the treaty is not in all likelihood a reference to
limiting the treaty’s terms to the Chickasaw’s territorial boundaries,
but rather a reference to the historical context of the treaty, which
500
required the Chickasaws to move west of the Mississippi. Given that
the “limits” language is at best ambiguous, the Indian law canon of
construction that ambiguous terms be construed in favor of the
501
Indians should apply.
Justice Breyer applied those canons, using
the arguments dismissed by Ginsburg, to craft a narrow decision
disallowing state taxation of tribal member employees of the
502
Chickasaw Nation who live outside of the reservation.
The problem with Justice Ginsburg’s approach is that it uses Indian
law as a gap-filler. Once she starts with general tax principles, as
opposed to Indian law, and plugs any remaining holes with standard
procedural narrowing devices, there are no gaps to be filled. The
dissenters in Chickasaw demonstrated that a narrow ruling in favor of
the Tribe was entirely plausible, but that the consideration must
503
begin with an analysis of Indian law.
The majority opinion,
however, highlights the significance of the unstated choice to
abandon Indian law for some other area of law. As in Justice

the nation . . . but the U.S. shall forever secure said Nation from and against
all [such] laws. . . .
Id. at 465 (quoting Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, art. 4, 7 Stat. 33334).
496. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 465-66 (1995)
(determining that the terms of the treaty apply “only to persons and property” within
the Chickasaw Nation’s limits).
497. Id. (quoting Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985)).
498. Id. at 466.
499. See id. at 466-67 (asserting that the treaty gave no thought to a state’s
authority to tax Indians living in state domain, because the authors expected Indians
to remain on Indian land).
500. Id. at 471 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and O’Connor) (arguing that the reason the treaty applies
only to lands west of the Mississippi is because the Chickasaws would only have
received protection if they moved there).
501. See id. (asserting that the benefit of the doubt should be given to the Tribal
view when the terms are unclear).
502. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 468-71 (1995).
503. See generally id. at 468 (interpreting the tax within the context of Indian law).
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Thomas’s opinions in Leech Lake and Venetie, the normative
assumption about the appropriate doctrinal context is obscured by
the shallow nature of the opinion.
In three Eleventh Amendment cases, tribes were on the losing end.
This context more obviously illustrates that the majority of the Court
is abandoning Indian law norms and that the Court’s federalism
504
agenda drives the decisions. In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
the Court found that the Eleventh Amendment bars a lawsuit by an
505
Alaska Native Village. Justice Souter joins in the majority, and three
506
The
non-minimalists, Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens, dissent.
majority opinion found no distinctions between Indian tribes and
citizens for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. The Court
failed to recognize the unique place that tribes occupy, both
507
The dissent, however, stressed
geographically and jurisdictionally.
the importance of the unique sovereign status of tribes, and in
particular their often contentious relations with the states in which
508
they are located.
The dissent also explicitly relied on foundation
principles to conclude that Congress intended to waive the states’
509
immunity circumstances such as were present in Noatak. Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg were not yet on the Court in Noatak, and Souter,
although soon to emerge as an Eleventh Amendment skeptic,
perhaps did not see the importance of contesting its application to
tribes.
510
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Court overturned precedent
finding that Congress cannot waive a state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit under its Commerce Clause powers, whether the
matter is one covered by the Indian Commerce Clause or the
511
Interstate Commerce Clause.
Seminole drew two dissents. Justice

504. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
505. Id. at 788.
506. Id. at 788 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens).
507. See id. at 777-88.
508. See id. at 792 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that tribes are unique
entities and should be treated as such).
509. See id. (“Congress intended . . . to authorize Constitutional claims for
damages by tribes against the States.”).
510. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
511. See id. at 76. Seminole could have been confined to the Indian law context,
and decided solely on the basis of an interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause
without necessarily implicating the Interstate Commerce Clause. The majority,
however, seized the opportunity to decide whether Congress had the power under
either version of the Commerce Clause to waive state immunity from suit. See id. at
55. This determination allowed the Court to reconsider Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which held, in a plurality opinion, that Congress did have the
authority under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Id. at 59-73. Seminole overruled Union Gas, and found that Congress
lacked power under both the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian
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512

Stevens filed his own, and Justice Souter filed one in which Justice
513
Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Justice Souter’s eighty-six page dissent
is a mini-treatise on the historical bases for states’ sovereign
immunity, and builds the case for both a more limited notion of what
the framers intended the scope of that immunity to be, and for
Congress’ ability to abrogate that immunity with a clear statement in
514
federal law.
Souter only indirectly made the case that there is a stronger
argument for abrogation under the Indian Commerce Clause than
515
under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
In a discussion attacking
the majority’s reliance on portions of The Federalist Papers, Souter
pointed out that Hamilton expressed the view that when the states
joined together to create the federal government, they retained their
sovereignty except with respect to three circumstances, one of which
was “where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive
516
authority to the Union.” Souter then noted that the federal power
to regulate commerce with Indian tribes has been interpreted to be
517
exclusive, leaving the states with no regulatory role.
The power
delegated to Congress under the Indian Commerce Clause thus fits
into Hamilton’s first category of cases where state sovereignty did not
518
survive entry into the Federal Union.
This discussion favors the position that there is a stronger case for
abrogation of states’ immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause
than under the Interstate Commerce clause. Yet, it constitutes only
one paragraph of a lengthy dissent, and is largely a build-up to
Souter’s broader point, which is that Hamilton’s Federalist No. 32
either undermines the majority’s conclusion that the regulation of
interstate commerce cannot serve as a basis to abrogate state’s
519
immunity, or is silent on that issue.
Thus while Souter’s dissent

Commerce Clause to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 47.
512. See id. at 76-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority opinion
prevents Congress from allowing states to be sued in a federal forum in a wide variety
of suits).
513. See id. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting).
514. See generally id. at 100-85 (Souter, J., dissenting).
515. See generally id. (explaining that since States maintain no sovereignty in the
regulation of commerce with tribes, sovereign immunity could not be asserted under
the facts of Seminole Tribe).
516. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 146 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 200
(Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961)).
517. Id. at 147 (citing Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985))
(stating that federal law has exclusive province over the power to regulate commerce
with Indian tribes).
518. See id. at 149.
519. Id. at 149 (“In sum, either the majority reads Hamilton as I do, to say nothing
about sovereignty or immunity in [a case involving the Interstate Commerce clause
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supports the tribal position, that argument is not central. The tribal
cause, it appears, was merely a casualty in the Court’s larger battle
over limiting Congress’ powers under the Interstate Commerce
Clause.
Facing similar federalism issues, Souter and Ginsburg dissent from
520
the majority opinion in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe. In Coeur d’Alene,
the Tribe sued the State of Idaho and various state officials alleging
the Tribe’s ownership in the submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur
d’Alene and the various rivers and streams that make up part of its
521
watershed. The Tribe’s claims were to quiet title, and also to obtain
declaratory and injunctive relief to the effect that Idaho laws would
have no force or effect on the lands at issue, and that the defendants
would be prohibited from taking any action in violation of the Tribe’s
522
The defendants asserted that the Eleventh
ownership interests.
Amendment barred the Tribe’s claims against the State as well as the
523
state officials.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether,
pursuant to the Ex parte Young doctrine, the claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief against the state officials should be allowed to
524
proceed.
The Supreme Court held that the Ex parte Young doctrine did not
apply, basing its decision on a fact-sensitive inquiry to find the line
between requiring state officials to follow federal law and
525
encroaching on a state’s sovereign immunity. If the application of

in which Congress has regulated in such a manner as to create an affirmative
obligation on states], or it will have to read him to say something about it that bars
any state immunity claim.”).
520. 521 U.S. 261, 297 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg and Breyer).
521. Id. at 264. For an extensive discussion, and criticism, of the majority and
concurring opinions in Coeur d’Alene, see generally John P. LaVelle, Sanctioning a
Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex parte Young, Expansion of Hans Immunity, and Denial
of Indian Rights in Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 787 (1999).
522. See Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 265 (noting that, in the alternative, the tribe
claimed ownership of the submerged lands pursuant to unextinguished aboriginal
title).
523. See id. (finding that the claims posited by the tribe were the functional
equivalents of a damages award against the state).
524. See id. at 266.
525. See id. at 269. Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
concurred in the judgment, reasoning that Ex parte Young entailed a fact-specific
analysis depending on a number of factors, including whether a state forum was
available. See id. at 291. Justice O’Connor reasons that such an approach is a
departure from existing law, and is not necessary to reach the same result in the case
at hand. See id. Rather, she concludes that the Young doctrine applies only to suits
against state officials for prospective injunctive relief. See id. at 292. Without devising
a case-sensitive test, she concludes that the Tribe’s claims cannot be characterized as
such, because the Tribe ultimately sought to divest the state itself of real property as
well as regulatory power. See id. at 296.

KRAKOFFJCI.DOC

2001]

10/11/2001 1:59 PM

UNDOING INDIAN LAW

1247

Ex parte Young is merely a means of suing the state itself without
saying so, then, according to the majority, the doctrine is stretched
526
By attempting to enjoin prospectively the application of
too far.
state laws and regulations to the disputed lands and waterways, the
Tribe was essentially seeking the same relief that it could obtain
527
through a quiet title action. Because of what the Court deemed the
State’s very strong sovereign interest in its lands and navigable
528
waterways, it refused to apply Ex parte Young to the Tribe’s claims.
In his dissent, Souter attacked both the Kennedy and the
O’Connor opinions’ assertion that the Tribe’s quest for something
529
The
more than mere title takes it outside of the Young doctrine.
Tribe, in asserting its claim to the lakebed under federal law,
simultaneously sought to enjoin all state regulation of the disputed
530
land.
Kennedy asserted that “navigable waters uniquely implicate
531
sovereign interests.”
O’Connor similarly pointed out that other
Young cases in which government officers were held to lack possessory
authority did not interfere with the state’s ability to regulate that
532
land. Souter argued that this distinction has no bearing on Young’s
application, because the Young inquiry is limited to whether the state
533
officials are violating federal law. If they are, and the way in which
they are requires them to withdraw their regulatory authority, then
534
requiring them to do so is merely a necessary aspect of the remedy.

526. See id. at 270 (finding that “where a plaintiff seeks to divest the State of all
regulatory power of submerged lands” it is a suit against the State).
527. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 282 (1997) (noting that the
relief sought is the functional equivalent of an action to quiet title, thereby shifting
ownership from the State to the Tribe).
The suit seeks, in effect, a determination that the lands in question are not
even within the regulatory jurisdiction of the State. The requested injunctive
relief would bar the State’s principal officers from exercising their
governmental powers and authority over the disputed lands and waters. The
suit would diminish, even extinguish, the State’s control over a vast reach of
lands and waters long deemed by the State to be an integral part of its
territory. To pass this off as a judgment causing little or no offense to
Idaho’s Sovereign authority and its standing in the Union would be to ignore
the realities of the relief the Tribe demands.
Id.
528. See id. at 287 (suggesting that a holding for the Tribe would be as intrusive to
Idaho’s interests in its land and waters as “almost any conceivable retroactive levy
upon funds in the Treasury”).
529. See id. at 297-98 (finding that the opinions of Justices Kennedy and O’Connor
“redefine and reduce the substance of federal subject-matter jurisdiction”).
530. See id. at 265.
531. Id. at 284.
532. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 288 (1997).
533. See id. at 298.
534. See id. at 310-11 (“Young, accordingly, made it clear from the start that in a
federal-question suit against a state official, action in violation of valid federal law was
necessarily beyond the scope of any official authority, thus rendering the official an
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Souter’s point could have been even stronger if he had grounded it
in Indian law concepts. Justice O’Connor attempted to distinguish
the Tribe’s claims from two cases in which the Court allowed suits to
proceed against state officials alleged to be interfering with the
535
In those cases, O’Connor
plaintiffs’ possession of real property.
argued, the state officials could be divested of possession without
536
interfering with the state’s right to regulate.
Here, however, “the
Tribe seeks a declaration not only that the State does not own the
bed of Lake Coeur d’Alene, but also that the lands are not within the
537
State’s sovereign jurisdiction.”
The most forceful rejoinder to O’Connor’s concern would include
the observation that when a claim of ownership based on treaty
promises is made by a tribe, it inherently includes a claim of regulatory
authority, and therefore an implicit divestiture of the state’s ability to
regulate. Tribes are sovereign governments, with their own rights to
538
regulate their members and their lands.
In other words,
O’Connor’s objection is one based on the class of the people making
the claim state officials are violating their possessory rights. If her
analysis is accepted, then Indian tribes are categorically excluded
from filing claims in federal court alleging state officials are violating
their rights to possess treaty lands. The result of O’Connor’s
reasoning is that this class of cases—two sovereigns making
arguments based upon federal law—is forever relegated exclusively to
539
the court system of one of the litigants: the State. Souter does not
make the point this forcefully, perhaps because, as in Seminole, he is
mainly concerned about the broader federalism question of
continually narrowing the bases upon which one can sue states and

individual for Eleventh Amendment purposes and thus obviating an encroachment
on the State’s immunity.”).
535. See id. at 289 (discussing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) and Tindal
v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897)).
536. See Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 290 (finding that “[w]hatever distinction can be
drawn between possession and ownership of real property in other contexts, it is not
possible to make such a disctinction for submerged lands”).
537. Id. at 291.
538. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832) (noting Georgia’s
“acquiescence in the universal conviction” that Indian nations had full right to their
lands until they ended it by mutual consent with the United States); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959) (recognizing that “the internal affairs of the Indians
remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed”).
539. But see Idaho v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2135 (2001) (finding that Congress
intended lands submerged by Lake Coeur d’Alene and St. Joe River to belong to the
federal government in trust for the Coeur d’Alene Indian Tribe). In Idaho, the
Court reached the merits that were avoided in Coeur d’Alene and found in favor of the
Tribe. Justice O’Connor switched sides, turning the Coeur d’Alene minority into the
majority. Apparently, the tribe as a sovereign cannot argue on its own behalf in
federal court, but can do so through its trustee, the federal government.
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540

Souter and the other dissenters
state officials in federal court.
could serve their goals better by adhering more closely to an Indian
law analysis. In Seminole and Coeur d’Alene, focusing on the arguments
that are most forceful in protecting tribal interests might have yielded
bases upon which to limit the scope of the majority’s rulings.
The Eleventh Amendment cases are somewhat unusual in the
Indian law context. Because of the federalism issues directly at stake,
the Court divides along its somewhat predictable liberal/conservative
541
lines.
Moreover, in this context the liberal minimalists are more
inclined towards deep justifications. In the more typical Indian cases,
the political fault lines are much less predictable. Four of the five
542
543
remaining Indian cases revert back to the unpredictable.
In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies,
544
the Court determined that the Tribe’s sovereign
Incorporated,
immunity from suit extended to its off-reservation commercial
545
activities.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion is a reluctant one,
practically begging Congress to modify tribal sovereign immunity by
legislation while at the same time acknowledging that the Court is
546
constrained by precedent not to do so.
The Court disparages the
doctrine supporting tribal immunity while resentfully upholding it.
Still, its outcome is indisputably better than the alternative for tribes,
because it preserves for Congress, and tribes themselves, the question
of whether and when to waive tribal immunity. In this way, the

540. See generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
541. See id. at 76, 100 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by
Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J.); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 288
(1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas).
542. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998); see also
Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696, 719 (1998); Amoco Prod. Co. v. S.
Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 880 (1997); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679,
697 (1993).
543. It is easier to predict which Justices will not support tribal litigants than it is to
predict which ones will. Justices Thomas and Scalia are the most consistent in
deciding against tribal interests. Justice Rehnquist is next, followed by Justice
Kennedy in rulings adverse to tribal interests. See Case Chart at Appendix.
544. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
545. See id. at 753.
546. See id. at 758. The Court first notes that the doctrine of tribal immunity
developed “almost by accident.” Id. at 756. Then the Court criticizes the rationale
for perpetuating immunity to the various off-reservation business enterprises of a
tribe. Id. at 757. To be certain that it is not misunderstood, the Court states, “there
are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine.” Id. at 758. The
Court then practically invites Congress to step into a forum where the Court feels
institutionally constrained. See id. (“These considerations might suggest a need to
abrogate tribal immunity, at least as an overarching rule . . . We decline to draw this
distinction in this case, as we defer to the role Congress may wish to exercise in this
important judgment.”).
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opinion comports with the substance as well as the form of
minimalism; the Court follows precedent, and leaves the conversation
547
for Congress to finish.
In a case involving tribal regulation of non-Indians, South Dakota v.
548
Bourland, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe attempted to impose its
hunting and fishing regulations on non-Indians in a portion of the
reservation that had been removed from tribal trust status for the
549
construction of a federal dam and reservoir. The Court found that
the Tribe lost the authority to regulate the land when Congress
550
551
passed the Flood Control Act and the Cheyenne River Act,
552
opening up tribal lands to use by the general public. Even though
the lands at issue were federal lands, as opposed to lands held in fee
by private citizens, the Court found that the tribe had been divested
553
of the authority to regulate non-Indian activity.
Justice Blackmun,
joined by Souter, dissented, urging that Indian law principles
preclude finding that the federal government intended to diminish
tribal authority when, as far as the record showed, all the government
554
intended was to construct a reclamation project.
Three other cases warrant brief mention because of the pro-tribal
555
positions taken by some of the minimalists.
In Montana v. Crow
556
Tribe of Indians, the Court decided the Crow Tribe could not
recover taxes improperly assessed by the state against a mineral lessee
557
Justices Souter and O’Connor concurred with the
of the tribe.

547. But see C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma, 121 S. Ct. 1589 (2001) (holding that arbitration provisions in contract
between Tribe and construction company constituted clear waiver of Tribe’s
sovereign immunity). C & L Enterprises did not depart from the analysis in Kiowa.
But the Court’s unanimity in C & L Enterprises might reflect the Court’s eagerness to
find ways around tribal sovereign immunity without waiting for Congress to act.
548. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
549. Id. at 681-82.
550. Act of Dec. 22, 1944, 58 Stat. 887 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701-1) (1994 &
Supp. V 1999).
551. Act of Sept. 3, 1954, 68 Stat. 1256 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701b-8) (1994).
552. See Bourland, 508 U.S. at 688-90.
553. See id. at 692 (“[R]egardless of whether land is conveyed pursuant to an Act
of Congress for homesteading or for flood control purposes, when Congress has
broadly opened up such land to non-Indians, the effect of the transfer is the
destruction of pre-existing Indian rights to regulatory control.”) (footnote omitted).
554. See Bourland, 508 U.S. at 698 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Justice
Souter) (finding the Tribe’s authority to regulate hunting and fishing is consistent
with Congress’ intended use and therefore continues until Congress clearly
abrogates it).
555. The following cases, as listed in the main text, call only for brief treatment,
however, because they arguably are not “federal Indian law” cases, but rather cases
involving tribes that address non-Indian law issues.
556. 523 U.S. 696 (1998).
557. Id. at 700 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Justice O’Connor).
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Court’s decision to reverse and remand the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, but would have left it to the lower court to weigh an
558
In Amoco Production
amended claim and “reweigh the equities.”
559
Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, the Court found that the
Southern Ute Tribe does not own coal bed methane, a gas produced
560
as a by-product of coal, despite tribal ownership of the coal beds.
561
Justice Ginsburg was the sole dissenter in this case. And in Arizona
562
v. California, the Court, with Ginsburg writing the majority opinion,
finds that the Quechan Tribe may pursue claims for increased water
563
rights in a long-standing river adjudication.
The states had raised
the defense of res judicata, which the Court determined had been
564
waived by a failure to raise it in a timely manner.
Rehnquist,
565
O’Connor and Thomas concurred in part and dissent in part.
These three cases reveal the inconsistent positioning of the
minimalists with regard to Indian issues. These decisions lend
support to the notion, however, that several Justices may be potential
566
redeemers of Indian law.

558. Id. at 719-20.
559. 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
560. Id. at 868.
561. See id. at 880 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
562. 530 U.S. 392 (2000).
563. See id. at 397.
564. Id. at 408-09.
565. Id. at 422 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Justices O’Connor and Thomas).
566. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), is another case in which some
minimalists line up against Indian law principles. At least one Justice, however
(Justice Ginsburg), writes in support of these principles. Id. at 528. Rice, like the
other cases, was not, strictly speaking, a federal Indian law case. The issue was
whether a state statute restricting voting to “Hawaiians” or “Native Hawaiians” in
elections for trustees of a trust for the benefit of those classes violated the Fifteenth
Amendment. Id. at 499. The State urged an analogy to Indian law principles that
would have exempted the restriction from strict scrutiny. Id. at 511. The Court
found that the statute violated the Fifteenth Amendment, though only Justices
Souter and Breyer, in concurrence, reached and rejected the Indian law argument.
Id. at 524-27.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, found that the Indian law analogy was
apt and that it resolved the matter in favor of the voting restriction. Id. at 528. The
concurrence found that the categories “Hawaiian” and “Native Hawaiian” defined a
class of people to whom the state owed a debt of protection and trust. Id. at 529-35.
In addition, Ginsburg wrote separately to emphasize that the United States itself
continues to recognize Native Hawaiians as those with whom it has a trust
relationship. Id. at 547-48. She determined that it was Congress’ prerogative “to
enter into special trust relationships with indigenous peoples.” Id. at 548 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). Ginsburg’s dissent in Rice is particularly encouraging because it
displays an inarticulable comprehension of the historical circumstances of
indigenous peoples. The unique trust relationship that American Indians share with
the federal government can only be understood through the lens of history. That
Ginsburg not only understands this relationship, but would extend it to similarly
situated indigenous groups, like Native Hawaiians, indicates some sensitivity to the
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The last case discussed in this section provides the best evidence
for a potential minimalist redemption of Indian law. In Minnesota v.
567
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, the Court held that the Tribe
retained its hunting, fishing and gathering rights guaranteed to them
568
The decision required a review of various
by an 1837 treaty.
executive and legislative acts to determine if any had revoked the
569
570
usufructuary rights of the Tribe.
The majority, consisting of
O’Connor, Souter, Breyer, Stevens and Ginsburg, concluded that
Congress never clearly expressed its intent to abrogate the Tribe’s
usufructuary rights, and therefore, the Tribe retained those rights
571
upon Minnesota’s admission to statehood in 1858.
O’Connor’s opinion analyzed the 1837 Treaty and concluded that
neither it nor any other source provided authority for an 1850
Executive Order purporting to remove the Tribe from previously
572
ceded lands and to terminate the Tribe’s usufructuary rights.
Without any legal authority, the President could not validly order the
removal of an Indian tribe. O’Connor then concluded that the
Executive Order was not severable because the President clearly
573
intended it to stand or to fall as a whole. Therefore, the portion of
the Executive Order terminating the usufructuary rights was also
574
invalid.
O’Connor next tackled the State’s argument that the 1855 Treaty
with the Tribe, which ceded all remaining lands, leaving the Tribe to
occupy reservations within their former territories, terminated the
575
Tribe’s hunting, fishing and gathering rights.
The Treaty itself is
silent as to the usufructuary rights, but O’Connor refused to infer
from this silence that the Tribe consented to the termination of
576
rights that it fought hard to retain only eighteen years earlier.

contextual, historical, and structural nature of Indian law claims.
567. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
568. Id. at 176; see also 1837 Treaty with Chippewa, July 29, 1837, art. 5, 7 Stat. 536,
537 (stating that “[t]he privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice,
upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded, is
guaranteed to the Indians”).
569. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “usufruct” as a “right
to use another’s property for a time without damaging or diminishing it, although
the property might naturally deteriorate over time”).
570. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 176 (“We must decide whether the Chippewa
Indians retain these usufructuary rights today.”).
571. See id.
572. See id. at 190.
573. Id. at 191.
574. Id. at 193.
575. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 195-202
(1999) (concluding that the Mille Lacs Band did not relinquish their rights).
576. See id. at 198.
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Relying on the canons of construction for Indian treaties, O’Connor
577
She also cited
views the Treaty in the same manner as the Tribe.
the corollary canon that where there are ambiguities, “treaties are to
578
be interpreted liberally in favor of the Indians.”
She concluded
that the 1855 Treaty did not abrogate the Tribe’s usufructuary
579
rights.
Third, O’Connor rejected the State’s argument that the Equal
Footing doctrine terminated the Tribe’s usufructuary rights when
580
Minnesota became a state in 1858.
O’Connor again relied on
Indian law canons of construction to conclude that Minnesota’s
admission to the Union did not abrogate the Tribe’s rights:
“Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly
581
express its intent to do so.”
The majority opinion in the Mille Lacs case appears to be a return
582
to some of the foundational doctrines governing Indian law cases.
The opinion is careful not to infer congressional intent where none is
clear, and it reserves for Congress, and perhaps the Executive, the
583
role of abrogating the Tribe’s usufructuary rights.
In this narrow,
minimalist opinion, the Court appears to follow a predetermined,
and therefore, constrained path. Perhaps this case is best explained
by the fact that it does not involve the imposition of tribal control
584
Nonetheless, it provides the basis for
over non-Indians.
maintaining that the Court has not entirely abandoned Indian law
norms.

577. See id. (reflecting on the absence of language in the 1837 Treaty referring to
usufructuary rights, O’Connor states, “[t]his silence suggests that the Chippewa did
not understand the proposed Treaty to abrogate their usufructuary rights as
guaranteed by other treaties”).
578. Id. at 200.
579. Id.
580. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 202-05 (finding that “statehood by itself is
insufficient to extinguish Indian treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on land within
state boundaries”).
581. Id. at 202.
582. See supra Part II.A (discussing the foundational approach).
583. See generally Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 188-208. Ordinarily, only Congress can
revoke treaty terms, but the 1837 Treaty appeared to reserve for the President the
power to revoke the Tribe’s usufructuary rights. See id. at 177 (reciting 1837 Treaty
terms). O’Connor finds that the 1850 Executive Order failed to revoke those rights
not because it could not do so as authorized by the Treaty, but primarily because the
Order was invalid, and secondarily, because the Order was not severable. See id. at
197.
584. See Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 1155-64 (investigating the
expectation for judicial deference in cases involving the regulation of members
versus non-members); see also Gould, supra note 200, at 885-86 (suggesting
“sovereignty is recognized for tribal members who reside on tribal lands”); Getches,
supra note 118, at 1631 (discussing other cases involving Indian law as applied to
non-Indians).
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IV. REDEEMING MINIMALISM BY REVIVING INDIAN LAW
When Chief Justice John Marshall assessed the “actual state of
585
things” in Worcester v. Georgia, he determined that it was too late,
and too far beyond the institutional capacities of the Court, to reverse
586
colonialism.
Yet, Marshall also concluded that the Court should
587
Marshall
not be the agent to further the colonial enterprise.
reasoned that, by entering into treaties with tribes that recognized
their pre-existing status as sovereigns, Congress had left tribes free to
588
continue exercising their rights to self-governance.
The Court,
according to Marshall, not only should go no further, it should put
the burden on the other branches of government to be clear about
589
the extent of their unilateral acts of colonization.
This position is entirely consistent with minimalism. Minimalism’s
substance—the promotion of democratic deliberation—is served by
Indian law opinions that do not usurp the ongoing discussion
(between Members of Congress and tribes, between tribes and tribal
members, between Indians and non-Indians) regarding the status of
Indian tribes in our republic. Indeed, it is even more imperative
today, from a minimalist perspective, for the Court not to legislate
the contours of tribal sovereignty from the bench. Unlike in
Marshall’s time, during which the executive branch was actively
590
attempting to undermine tribal self-governance,
today federal
policies (both legislative and executive) recognize and support tribal
591
sovereignty.
So the Court, when it engages in what Indian law

585. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546 (1832).
586. See id. at 543.
587. See id. at 552-54.
588. See id. at 551-52 (explaining that the stipulation construing Indians to be
under the protection of the United States and no other powers is one “found in
Indian treaties generally,” but does not involve a “surrender of their national
character” nor a claim to Indian lands, nor “dominion over their persons”).
589. See id. at 561-62 (recognizing the Federal Government’s obligation to enforce
the terms of these treaties).
590. See generally JAHODA, supra note 131 (detailing the events leading to Indian
removal where the U.S. forcibly removed tribes originally located east of the
Mississippi westward); WALLACE, supra note 131 (describing generally Andrew
Jackson’s role in U.S. government policies removing Indians to western territories).
591. See supra notes 203-10 and accompanying text (listing federal policies and
programs designed to provide funding and assistance to the goal of tribal selfgovernance); see also Exec. Order No. 13,084, 25 C.F.R. 1000.4 (MAY 14, 1998),
reprinted as amended in 25 U.S.C. § 458 (2000) (reciting the policies of the United
States with regard to the sovereignty of Indian tribes); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65
Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); Government-to-Government Relations with Native
American Tribal Governments: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994) (outlining the
principles to be followed by government agencies when interacting with American
Indian tribal governments).
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scholar Philip Frickey has called the “new common law of
592
colonization,” is doing more than stifling the conversation about
tribal sovereignty; it is promulgating a monologue that runs counter
to the policies of other branches of government.
A truly minimalist Court, therefore, must do more than simply look
to recent precedent and attempt to apply it narrowly. While this
approach has the appearance of minimalism, it, in fact, undermines
minimalism’s substance. Without a commitment to promoting
democracy both for tribes and within them, procedural minimalism
results in opinions that unilaterally divest tribes of aspects of
sovereignty. Opinions like Strate, Yankton, and the income tax
portion of Chickasaw bear such a result. After the substantive
commitment is in place, however, narrowness (not laying down broad
rules, deciding on the facts before the court, leaving things open)
can be particularly appropriate in Indian law. Tribal sovereignty has
endured, but Indian law and policies have been in flux since the
593
founding of this country.
Presently, Congress and the Executive
594
Branch encourage tribal self-governance. But, a complex legacy of
congressional policy and decisional law has left many questions that
can only be resolved on a case by case basis. For example, in the
tribal jurisdiction and diminishment contexts, each case that arises
requires the Court to consider the unique treaties and statutes that
595
apply to the particular tribe. Moreover, the case law itself creates a
596
“scattering” effect. Rather than issue broad rules that divest tribes
of aspects of sovereignty, the Court should act in a truly minimalist
fashion, looking at each case, crafting decisions based on the
particular facts, and deferring whenever uncertain to other branches
of government. Thus, while Sunstein only addressed the appropriate

592. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 81.
593. See supra notes 585-91 and accompanying text (delineating the government’s
inconsistent approaches to tribal sovereignty).
594. See supra notes 203-10 and accompanying text (listing policies designed to
assist tribes in sustaining self-governance).
595. See supra notes 246-87 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdiction and
diminishment cases); see also WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 3-4:
Federal Indian law presents uniquely formidable obstacles to the
development of consistent and unitary legal doctrine. There are a number
of scattering forces that push Indian law away from any center. Taken
together, these splintering influences have the potential of creating a body
of law almost without precedent, of reducing each dispute to the particular
complex of circumstances at issue—the tribe, its treaty or enabling statute,
the races of the parties, the tract-book location of the land where the case
arose, the narrow tribal or state power involved, and other factors.
596. See supra Part II.B (discussing the “scattering” effect); see also Frickey,
Adjudication and its Discontents, supra note 107, at 1754 (“More than any other field of
public law, federal Indian law is characterized by doctrinal incoherence . . . .”).

KRAKOFFJCI.DOC

1256

10/11/2001 1:59 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1177
597

preconditions for minimalism in the individual rights context, with
some adaptation, these conditions exist in Indian law: (1) tribes
themselves, and the dominant society’s ideas about tribes, are in flux;
(2) solutions in one case seem likely to be confounded by future
cases, which will involve different tribes, different treaties, and
different statutes; (3) for these same reasons, the need for advance
planning is not necessary; and finally, (4) democracy, both within
tribal governments and in the larger society, is not necessarily served
by broad rules.
Using Strate as an example, we can, in the counter-factual world of
this law review article, draft a procedurally minimalist opinion that,
unlike the real thing, also serves minimalism’s substance. I choose
Strate for this admittedly academic exercise because it is a classically
minimalist case and because it set up the rulings in Atkinson Trading
Post and Hicks. Had Strate been decided differently, the minimalist
justices might have followed a different course for tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. Some might contend that Montana set the Court’s
598
599
agenda in motion, but National Farmers and Iowa Mutual were
decided after Montana, indicating perhaps a trend towards
recognizing tribal authority over non-Indians, at least in tribal courts.
As demonstrated below, the Strate Court was not overly constrained by
Montana. Strate could have provided an opportunity for minimalist
restoration of Indian law, as well as the very underlying principles of
minimalism itself.
Strate presented the question of whether tribal courts have
jurisdiction over an action involving non-tribal members on a road
running through the reservation.
As discussed above, Justice
Ginsburg locates Montana as the “pathmarking” case concerning
600
tribal jurisdiction over non-members, and then decides: (1) that
601
the state road is aligned with non-Indian fee land, and (2) that the
presumption therefore is that the tribe does not have jurisdiction
602
over non-Indians unless one of the two Montana exceptions apply.

597. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
598. 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (requiring non-Indian litigants objecting to tribal court
jurisdiction to exhaust their tribal court remedies prior to seeking federal court
review). See also supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text, discussing National
Farmers and Iowa Mutual.
599. 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) (finding that federal statute defining diversity
jurisdiction does not allow non-Indian litigant to avoid exhaustion of tribal court
remedies).
600. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997) (discussing the evolution
of jurisprudence pertaining to tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of non-members).
601. Id. at 456.
602. Id. at 456-60.
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No Justices dissent
Ginsburg finds that neither exception applies.
from Strate.
A minimalist opinion in Strate could express that the Court is
bound by precedent not to diminish tribal sovereignty where
Congress has not done so. Thus, following the foundational
approach, the question is whether Congress has indicated that tribal
courts do not have jurisdiction over matters involving non-members
that arise on state roads within tribal territory. First, a minimalist, but
foundationalist, Supreme Court would need to determine whether
Montana applies. It is safe to assume that making a distinction
between regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction would require a
deep theoretical commitment either to the importance of courts to
self-governance (which is somehow distinguishable from the
importance of territorial regulation to self-governance), or to tribal
sovereignty itself. It is therefore unlikely that the minimalists would
distinguish Montana on the basis that adjudicatory authority is
distinguishable from regulatory authority.
Instead, the Court could look at the right-of-way at issue in Strate. If
the state highway falls within the definition of “Indian Country,” then
604
Montana might not necessarily apply. The Indian Country statute,
which defines Indian country for the purposes of determining
criminal jurisdiction, had, prior to Strate and Montana, also been used
in civil cases. The statute includes “rights of way running through
605
[the reservation].”
The Court could use this statute to create a
presumption that the right-of-way should be aligned with Indian trust
land for the purpose of determining jurisdiction.
Then, to narrow the ruling even more, the Court could decline to
decide whether all such rights-of-way should be so aligned in civil
cases. Looking to the particular right-of-way in Strate, the Court could
rely on the following facts, which were in the record but did not make
their way into the unanimous opinion. The state road on which the
accident occurred is a dead-end route that terminates at a reservoir.
The reservoir is a park, which is used largely by tribal members. It is
606
not a destination for non-tribal members, generally speaking. Thus
the road, while maintained by the state, is not one on which anyone
other than tribal members, or those with other reasons to be on the

603. See id. at 459.
604. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
605. Id.
606. Official Transcript of Proceedings Before The Supreme Court of the United
States at 10-11, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872)
(describing to the Justices the remote location of this road and its limited use, i.e.,
only by tribal members).
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reservation, would drive. It is not comparable, for example, to
Interstate 40, which is a highway running through the southern
portion of the Navajo Nation.
The narrow ruling, on the facts of Strate, could be that the right-ofway in these circumstances should be aligned with tribal trust land for
the purpose of determining jurisdiction.
Then, foundation principles would control. There is no statute
limiting tribal court jurisdiction over causes of action arising on tribal
lands. While states may have a concurrent interest in disputes
between non-tribal members, that interest is not sufficient to divest
tribal courts themselves of jurisdiction, especially in a situation in
which one of the non-member litigants chose to avail herself of the
607
tribal forum.
Thus, while the foundational approach has to cope
with the troublesome line of cases, dating from the turn of the
century, granting state jurisdiction over non-Indian matters on
608
reservations, those cases do not create precedent for divesting tribal
courts of jurisdiction in a case such as the personal injury action at
issue in Strate. According to the foundationalists, only Congress
could accomplish such a diminishment of tribal sovereignty. The
narrow holding could mean that the right-of-way at issue in Strate is
aligned with tribal trust lands (not determining whether all rights-ofway would be so aligned), and that absent congressional divestment
of tribal jurisdiction on tribal trust lands, the Court is constrained to
find that such jurisdiction exists in this case.
Under the pragmatist approach, the Court would have two options
609
to rule narrowly and shallowly in favor of tribal court jurisdiction.
First, as under the foundational approach, the Court could rule that
the right-of-way is aligned with tribal trust land for the purpose of
determining jurisdiction. The pragmatic Justice would take context
into account, and look to the same facts listed above about the nature
of the right of way. Moreover, the pragmatic Justice might go
further, looking at rights-of-way granted across Indian reservations
generally. The Justice would find that many roads running within
and across reservations are there by virtue of rights-of-way granted by

607. An interesting aspect to the Strate opinion is the complete absence of any
consideration of the plaintiff’s forum choice. One might expect that Justice
Ginsburg, a former civil procedure professor, would at least mention a rationale for
excluding the plaintiff’s (Mrs. Frederick) preference from any part of the Strate
calculus. See generally Strate, 520 U.S. at 438.
608. See Getches, supra note 118, at 1586.
609. See generally Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 119 (describing the
pragmatic approach in Indian law cases).
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610

While some of these
the federal government and/or the tribe.
roads are highways running through reservations, many are more like
local routes, used largely by tribal members or others intentionally
visiting or doing business on the reservation. In other words, part of
the reservation context is the reality that roads may be constructed
and maintained by state governments. This function is a result of
sparse tribal funding for such projects, and does not necessarily
indicate a change in the character of the land. While not all such
rights-of-way should be aligned with tribal trust land, the context
indicates that many should. Such alignment conforms with tribal
member as well as non-tribal member expectations with respect to
these roads.
The pragmatic Justice would then look to any relevant sources of
611
statutory meaning.
As discussed above, the definition of “Indian
country” for the purposes of determining federal criminal
jurisdiction has been held to apply in the civil context, and that
612
definition includes rights-of-way running through reservations.
While there is a definition within the same chapter that excludes
rights-of-way, it applies only to the sections governing the
613
This section has not
dispensation and possession of intoxicants.
been held to apply more generally.
There is no legislation
concerning the definition of Indian country for civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction.
Given the absence of clear legislative direction, the question for the
minimalist pragmatist Justice is whether, in light of all relevant
sources of meaning, a tribal court should have jurisdiction over the
614
personal injury action in Strate.
Here, the non-Indian plaintiff’s
forum choice could be taken into account explicitly. In addition, the
pragmatic minimalist Justice might look to this particular plaintiff’s

610. See 25 U.S.C. § 323 (1994) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to grant
rights-of-way for all purposes over and across any lands held in trust for or owned by
individual Indians or Indian tribes); see also 25 U.S.C. § 324 (1994) (“No grant of
right-of-way over and across any lands belonging to a tribe . . . shall be made without
the consent of the proper tribal officials.”); 25 U.S.C. § 311 (1994) (authorizing the
Secretary of the Interior to grant permission to State or local authorities for the
opening and establishment of public highways through any Indian reservations).
611. See Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 1208 (referring, under such
an approach, to statutory text, legislative intent, evolution of the statute over time,
and coherence of the statute with broader public law).
612. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
613. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154(c), 1156 (1994) (excluding lands or rights-of-way from
the definition of Indian country, in the absence of a treaty or statute extending
Indian liquor laws).
614. See Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 1208 (describing the
“practical reason” approach in which the interpreter undertakes her task with
preconceptions that have arisen from her own situation and experiences).
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interest in litigating in tribal court. Gisela Fredericks, the plaintiff in
the underlying case in Strate, though not a member of any of the
affiliated tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, was a resident of the
Fort Berthold reservation, was married to a tribal member, and all of
615
In addition, the only home on
her children are tribal members.
U.S. soil that Gisela Fredericks knew was on Fort Berthold. She met
her husband while he was on a tour of duty in Germany during World
616
War II, and followed him home after the war to the reservation.
Mrs. Fredericks’s ties to the Fort Berthold reservation are thus
stronger than any she has to the state in which Fort Berthold sits—
North Dakota. These facts bolster the importance of permitting her
to choose where to litigate her claims. They also bolster the tribe’s
interest in hearing her claims.
The pragmatic minimalist judge would also take into account the
617
interests of the defendant. This defendant, A-1 Contractors, was on
the reservation by virtue of a construction contract that it had
618
Thus, A-1 was no stranger to the
entered into with the Tribe.
reservation. The only reason A-1 was on the state highway when the
accident occurred was because of its consensual relationship with the
619
tribe.
Using the sorts of considerations that one might take into
account in other contexts, for example whether a defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with a jurisdiction such that it comports
620
with due process to subject him to suit there, the pragmatic
minimalist Justice could conclude that fairness considerations are not
sufficient to over-ride the other factors militating against unilaterally
621
divesting the tribal court of jurisdiction.

615. Brief for Petitioners at 3-4, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)
(No. 95-1872).
616. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No.
95-1872).
617. See Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 1185.
618. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 443 (1997).
619. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No.
95-1872). Note that this is not the same as arguing that the basis for A-1’s being
subject to jurisdiction in tribal court is the “consensual relationship” exception
under Montana’s main rule. Rather, here, A-1’s consensual relationship with the
Tribe provides context for deciding whether it is fair to subject A-1 to tribal court
jurisdiction on an (arguably) unrelated matter.
620. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (finding
no personal jurisdiction if a party’s relation to the forum state does not stem from a
constitutionally cognizable contact with that state); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
249 (1958) (articulating a test requiring defendant to have “purposefully availed”
himself of the forum state’s protections and law in order to be subject to suit there);
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (noting that due process
requires a defendant to have minimum contacts with the forum state so as not to
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”).
621. Cf. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21, at 78-82
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In the alternative, the pragmatic minimalist Justice might conclude
that the state’s interest in enforcing its laws on the highway is
sufficient to override the tribal character of the road. Thus, it is
conceivable that the Justice would align the road, as Ginsburg did,
622
with non-Indian fee land. The Montana test would therefore apply.
The Court would then turn to whether either of Montana’s
exceptions could be invoked to uphold tribal court jurisdiction. The
first exception covers “activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
623
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”
A
minimalist would be unlikely to read this exception broadly enough
to find that the automobile accident fits within this exception.
Although A-1 was on the road only by virtue of its contract with the
Tribe, the accident did not arise out the contract itself.
Even a minimalist, however, could find that the highway accident
in Strate fits within the second exception, which allows tribal
jurisdiction over conduct that “threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
624
of the tribe.” Taking into account the facts about Mrs. Fredericks’
ties to the reservation and A-1’s reason for being within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation, a minimalist could conclude that the
ability to determine fault in a highway accident of this sort implicates
“the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
625
by them.”
As discussed above, Mrs. Fredericks, the plaintiff in the tribal court
action, has as many ties to the reservation as one could have without

(discussing the Court’s tendency to incorporate reasoning from other bodies of law
into Indian law). Frickey notes that the Court’s tendency in this regard generally
harms the independent development of Indian law, because concepts that should
not apply from other areas are inappropriately mapped onto Indian law. Id. at 81.
Extrapolation of this kind is perhaps inevitable in law, where there are only so many
refrains from which to choose. The important question is how to nudge the analogy
more towards one doctrinal area than another. In other words, why hasn’t the Court
adopted a due process analogy for its common law decision-making concerning
questions of tribal court jurisdiction?
622. It is unlikely that a minimalist relying on the foundational approach would
find that the state road was the equivalent of non-Indian fee land, however. A
foundationalist approach does not take present-day context into account (at least not
explicitly) in the way that the practical reasoning approach does. See Frickey,
Practical Reasoning, supra note 119, at 1216. Because fairness to non-tribal members is
one of the interests a pragmatic minimalist might consider, and because there is no
clear legislative direction with respect to the nature of rights-of-way running through
reservations in the civil context, it is conceivable that a pragmatic minimalist would
find the road aligned with non-Indian fee land.
623. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
624. Id. at 566.
625. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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actually being an enrolled tribal member. Certainly a tribe has an
interest in providing security and protection to people who are the
equivalent of “permanent resident aliens” on reservations. The tribe
also has an interest in promulgating standards of care for those whom
it invites onto the reservation when it enters into contractual relations
with them. A-1 falls into this category. And finally, the tribe has a
stake in determining general standards of care for how people drive
on a road that is largely trafficked by tribal members. These facts
together combine to make jurisdiction over the accident in Strate a
matter that “threatens or has some direct effect on . . . the health or
626
welfare of the tribe.”
Thus, a minimalist pragmatic Justice could conclude that the facts
of this particular case combine to create an interest that fits within
Montana’s second exception. The ruling would be neither deep nor
broad. It need not rely on a generally accepted theory of tribal
sovereignty, nor need it decide whether other cases with different
facts would fit within Montana’s exceptions. But by both taking the
tribal interests seriously, and turning to Indian law scholars
concerning how to interpret cases in a defensible way, the minimalist
pragmatist Justice could rule in favor of the Tribe.
Ruling in favor of tribal court jurisdiction, according to any one of
the above routes, better serves the substance of minimalism. After
Strate, Hicks, and Atkinson Trading Post, tribes are (barring action by
Congress) forever divested of certain categories of civil jurisdiction
over non-members. While Strate has certain indicia of narrowness,
627
including the fact-bound way in which the Court states the holding,
628
its implications were actually quite broad. Strate opened the door to
Hicks and Atkinson by taking the tack that Montana was the
“pathmarking” case involving all questions of jurisdiction over non
626. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
627. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (holding that tribal
courts may not adjudicate claims against non-members arising out of accidents on
state highways absent a statute or treaty authorizing such jurisdiction).
628. Even before Hicks and Atkinson, lower courts were interpreting Strate broadly.
See, e.g., Big Horn Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 945 (9th Cir. 2000)
(overturning a tribal court’s decision regarding the Crow Tribe’s authority to tax a
non-member business for easements on tribal trust lands); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.
Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that the tribal court did not have
jurisdiction over a personal injury accident between the railroad and tribal members
on an exclusive right of way running through Crow reservation); Montana v.
Bremner, 152 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1998) (denying a tribal court jurisdiction over
action by a tribal member against the state and a non-Indian contractor for injuries
suffered while working on a road construction project within reservation
boundaries); Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997) (prohibiting tribal
court jurisdiction over a personal injury accident between a member and a nonmember on a state highway located within a reservation).
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Indians.
The jurisdictional scheme announced by the Court in Strate, Hicks,
and Atkinson will prove to be unworkable for many tribes. The
difficulties include the following. Tribes seeking to regulate nonmembers within their boundaries pursuant to environmental statutes
629
Tribes that rely on Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
will face uncertainty.
630
Tribe to impose taxes on non-members will likely face objections
and litigation unless the taxes stem directly from activity based on a
contract with the Tribe. Tribes will be unable to provide their
members with convenient forums to litigate disputes against nonIndians. In all likelihood, tribes will seek a congressional solution. Is
this substantive minimalism at work, bouncing difficult questions to
the legislative branch? No, not unless minimalists are disingenuous.
Here, the Court created a legislative issue where none existed before.
It usurped to itself the role of defining the jurisdictional reach of
tribes, and created complexities that now can only be solved through
a congressional solution. The chances of that solution are not
particularly great. Tribes do not have direct representation in
631
Congress, and many of their opponents do. Thus ruling the way it
has, the Court has weighed in heavily, and maybe permanently, on
the side of a majority that can better fend for itself in Congress.
The same is true of the Court’s decisions in Yankton, Venetie, and
Leech Lake. Rather than deciding in a manner that bounced the
difficult questions surrounding tribal self-governance and the
imposition of state laws into tribal territory back to legislative bodies,
the Court ended the conversation. Whether the rulings are narrow,
like Yankton, or wide, like Venetie and Leech Lake, the unstated
normative assumption is the same: Indian tribes should not be

629. See, e.g., Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
921 (1996) (upholding tribal regulation of non-Indians pursuant to EPA
determination that tribe should be “treated as a state,” under the Clean Water Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7410(o)); see also Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 965 (1997) (upholding tribal imposition of water quality
standards on non-Indian upstream water user); Wisconsin v. EPA, 2001 WL 1117281
(7th Cir. Sept. 21, 2001). Both of these decisions are called into question by Hicks
and Shirley. They may survive court scrutiny, but they may not. Meanwhile, tribes
are left with serious questions concerning imposing uniform environmental
standards throughout their reservations.
630. 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (upholding tribal tax on non-Indian companies engaged
in mineral leasing on tribe’s reservation). See supra notes 239-40 for further
discussion of tribal authority to tax.
631. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae for States of Montana, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Idaho, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, South Dakota, Utah,
Washington and Wyoming in Support of Respondents at 2-3 Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872) (discussing the states’ interests in
tribal court jurisdiction and the states’ desires to limit such jurisdiction over nonmembers).
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treated like sovereigns, with historical and structural claims to
determine the contours of their self-governance in a manner that
allows for growth and change. If the normative assumption were the
opposite, then minimalist opinions would be highly appropriate to
meet the substantive goal of democratic deliberation in this context.
In Venetie, for example, the Court could have determined that,
regardless of whether ANCSA terminated Indian Country status for
other tribes, it did not do so in the Native Village of Venetie. The
632
facts lent themselves to such a narrow ruling.
And such a ruling
would have forced those who opposed such status to open discussions
with tribes and members of Congress regarding the practicability of
having multiple jurisdictions in Alaska.
One could undertake this same exercise with respect to many of
the Court’s recent Indian law decisions. Minimalists would not have
had to revamp the case law in some visionary way. Nor would they
have had to over-turn cases, or even ignore them. They would simply
have had to recognize the underlying normative commitment to
tribal sovereignty—a commitment which requires courts to stay their
hands so that tribes can negotiate the terms of their evolving
sovereignty in more democratic, less jurispathic forums.
Why have the minimalists abandoned the normative commitment
to tribes, when doing so appears to be so contrary to their general
jurisprudential tendencies? Several explanations surface from the
preceding discussion of the cases. First, even the arguably pro-tribal
633
minimalists have a wavering commitment to the issue. Second, the
“modern era” cases left a confusing, and at times deceptively shallow,
634
road map.
And finally, a minimalist approach risks masking the
normative stance underlying shallow decisions. Critics of minimalism
may contend that this result is so regardless of the legal issue. But it
is well beyond the scope of this paper to engage in a general critique
of minimalism. Moreover, the risks of minimalism are uniquely acute
in the Indian law context, where there is no underlying agreement
regarding the “substantive core” of the role of tribes in our
635
democracy. The lack of agreement stems, I contend, not from the
absence of a clearly normatively superior path, which would require
636
refraining from judicial divestment of tribal sovereignty, but more

632. See supra notes 403-20 and accompanying text.
633. See supra Part III (discussing relevant cases); see also Case Chart at Appendix.
634. See supra Part II.B (discussing cases).
635. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 63-69 (describing the core commitments to
individual freedom embedded in constitutional law).
636. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (describing normative unity in
Indian law scholarship); see also Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism,
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likely from a failure to consider the issue, in the public at large as well
as the judiciary. How can there be a core commitment concerning
the role of tribes when there is such a staggering degree of ignorance
637
about the fact that tribes, as self-governing sovereigns, exist at all?
Shallowness is a risky approach when the underlying norms are
inchoate. “Deep theorizing” has the advantage of forcing members
of the judiciary to think seriously about how a particular
jurisprudential stance will shape the institutional role courts play, as
well as how that role will affect litigants and other political players.
Incompletely theorized judicial agreements may be low-risk if the
Court’s role has been narrowed by consensus on a range of
638
substantive issues. But where the underlying norm is completely up
639
for grabs, judicial reluctance to state clearly the jurisprudential
underpinnings merely masks moves that, on reflection, are not
minimalist in any sense of the word. Displacing an entire body of law,
such as was accomplished in Leech Lake and Venetie is such a move.
Perhaps it is not too late for minimalism to be redeemed, by
accepting the underlying normative commitment to tribal selfgovernance. If minimalist members of the Court recognize the
inescapable normativity of the enterprise, they may be able to resume
shallow, narrow approaches to Indian law cases. And, unlike the
cases discussed herein, their decisions will serve, rather than
undermine, the underlying substantive goal of fostering democratic
deliberation.
CONCLUSION
Tribal sovereignty provides a protective shell around the evolution
of tribal life. That life is not static, to be sure. The possibility of an
extra-colonial existence was extinguished the moment Europeans
washed up—lost but ambitious—on the shores of North America.
Moreover, Indian tribes, like all other societies, have always acquired

supra note 21, at 7 (“[Accounts of the Court’s recent cases] are rooted . . . in a
normatively unattractive judicial colonial impulse beneath the dignity of the best
qualities of federal Indian law.”)
637. I cannot cite a figure to confirm this wide-spread ignorance. But I can
report, anecdotally, that when I teach Indian tribal jurisdiction during my Civil
Procedure class, tribal sovereignty is an entirely new concept for ninety-five percent
of my students. See also Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, supra note 135, at 3133 (discussing the citizenry’s general lack of knowledge regarding tribal sovereignty
and its relation to the Constitution).
638. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 42-44 (describing analogical reasoning as
dependent upon agreement of certain underlying commonalities).
639. In other words, the competing norms of “tribes are sovereigns, who must be
able to adapt to changing circumstances,” versus “tribes are anachronisms, and the
vestiges of their sovereignty should not expand.”
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and lent cultural and political practices from and to other sovereigns.
But history has demonstrated that the protective shell is not merely a
luxury for tribes. Without it, American Indians, as people with
separate cultures and identities, cease to exist.
Today, the vagaries of that same history dictate that tribal
sovereignty itself can be neither a static nor a shrinking notion. For
tribes to continue as anything other than quaint anachronisms,
courts must find ways to interpret their sovereignty as consistent with
their current status.
That status includes increasing traffic—
economic and otherwise—with non-Indians. That status also includes
grappling with all of the destructive practices of previous federal
policies, without mindlessly repeating them as the Supreme Court has
done recently.
Why haven’t the minimalists deferred to current congressional and
executive policies that, in general, support tribal self-governance?
Why, instead, have they engaged in extensive common law
decisionmaking concerning tribal jurisdiction, deciding cases in a
manner that runs counter to the modern ideal of tribal selfgovernance? This article has made one rather technical attempt to
answer this by suggesting that the minimalists were overly swayed by
the trends of a handful of “modern era” cases, typified by Montana. A
more nuanced explanation lies in the minimalist tendency to mistake
shallowness for the absence of underlying norms. The over-riding,
yet thoroughly under-explained, norm in the cases that restrict tribal
jurisdiction is that tribes cannot be trusted with the legal fates of nonIndians. Ironically, minimalism should protect litigants against
precisely those kinds of inchoate, unexamined judgments. Yet where
jurisprudential theory meets real life in Indian law, the theory gives
way to judicial speculations and prejudices.
There is still time for the Court to call a halt to its unguided foray
into judicial defeasance of tribal powers. Hicks and Atkinson Trading
Co. did not decide that tribes have no civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. Nor did those cases decide that there are no circumstances
under which non-members might be subject to civil jurisdiction other
than by their own consent. The Court could still “freeze” the law
640
where it stands. But in terms of who will now have to seek relief in
Congress, the burden has been shifted decidedly to tribes. A judicial
“freeze” would only make the congressional burden less onerous than

645. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 21 at 81
(suggesting that the simplest way for the Court to stop engaging in judicial
colonization “would be to freeze the law as it now stands, and force Congress to
undertake any further relief for nonmembers in Indian country”).

KRAKOFFJCI.DOC

2001]

10/11/2001 1:59 PM

UNDOING INDIAN LAW

1267

it might be otherwise. It is striking that the minimalists have
succeeded, along with their maximalist colleagues, in instigating a
legislative agenda, the burden of which must now be borne by
relatively powerless constituents.
Nonetheless, the minimalists could attempt to ensure that the
Court leaves things where they stand. In most Indian law cases that
reach the Supreme Court, it will still be possible to reach a narrow,
shallow opinion that declines to erode tribal sovereignty further. For
example, the minimalists could guard vigilantly, and on firm
minimalist ground, against a civil version of Oliphant, the case that
641
found that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
The crucial recognition the minimalists will have to make, however, is
that it is impossible to avoid the underlying values and norms. The
Court, for better or worse, faces issues that determine the contours of
tribal self-governance. To arrive at shallowness, the Court might first
have to think deeply about the vision of tribal sovereignty it wishes to
endorse.
How might the minimalist members of the Court acquire such
depth? Options include: hiring clerks with a background in and
dedication to tribes; reading more than just judicial opinions about
tribes; spending time in Indian country, immersed in the beauty,
harshness, frailty, and contradictions that abound there. The last
suggestion is doubtless the most powerful. Perhaps, then, the
ultimate constructive suggestion of this article is to have the
minimalists undertake the following tour. They should live for a time
under Navajo-land’s big southwestern skies, near the beauty that is an
alchemical mix of landscape and cultures that have endured despite
all odds. They should bend at the knee of a Hopi elder, acquiring a
feeling for why it is worth preserving the sacred knowledge passed
down from one generation to the next. They should travel in dusty
Oklahoma, where Indian people and tribes still dominate the
landscape of yet another territory that was promised to them, and
then carved up and taken away from them. They should take a trip to
the Cherokee country of North Carolina, where traditional dances
and ceremonies live alongside the plethora of plastic Indian road-side
memorabilia that is peddled to curious tourists. The Justices need
somehow to feel that Indian tribes and people do endure and should
continue to do more than just that; that a future without Indian
tribes is an intolerable one for the second arrivals to this nation.

646. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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APPENDIX: SUPREME COURT INDIAN LAW CASES SINCE 1991
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